Commitment to a life : thinking beyond Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's conceptualization of art by L'Heureux, Antoine
  
 
Commitment to A Life: 
Thinking Beyond Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Conceptualization of Art 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Antoine L’Heureux 
 
Submitted for the degree of Ph.D. in Art 
Goldsmiths College, University of London 
2011 
 
 
The work presented in this thesis is the candidate’s own. 
 
………………………………………………………….. 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis takes as its point of departure Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
conceptualization of art. Art for them is the expression of A Life in the living. A Life 
is the ontological and genetic condition of that which we are and ordinarily 
experience, it is the vital and material transcendental plane of immanence which 
characterizes Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology. Their conceptualization of art, 
however, sits uncomfortably with contemporary art in rejecting conceptual and 
photographic practices, and in its radical rejection of human experience. The aim of 
this thesis is to expand their conceptualization of art whilst remaining close to what 
is argued to be its core or essence: a commitment to A Life. This thesis explores 
three paradigms of commitment to A Life that move beyond the paradigm of A Life 
in the living. These paradigms are developed through the application of concepts 
developed by Deleuze and Guattari to contemporary mediums and artworks, with the 
aim of broadening the relevance of their philosophy for contemporary artistic 
practices. Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetics is analyzed and expanded through an 
engagement with works by Francis Bacon, Thomas Struth, Pierre Huyghe, Francis 
Alÿs and Peter Doig. By finding a commonality between these artists in their 
commitment to A Life, this thesis hopes to develop a conceptualization of art which 
allows us to understand how contemporary art practices engage with A Life, the 
infinite inside which we live and which lives inside us. 
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Introduction 
 
This text takes as its point of departure Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
conceptualization of art. To a large extent, this conceptualization is established in 
Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991) and in Deleuze’s 
writings on painter Francis Bacon in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation 
(Deleuze, 2002). The following summarily introduces terms related to DG’s1 
conceptualization of art and the motivation for and purpose of this text.  
DG conceptualize art as the expression of ‘Life in the living or the Living in the 
lived’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 163). A Life is a transcendental field, a pure 
plane of immanence (Deleuze, 2003a, 361)2, it is a ‘material vitalism that doubtless 
exists everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 
512). It is as a material vitalism that the transcendental field or plane of immanence 
is termed A Life, and it is as the ontological and genetic condition of the living or the 
lived that A Life is ordinarily hidden from or covered by the living, i.e. by the 
conditioned. A Life is in the living in that A Life is in reciprocal presupposition with 
the living: A Life and the living presuppose and determine each other, A Life 
conditions the living and “in turn” (in fact simultaneously) the living “feedbacks” 
into A Life changing its very own ontological and genetic condition in a never-
ending process. A Life is ‘non organic Life’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 512) in 
reciprocal presupposition with the living or what can be termed nature. The living, 
nature, consists in what we ordinarily experience A Life as, it is that which we 
ordinarily experience of the transcendental field or plane of immanence inside which 
we live. The living or nature refers not only to “the natural” (trees, rain, stars, etc.) 
but also “the artificial” (technologies, architectures, medias, etc.), it refers to all that 
which we ordinarily experience the world as. 
                                                 
1
 “DG” is used to reference “Deleuze and Guattari”. 
2
 In relation to the terminology of the concept of ‘A Life’, ‘the indefinite article [serves] as an index 
of the transcendental’; this quote is from Deleuze’s last published essay Immanence: A Life… 
(Deleuze, 2003a, 359-363), originally published in Philosophie, number 47, September 1995, pp.3-7. 
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Art ‘liberate[s] life where it is imprisoned’3 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162). The 
expression of A Life in the living is the liberation of A Life imprisoned, ordinarily 
hidden or covered, in the living or nature. The artist for DG is ‘a seer, a becomer’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161), qualifications which have undertones of hardship: 
‘to have seen Life in the living or the Living in the lived, the novelist or the painter 
come back with red eyes, and short breath’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 163). Art 
and philosophy have in common to ‘call for a new earth and people that do not yet 
exist’, and it is not ‘populist authors’, but ‘the most aristocratic’, that call for a new 
‘earth and people that will not be found in our democracies’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 104). By liberating A Life where it is imprisoned, art gives us that which we 
‘lack’: ‘resistance to the present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104), resistance to our 
democracies, to the common realm of perceptions, affections and opinions which 
concern the lived and oppose themselves to A Life4, in other words resistance to the 
living which imprisons the transcendental plane of immanence that A Life is. 
DG’s conceptualization of art is at odds with contemporary art practices. In the 
chapter Percept, Affect and Concept of Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? where DG 
explicitly discuss art, the artists (which also include writers and musical composers) 
encompassed by their conceptualization of art include exclusively celebrated art 
historical figures of past generations: Cézanne, Klee, Miro, Dürer, Bonnard, 
Rembrandt, Melville, Virginia Woolf, Debussy, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 
156-168). Simultaneously, other celebrated art historical figures or types of art 
practice are rejected: for example, in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation, 
Deleuze to a certain degree rejects abstract painting (Mondrian for example) and 
‘abstract expressionism, or art informel’ (for instance Pollock) in favor of an 
alternative way of painting exemplified by Bacon (Deleuze, 2002, 96-102, 110-111). 
The expression of A Life in the living is termed sensation: the artwork is and 
through its aesthetic experience gives a sensation. Deleuze rejects abstract painting 
and abstract expressionism because they fail, he argues, the sensation, they fail the 
                                                 
3
 ‘Life’ in this quote refers to A Life, to Life, as in the previously quoted passage: ‘Life in the living 
or the Living in the lived’. In the essay Immanence: A Life… the indefinite article indexes the 
transcendental (“a life”), and in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, as quoted above, the capital letter 
serves as such index (“Life” or “the Living”). 
4
 To the trilogy perception, affection and opinion opposes itself the trilogy percept, affect and concept, 
i.e. that which art and philosophy create, and through which they attain to and engage with A Life. 
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expression of A Life in the living. And when DG discuss types of art practice of 
more recent generations, in particular conceptual art and the use of photography5, 
they assign to them this same status of failing the sensation, and as such failing art as 
it is defined by them (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 187). Whereas art creates 
sensation, philosophy creates concepts. Conceptual art fails both the sensation and 
the concept: ‘it is not sure that we as such attain to […] the sensation nor the 
concept, because the plane of composition tends to be “informative”’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1991, 187). The same can be said for photography (and of many 
contemporary art practices): it is informative and as such fails the sensation, it aligns 
itself with perceptions, it is “of the living”, “of the sensed”, and as such fails A Life, 
i.e. the sensing, the genetic condition of the living, the lived or the sensed. Abstract 
painting, abstract expressionism, conceptual art and photography fail the expression 
of A Life in the living, and as such cannot be encompassed by DG’s 
conceptualization of art. Their conceptualization of art sits uncomfortably with 
contemporary art practices, conceptual art and photography arguably being two of 
the most important aspects of contemporary art. Many contemporary art practices 
engage with perceptions or figurations, affections, opinions, information, journalism, 
appropriation, etc.; they represent, comment on, discuss, the living or the lived, and 
as such cannot either be encompassed by DG’s conceptualization of art. And yet, DG 
are frequently referenced in discourses that surround such practices. It seems 
however that whilst using many of the concepts DG have created many of these 
discourses do not explicitly engage with what DG actually write about art, with their 
conceptualization of art. The purpose of this text is to expand DG’s 
conceptualization of art whilst remaining close to what is argued to be its core or 
essence: what I term a commitment to A Life. This has for purpose to allow for the 
understanding of contemporary artworks or types of practice which cannot be 
encompassed by DG’s conceptualization of art but which can nevertheless be said to 
embody a commitment to A Life. 
Art, following DG’s conceptualization, can be said to be a commitment to A Life 
because it always is the liberation of A Life imprisoned in the living. The artist 
herself is committed to A Life because her act of creation requires the difficult task 
                                                 
5
 Deleuze discusses the failure of photography to express sensation most explicitly in Francis Bacon. 
Logique de la sensation (Deleuze, 2002). 
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of having seen A Life in the living and to express it in the artwork. Art is a 
commitment to A Life because art always is and gives expressions of A Life in the 
living, expressions which are termed visions.  
Vision can also be said to be the mode of aesthetic experience which corresponds to 
the expression of A Life in the living: the viewer through his aesthetic experience of 
the artwork has (or is given) a vision. The composition of these visions in painting 
are termed Figures. Bacon paints Figures: visions of A Life in the living which 
oppose themselves to figures, i.e. to the figurations of views of the living. The 
Figure, Figural painting6, can be termed the mode of practical engagement with 
painting by which painting expresses A Life in the living. The expression of A Life 
in the living, the Figure as its corresponding mode of practical engagement in 
painting, and vision as its mode of aesthetic experience, form what I define as a 
paradigm of commitment to A Life. This paradigm of commitment to A Life can be 
termed A Life in the living, and is said to be embodied for example by Bacon’s work. 
It defines the way (or the paradigm) by which Bacon’s practice embodies a 
commitment to A Life, and corresponds to DG’s conceptualization of art. 
The basis for the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art is the affirmation that A 
Life in the living is not the only paradigm by which to embody a commitment to A 
Life, but one amongst others which are yet to be conceptualized. The expansion is 
operated through the conceptualization of three other paradigms of commitment to A 
Life, three other ways by which art can embody a commitment to A Life. The four 
paradigms of commitment to A Life are inspired by and conceptualized through an 
engagement with works by Francis Bacon, Thomas Struth, Pierre Huyghe, Francis 
Alÿs and Peter Doig. 
DG’s conceptualization of art is the most radical paradigm of commitment to A Life 
possible: the artwork is and gives a sensation, in other words the artwork is and gives 
A Life. Their conceptualization of art might be accused of being narrow, exclusive, 
and limited in relation to contemporary art practices, but it is exactly as exclusive 
that it can be, and should be praised for being, an intransigent and radical 
                                                 
6
 ‘Figural’, a term used by Deleuze in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Deleuze, 2002, 12), 
opposes itself to “figurative”; Figural qualifies the mode of practical engagement with painting by 
which painting can be and give visions of A Life in the living. 
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commitment to A Life. Each of the three other paradigms of commitment to A Life 
consists in an increasing level of expansion, and departure from, DG’s 
conceptualization. In the order in which these three paradigms are conceptualized in 
this text, they are: the living as point of view on and from A Life, new living 
emerging from A Life and to live A Life. The four paradigms of commitment to A 
Life are defined through a set of five properties. For example, each paradigm is 
defined by a property termed mode of aesthetic experience. Corresponding to the 
paradigm A Life in the living is a mode of aesthetic experience termed vision; 
corresponding to the three other paradigms are respectively the modes of aesthetic 
experience termed hallucination, view and narration. The definition of each 
paradigm through this set of properties charts the expansion of DG’s 
conceptualization of art.  
In addition, three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life are conceptualized. 
These paradigms define ways by which some works give the illusion of a 
commitment to A Life but in fact fail such commitment and as such fail A Life. This 
total of seven paradigms define the boundaries of an expanded conceptualization of 
art centered on the aim of embodying a commitment to A Life. 
In addition to its introduction and conclusion, this text is composed of 8 sections:  
 
 the introduction to A Life (section 1),  
 DG’s conceptualization of art, and the paradigm A Life in the living 
elaborated through a discussion of the mediums of painting and cinema 
(sections 2 and 3),  
 the motivation for and the logic of the expansion of DG’s conceptualization 
of art, and an introduction to the three new paradigms of commitment to A 
Life (section 4), 
 the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life conceptualized 
through an engagement with the medium of photography (section 5),  
 the paradigm new living emerging from A Life (section 6),  
 the three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life (section 7), and  
 the paradigm to live A Life (section 8). 
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The purpose of a concept of art is not to prescribe modes of art practice, it doesn’t 
futilely define what art should be (who would listen?). It only defines what art is for 
the propose of developing new understandings of what art can be. A 
conceptualization of art defines interrelations between different types of practice 
which otherwise might be thought to be incommensurable, it proposes to define what 
appears to be a shared interest between artists, a common problem addressed by 
different practices. Whereas DG, through their conceptualization of art as expression 
of A Life in the living, define an interrelation between amongst others Cézanne, 
Melville, Debussy and Bacon, the expanded conceptualization of art this text 
develops defines an interrelation between Bacon, Struth, Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig as 
contemporary art practices which differently embody a commitment to A Life. 
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Section 1 – A Life 
 
A Life 
Deleuze begins his last published essay Immanence: A Life… (Deleuze, 2003a, 359-
363) with the question: ‘What is a transcendental field?’ The transcendental field is 
‘defined by a plane of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life’, as A Life 
(Deleuze, 2003a, 361). Immanence is pure or absolute because it is not immanent 
‘“to” something’: pure immanence ‘is not immanence to life, but the immanent that 
is in nothing is itself a life’ (Deleuze, 2003a, 360, Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 47). 
Nothing transcends the pure and absolute immanence, nothing is external to it, nor is 
immanence immanent to life, immanence is itself A Life. When a form of exteriority 
to the plane of immanence is posited, or when immanence it attributed to something, 
immanence loses its purity, its absoluteness.  
A Life, the transcendental field or pure plane of immanence forms the 
conceptualization of a ‘wild and powerful’ empiricism, a transcendental empiricism 
(Deleuze, 2003a, 359). A Life, ordinarily hidden or covered, is simultaneously the 
unformed matter of the living (a transcendental materialism) and the non organic 
Life or forces that animate matter (a transcendental vitalism). 
There is no reason to believe that physico-chemical strata exhaust matter: 
there is an unformed Matter, submolecular. Equally the organic strata do not 
exhaust Life: rather the organism is that which life opposes to itself in order 
to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful, in 
that it is anorganic (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 628). 
The living or nature is that which A Life opposes itself in order to limit itself. A Life 
is a continuously renewed consistency given to chaos, an incessantly renewing 
genesis, ‘a continued and renewed creation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 627). A 
Life is non-organic Life or becoming, it is ordinarily7 “witnessed” or “lived” as our 
usual perceptions and affections, for example our perceptions of the changes or 
movements of nature and the way by which these changes affect us. In DG’s 
                                                 
7
 “Ordinarily” as when we are not having “visions” of A Life in the living (like the artist is required to 
have following DG’s conceptualization of art), and also in reference to A Life as transcendental 
material vitalism being ‘ordinarily hidden or covered’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 512). 
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ontology, being is becoming; ontology is the affirmation of ‘the being of becoming’ 
(Deleuze, 2007, 27) and becoming is creation, genesis. A Life is becoming in 
reciprocal presupposition with that which becomes, the living. It as such drives what 
is yet to come, and launches the living towards the future, A Life is the ‘forces of the 
future’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 383). It is designated as the virtual, and the 
living or nature as the actual. They respectively are the transcendental plane of 
immanence and what we ordinarily experience of it. The living, nature or the actual 
universe, is what of A Life we ordinarily experience, that which A Life is ordinarily 
experienced as.  
A Life is the condition or ‘conditions of real experience’ (Deleuze, 2008, 13): the 
condition of perception, affection, consciousness, thought etc., A Life is the 
condition or genetic element of the living or the lived (the experienced, the sensed). 
As condition of experience, A Life ordinarily exceeds experience and as such 
remains covered or hidden. As ontological and genetic condition, A Life is that 
which “gives to see”, and that which “is seen” can be said to be that which is 
perceived of A Life according to one’s threshold of perception. 
In most cases, the soul contents itself with very few clear or distinguished 
perceptions: the soul of the tick has three [perceptions], a perception of light, 
an olfactory perception of its prey, a tactile perception of the best place [to 
burrow itself], and everything else, in the immense Nature which the tick 
nevertheless expresses, is only dizziness, a dust of minute, obscure and non 
integrated perceptions (Deleuze, 1988, 122). 
Our ordinary perceptions, our perceptions of the living or nature, are clear or 
distinguished. These perceptions are produced when at least two minute and obscure 
perceptions ‘enters in a differential relation that determines a singularity’ (Deleuze, 
1988, 117). For example, ‘yellow and blue can surely be perceived, but if their 
perception vanishes by virtue of becoming ever smaller, they enter in a differential 
relation )(
dy
db
 that determine green’ (Deleuze, 1988, 117). Minute and obscure 
perceptions are the ‘requisites or genetic elements’ (Deleuze, 1988, 118) of our clear 
perceptions; the vanishing, minute and obscure perceptions of yellow ( dy ) and of 
blue ( db ) are, through the establishment of a differential relation between them, the 
genetic elements of a clear perception of green. The tick has three clear perceptions, 
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they determine both the (clear and distinguished) world the tick perceives and that 
which the tick can perceive of the (obscure and confused) immense Nature inside 
which it, and we, live. This immense Nature is universal in that it is the same for all 
perceiving subject (or ‘monad’), we all live in and “look at” the same infinity of 
minute and obscure perceptions. As such, we all in a sense “see” the same green in 
that we all “look at” the same vanishing quantities of blue and of yellow; and yet, we 
never perceive the same green because each perceiving subject actualizes minute and 
obscure perceptions differently (Deleuze, 1988, 119). ‘It could be said that each 
monad [perceiving subject] privileges certain differential relations that hereafter give 
it exclusive perceptions, and that it leaves other relations below the necessary degree, 
or, further, that it lets an infinity of minute perceptions subsist within itself without 
assuming relations [between them]’ (Deleuze, 1988, 120). This universal and 
immense Nature, this gigantic, dizzying and yet ordinarily invisible realm is the 
transcendental field or A Life8, the unformed matter and invisible forces9 which 
condition the living or the lived, and which the living as such expresses (‘the 
immense Nature which the tick nevertheless expresses’); it is the Life of the living, 
the virtual transcendental plane of immanence inside which we live; it is that which 
gives to see and is seen according to that which one can, i.e. according to one’s 
threshold or ‘degree’ of perception, in other words according to the differential 
relations one can establish or privileges between minute and obscure perceptions, 
actualizing them as clear perceptions. 
the transcendental and Kant 
A Life ordinarily exceeds experience but the conditions of experience ‘are not, in the 
Kantian manner, the conditions of all possible experience, they are the conditions of 
real experience’ (Deleuze, 2008, 13). The transcendental, a concept initially created 
                                                 
8
 I find that the quote above helps to discuss the relation of immanence or reciprocal presupposition 
between A Life and the living in relation to perception. However, it references Deleuze’s work on 
Leibniz and it is beyond the scope of this text to establish detailed relations between the concept of A 
Life and minute perceptions. It seems however appropriate to propose that they tightly relate in 
Deleuze’s ontology, especially when minute and obscure perceptions are discussed as the genetic 
elements, and as such the virtual, of clear perceptions: ‘the clear emerges from the obscure by way of 
a genetic process’ (Deleuze, 1988, 120). 
9
 ‘Unformed matter and invisible forces’ or vanishing quantities, ‘the differential quotient [e.g. )(
dy
db ] 
being the common limit of the relation between two vanishing quantities’ (Deleuze, 1988, 24). 
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by Kant, refers in Kant to a priori concepts which define the conditions of any 
possible experience. These a priori concepts are not grounded in nor dependant on 
experiences themselves, they are ‘too general or too large for the real’ (Deleuze, 
2003b, 94). They are as such general, abstract (Deleuze, 2008, 17), and arguably 
transcendent. Deleuze’s conceptualization of the transcendental “in opposition” to 
Kant’s defines the conditions of real experience and these ‘are not general nor 
abstract, they are no broader than the conditioned’ (Deleuze, 2008, 17). Deleuze’s 
transcendental exceeds experience but it is not general or abstract, since it is in 
reciprocal presupposition (or reciprocal determination) with that which is 
experienced: A Life is a continuously renewing genesis which operates as a kind of 
“feedback” process, it conditions real experience and real experience “in turn” 
feedbacks into A Life which in turn conditions real experience … and so on. On the 
other hand, Kant’s transcendental, the conditions of any possible experience, 
conditions experiences but these experiences do not “feedback” into the 
transcendental, experiences do not “affect” the a priori concepts, the conditions. 
Whereas the conditions of any possible experience is always the repetition of the 
same a priori concepts, the conditions of real experience in Deleuze are a genesis 
which cannot be preconceived or predetermined, and if it is a repetition, it is in 
opposition to the repetition of the same the repetition of difference itself, the 
affirmative and creative power of A Life. Whereas Kant’s transcendental is general, 
abstract and arguably transcendent, Deleuze’s transcendental field is conceptualized 
as pure immanence. Deleuze’s transcendental is an Outside since it is ordinarily 
hidden or covered, since it exceeds real experience, but it is an Outside which is 
conceptualized as pure plane of immanence, an Outside from which nothing can 
transcend, an Outside inside which we live and which lives inside us. 
The living or nature, as that which is ordinarily experienced of A Life, corresponds 
to a tamed empiricism, a ‘simple empiricism’ which “opposes” itself to the wild and 
powerful empiricism that A Life is (Deleuze, 2003a, 359). A Life, the transcendental 
field, the Outside or the plane of immanence forms a radical ontological view of the 
world entirely decentred from humans: a non human landscape, ‘the impression of a 
fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this 
16 
 
world is already ours, and those creatures, ourselves’10 (Deleuze, 2005d, 35). The 
transcendental field is effectively already ours and we already are its creatures: we 
live “in its middle”, experiencing it as nature. 
 
science, art and A Life 
Thought or creation is a form that gives consistency to the reciprocally presupposing 
virtual and ‘infinite movements and speeds’ of chaos (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 
44). Chaos is intrinsically linked to A Life, both can only be thought in relation to 
the other. Chaos, ‘in fact, is less the absence of determinations than the infinite speed 
at which they take shape and vanish’, it ‘chaotises, and undoes all consistency in the 
infinite’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 44). A Life is genesis defined as the 
continuously renewed consistency given to chaos, whilst nevertheless withholding 
within itself the infinite movements and speeds of chaos as that which launches the 
actual into becoming, undoing all actual consistency in the infinite. A Life is 
simultaneously both the actualization of the virtual (consistency given to chaos) and 
the virtualization of the actual (chaotization of all consistency). A Life is chaosmos 
or ‘rhythm-chaos’, rhythm being that which gives consistency to chaos.11 The 
chaosmos is both ‘affirmation’ and ‘ontology’ (Deleuze, 2003b, 80, 257): both 
repetition of difference, the continuously renewed consistency or rhythm given to 
chaos and the chaotization of all consistency, i.e. becoming (= affirmation), and 
nature of being (= ontology; the nature of being is becoming, repetition of difference, 
incessantly renewed consistency given to chaos). 
Chaos cannot be thought of (and does not exist) in and of itself, it is always in 
relation to a rhythm or consistency. Chaos cannot be thought of outside A Life, and 
inversely so: both need to be thought of as chaosmos. Following DG, the three forms 
                                                 
10
 From an essay titled ‘Hume’ originally published in La Philosophie: De Galilée à Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, 1972, Paris, Hachette. 
11
 One of the first appearance of the term chaosmos in Deleuze links Nietzsche’s concept of the 
‘eternal return’ to chaos: ‘Joyce presented the vicus of recirculation as causing a chaosmos to turn; 
and Nietzsche had already said that chaos and eternal return were not two distinct things but a single 
and same affirmation.’ The notion of chaosmos is crucial to (in fact constitutive of) Deleuze’s 
ontology: ‘Ontology is the dice throw, the chaosmos from which the cosmos emerge’ (Deleuze, 
2003b, 80, 257). 
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of thought or creation (thought is creation and inversely so) art, science and 
philosophy, think or create through the operation of a ‘cut across chaos’, they ‘trace 
planes on chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 196, 190). Each form of thought 
traces its own specific type of plane and as such relate to chaos differently. The three 
planes are ‘the rafts on which the brain plunges into and confronts chaos’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1991, 198). Science traces a plane of reference whereas art traces a 
plane of composition, two different types of plane which correlate to two different 
types of cut through chaos. 
‘Art takes a bit of chaos in a frame in order to form a composed chaos that becomes 
sensory […]; but science takes a bit of chaos in a system of coordinates and forms a 
referenced chaos which becomes nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 194). 
There is a need to be careful here because in the above quote it is as if chaos is 
thought of in and of itself, whereas it can only be thought of as chaosmos, in its 
relation to A Life. It seems as such useful to immediately explain a crucial difference 
between art and science in their relation to chaosmos, to A Life. Evidently, in 
science, referenced is not chaos in and of itself, since such an operation, would it be 
possible at all, would result in a chaotic and meaningless reference. Equally art does 
not make sensory chaos in and of itself but a composed chaos. The crucial difference 
between art and science stems from the fact that art operates in co-creation with A 
Life (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 164) in that, like A Life, it operates a genesis by 
which it gives a consistency to chaos. Science is not said to operate in co-creation 
with A Life because it does not operate a genesis: its operation is to reference the 
genesis that A Life is. Both science and art plunge into and confront chaos, but 
science does so in order to give reference to creation, to the genesis that A Life is, 
whereas art is itself co-creation, genesis. Newton’s act of thought or creation is to 
trace a plane of reference on chaos, giving reference to A Life and as such defining a 
nature; Einstein, however imbricated with “Newton’s” nature or plane of reference, 
defined another nature by tracing another plane on chaos. Science needs to plunge 
into and confront chaos as the necessary process by which it can pass from one 
nature to another nature, from one reference to another reference. On the other hand, 
art needs to plunge into and confront chaos in order to compose it and make it 
sensory. Art does not have the purpose of attaining to another nature as science does, 
art has the purpose of attaining to the chaosmos, to A Life. Science operates a 
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movement from nature to another nature, and art operates a movement from nature to 
A Life. 
Through the tracing of their specific types of plane on chaos, art and science operate 
a territorialization of chaos which gives rise to different types of territory. Science 
leads to the re-definition of the actual universe whereas art leads to what is termed a 
possible universe. Whereas art operates in co-creation with A Life and as such leads 
to a possible universe, science references the creation that A Life is leading to the re-
definition of the actual universe. Science ‘renounce[s] to infinite movements and 
speeds’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 45) whereas art renders them sensory; whereas 
science’s act of thought or creation is to territorialize the infinite that A Life is as a 
finite nature, art’s act of thought or creation is to territorialize the infinite as such so 
as to render A Life sensory. ‘Art wants to create the finite which restores the 
infinite’, whereas ‘science on the contrary renounce the infinite to gain the reference’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 186). 
Between art, science and philosophy, DG insist that there isn’t a more creative or 
important form of thought. It is not because science, as opposed to art, renounces the 
infinite and does not operate in co-creation with A Life that it is a less important or 
creative form of thought. Both art and science involve the equally difficult task of 
plunging into and confronting chaos. 
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Section 2 – DG’s conceptualization of art, painting and the 
first paradigm of commitment to A Life: A Life in the living 
 
commitment to A Life 
It can be said that for DG, art is and requires a commitment, a commitment to A Life. 
The act of artistic creation ‘is always to liberate life where it is imprisoned’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1991, 162). Artists have ‘seen Life in the living’, they are ‘seer[s], a 
becomer[s]’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161), they see A Life in the living and go 
through becomings by which they establish a unity with A Life, by which they 
become A Life. It is as a commitment to A Life that artists aim to capture and 
express the visions they have and the becomings they go through. Artists are 
committed not per se to their practice or to art in general, but their practice is the 
means by which to commit to A Life. Terminologically, the term commitment, in its 
resonance with dedication, perseverance, effort, is the appropriate term to describe 
the artists’ relation to A Life: artists are athletes, they practice an inorganic 
athleticism through which they have visions of, and become, A Life (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1991, 163). Artists do not per se practice art, artists practice A Life, art 
being the name given to this practice and to that which results from it. Their practice 
is an athleticism through which they live A Life, A Life lived beyond that which is 
ordinarily experienced and from which they ‘come back with red eyes, and short 
breath’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 163). 
summary of Bacon’s practical procedure, or the procedure of Figural painting  
If the painter is to operate the expression of A Life in the living, if he is to attain to 
the vision, the painter must exceed ordinary experiences, the living or the lived. The 
task of the painter is to exceed the figurations, clichés, photographs and views of 
nature to attain to the vision: ‘The painter does not paint on an empty canvas […]; 
but the […] canvas is already so covered with preexisting, preestablished clichés that 
it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath 
of air from the chaos that brings us the vision’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 204). 
Photographs or clichés ‘virtually’ condition our sight, photographs ‘is what modern 
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man sees’, they cover the ‘white and virgin surface’ of the canvas even before the 
painter starts painting (Deleuze, 2002, 19).  
 
Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne by Francis Bacon, 1966 
 
The practical procedure by which the painter (or Bacon) attains to the vision 
primordially involves the passage ‘through the catastrophe, i.e. by the diagram and 
its involuntary irruption’, the diagram being ‘a chaos, a catastrophe, but also a germ 
of order or rhythm’ (Deleuze, 2002, 111, 95). Through the handling of the paint, the 
painter (and the painting) plunges towards chaos, towards a catastrophe. This 
operation is practically realized by Bacon as he ‘make[s] random marks (lines-traits); 
scrub[s], sweep[s], or wipe[s] the canvas in order to clear out locales or zones 
(colour-patches); throw[s] the paint, from various angles and at various speed’ 
(Deleuze, 2005b, 70). The diagram often appears in Bacon’s paintings as the most 
Removed due to copyright
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chaotic expression on the canvas; for example in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne 
where the area between the nose and the right part of the mouth expresses a chaotic 
zone of indiscernibility between the two, a section of more or less random lines-traits 
and colour-patches. In order to express a vision of A Life, the chaosmos, the painter 
must attain to chaos to compose it, and as such express it, anew: ‘Art is not chaos but 
a composition of chaos that gives the vision or sensation, it constitutes a chaosmos, 
as Joyce says, a composed chaos – neither foreseen nor preconceived’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1991, 192). To express A Life or the chaosmos, art composes chaos anew 
and this very process of genesis is rendered sensory, expressing A Life (genesis) 
beyond any of its previous conditions of existence, in an expression that is ‘neither 
foreseen nor preconceived’. After or simultaneously to the moment when chaos is 
attained, a chaosmos or Figure emerges through the diagram, constituting an order or 
rhythm over chaos.12 The Figure is an invention, a construction “from scratch”, from 
chaos. The operation of the diagram is simultaneously destruction (from a view of 
nature to chaos) and construction (from chaos to its composition, from chaos to the 
Figure or chaosmos, from chaos to a vision of A Life). Painting operates in co-
creation with A Life in that it, like A Life, gives consistency to chaos, it is a genesis 
by which chaos is composed. The diagram is an operational device, but it also is, in a 
sense, the previously mentioned ‘frame’ inside which painting (or art more 
generally) ‘takes a bit of chaos’ in order to compose it and to render it sensory. 
Crucially, the co-creation or genesis that Figural painting operates does not give rise 
to, and as such does not give to experience, that which we perceive through our 
ordinary views. Figural painting expresses its own genesis, its own conditions, and it 
is as such that it is and gives to experience visions of A Life (ontological and genetic 
conditions), which ultimately “forces” us, its viewers, to experience our own 
conditions of real experience. 
analogy 
The Figure is composed through an analogy that is not figurative. The problem of the 
expression of A Life is not to compose a form that resembles another form, the form 
of a chosen object/subject (for example the human being Isabel Rawsthorne). The 
passage through chaos involves the ‘destruction of figurative coordinates’ (Deleuze, 
                                                 
12
 As for the concept of A Life, the capitalization of “Figure” indexes the transcendental.  
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2002, 111), and from chaos, the problem is exactly not to re-establish figurative 
coordinates, traits, forms. The figurative analogy is intentional and representational. 
Figural painting on the other hand follows an aesthetic analogy (as opposed to a 
figurative analogy) that is operated through analogical language (Deleuze, 2002, 
107-109). In Figural painting, the analogy is not figurative in that it is not between 
resembling forms, the analogy is between Life forces which compose or transverse 
the living (for example the Life that Isabel Rawsthorne is) and these same forces that 
are captured and expressed in the painting (the Figure, Portrait of Isabel 
Rawsthorne). A resemblance is established (one can for example recognize Isabel 
Rawsthorne in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne), but this resemblance is not primary or 
intentional in the process of Figural painting, it is one of its consequences, the 
resemblance is produced (consequential) and not productive (a motive) (Deleuze, 
2002, 108). 
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Figure in movement by Francis Bacon, 1976 
 
the three dimensions of analogical language: the body, planes and colour 
The figure – ground relationship in Bacon or in Figural painting is best described as 
figure – transcendental field (the transcendental field, the plane of immanence or A 
Life imaged as ground).13 The Figure articulates, expresses, the relationship between 
the figure (the living) and the transcendental field (A Life), it opens the figure or 
                                                 
13
 Deleuze discusses the form (or figure) and ground relationship in Bacon as that which relates his 
work to Egyptian art. Deleuze does so through a discussion of the ‘assemblage of bas-relief’ where 
characteristically ‘the form and the ground [are] as two equally close sectors on the same plane’ 
(Deleuze, 2002, 115-116). 
Removed due to copyright
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view onto its conditions, the living onto A Life. The problem in composing a Figure 
is that of consistency. The hardest is to make the Figure hold, together and within or 
as the field: to give consistency to chaos without falling back into figuration, whilst 
not simply remaining chaotic. To that aim, the painter operates the radical invention 
or construction of the Figure along the three dimensions of analogical language: the 
body, planes and colour (Deleuze, 2002, 111). 
the body 
To discuss the Figure in terms of the body is not to refer to organs, to the organism, 
in other words to the living. Organs can be perceived in Bacon’s paintings but this 
resemblance is consequential to the capture and expression of Life forces. What is 
painted, what is the Figure, then if not organs? A body without organs, a concept 
which Deleuze borrows from Antonin Artaud.14 A body without organs (BwO15) is 
not per se organs or their organization as organism16, it is the ‘intensive fact of the 
body’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48). A BwO is the Life that the body is. The ‘organism is not 
life, it imprisons [life]’17 (Deleuze, 2002, 48). To liberate A Life where it is 
imprisoned and fulfill the task of art is to liberate the BwO imprisoned in the 
organism, human or otherwise. Our BwOs are the Life through which we sense, 
through which we have our ordinary views of nature, they are us in the 
transcendental field and the transcendental field in us. They are the Life in the living 
or the Living in the lived, the lived body or organs is exceeded by ‘a more profound 
and almost unlivable Power’ (Deleuze, 2002, 47): A Life. 
The sensation expresses (and is in the aesthetic experience of the artwork) the ‘action 
of forces on the body’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48), Life forces acting upon, and effectively 
composing BwOs. Figures express and as such are BwOs, ‘Bacon never ceased to 
paint bodies without organs, the intensive fact of the body’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48). 
                                                 
14
 ‘the Figure is precisely the body without organs’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48). 
15
 This notation found in Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux uses the capital letter to index 
the transcendental as for the concept of Life or A Life. 
16
 The BwO ‘opposes itself less to organs than to this organization of organs that is called organism’ 
(Deleuze, 2002, 47). 
17
 Again, in this quote ‘life’ needs be understood as A Life in reciprocal presupposition with the 
organism or the living. 
25 
 
There are in Bacon’s paintings what resemble organs, but this resemblance is only 
consequential to the expression of the BwO, they appear as it can be seen in Figure 
in movement to different degrees stretched, contracted, folded, integrated in one 
another, split open, overtaken by a spasm, dissolved etc. The sensation has many 
levels which the BwO or Figure ‘accounts for’ (Deleuze, 2002, 50), it accounts for 
the difference of levels that is constitutive of the sensation. The levels refer to a 
difference “of levels” between the sensed and the sensing, between the lived and the 
Living, between real experience and conditions (of real experience). To account for 
and as such express the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation is to reveal 
the ‘presence of a body without organ under the organism, [the] presence of 
transitory organs under organic representation’ (Deleuze, 2002, 52). But it is also to 
express an indiscernibility between the sensed and the sensing, between the 
organism and the BwO precisely because both reciprocally presuppose each other. It 
is not however as if there are only two levels, one correlating to the organism and 
one to the BwO. The difference of levels can be thought of as an infinity of levels 
that map or correspond to (Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne): the absolute infinite 
monochromatic black which the Figure emerges from and appears to dissolve into 
“all the way down or up to” the consequential or produced resemblance of an organ 
(an eye, a mouth, a nose, etc.). The difference of levels needs to be thought of as the 
difference between the infinite speeds of chaos at one end (lowest or highest level) 
and its temporary and transitory18 “coagulation” into nearly fully-formed organs at 
the other end (the right eye in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne is practically fully-
formed), with passages between levels. It is these passages between levels which 
Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne expresses that stretch what resembles a nose into a 
mouth and tears it open onto the infinite blackness into which the Figure’s shoulders 
also dissolve. These passages between levels are rhythms expressing the action of 
forces on the body, composing the intensive fact of the body: the BwO. 
In opposition to Figural painting, the photograph ‘tends to flatten sensation on a 
single level, and remains unable to include within the sensation the constitutive 
difference of levels’ (Deleuze, 2002, 87). The photograph, even if it gives to see a 
view beyond the threshold of human perception (as in x-ray photography), cannot 
                                                 
18
 Deleuze discusses time in relation to the BwO and the levels of sensation it accounts for (Deleuze, 
2002, 50). 
26 
 
express the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation since it actualizes 
sensation on a single level, falling to express an indiscernibility between that which 
it gives to see and its conditions. In that sense, the photograph is “similar” to our 
ordinary views, they do not include within that which they give to see an 
indiscernibility with the infinite speeds of chaos (or the chaosmos) they presuppose. 
A question remains however: how are Bacon’s paintings not the figuration of 
deformed living creatures but BwOs, the expression of the Life that bodies are, A 
Life in reciprocal presupposition with the living? In other words, how do Bacon’s 
paintings “get” ‘under the organism’? There are two answers to this question: a 
specific type of line and the modulation of colour. 
the line without contour, and planes 
The body in Bacon is often expressed as flows of broken tones against a 
monochromatic black (Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne) and/or a shore of bright tone 
(Figure in movement), and most often it is held by an armature or planes. The body 
emerges through or as the catastrophe of the diagram. When Bacon throws, scrubs, 
smudges or cleans the paint on the canvas, he destroys figurative traits and 
coordinates. Traits that emerge from the diagram are not figurative but material, 
accidental and asignifying lines, marks and patches which have the effect of opening 
up a world: ‘it is as if, all of a sudden, a Sahara, a zone of Sahara, is introduced in the 
head’ (Deleuze, 2002, 94). There are two inseparable consequences to Bacon’s use 
of the diagram: a specific type of line emerges, composing the Figure, and a specific 
type of space opens up or overtakes the purely optical space of figuration. 
The type of line which serves to express the body is the ‘line without contour’ 
(Deleuze, 2002, 102), an ‘abstract line’ exemplified by Jackson Pollock’s work 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 624), the Gothic line Deleuze borrows from Worringer 
(Deleuze, 2002, 48). The line does not represent forms. For example in Portrait of 
Isabel Rawsthorne, the line which appears to imprecisely emerge from the inside 
part of the right eye swirls around, nearly dissolves in the black field and it is as if it 
is re-captured by another swirl which leads it towards what resembles a mouth. This 
line serves not to define an organ, the form of a nose, it, following Deleuze (and 
Worringer), expresses a ‘powerful non organic Life’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48). As 
opposed to overtaking the whole surface of the canvas as in Pollock, in Bacon the 
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line without contour serves to compose the Figure. Deleuze tells us that Bacon is not 
‘attracted’ by the line as it is used in abstract expressionism (for example Pollock) 
because it is used in such a way that ‘the diagram takes over the whole of the 
painting […] and that its proliferation makes a real “mess”’19 (Deleuze, 2002, 102). 
When the diagram, and the line without contour it gives rise to, overtakes the whole 
of the painting as in Pollock, it fails to compose a Figure and simply remains chaotic. 
But there are, obviously, contours in Bacon’s paintings; for example, the contour of 
the hair is clearly defined against the field, and the nearly perfectly formed right eye. 
They serve to contain, hold, the expressive line which is itself without contour, and 
as such give consistency to the body which would otherwise dissipate in or as chaos. 
The armatures, frames or planes (which can generally be termed planes) often seen 
in Bacon (for example the armature and monochromatic orange plane in Figure in 
movement) have an equivalent purpose. These planes are architectural: from a non-
Euclidean or a-spatial “space”, i.e. from chaos, the junctions of planes, and as such 
their relations to the field, replace perspective and serve to isolate and hold the body 
within the field. When Bacon discusses his repetitive use of such planes, he says that 
it is ‘to see the image’, and that they ‘never ever had any sort of illustrative 
intention’ (Sylvester and Bacon, 2008, 22, 23). To see the image, in other words the 
Figure, Bacon needs to give consistency to the sensation, to make it durable, to give 
solidity to the BwO. 
haptic space  
Asignifying, figural material traits that emerge from the diagram (including the line 
without contour) impose ‘a violent manual space’ (Deleuze, 2002, 120) over or into 
the purely optical space of figuration (a space which can be said to correspond to the 
space perceived through our ordinary views). A new type of space emerges, a haptic 
space. The emergence of a haptic space is ‘like the emergence of another world’ of 
which the viewer is given a vision. The haptic is the tactile, insofar as it is the eye 
which gains a sense of touch; haptic space ‘can be visual and auditory as much as 
tactile’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 615). Haptic space involves a new eye, a ‘non 
                                                 
19
 Pollock’s work is only “problematic” in the context of Deleuze’s writings on Bacon. In Capitalisme 
et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux, Pollock is exemplary of ‘nomad art’ which DG value (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1980, 624). 
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optical function’ of the eye: a haptic eye which the Figural painting gives to the 
viewer.  
[…] space is not visual, or rather the eye itself has a haptic, non optical 
function: no line separates the earth and the sky, which are of the same 
substance; there is no horizon, no bottom, no perspective, no limit, no 
contour or form, no centre (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 616).  
A haptic space is neither abstract nor general, it is specific and precise in its 
composition, only its ‘topology relies not on points or objects, but on haecceities, on 
set of relations (winds, undulations of the snow or the sand, song of the sand and 
crackling of the ice, tactile qualities of both)’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 474). 
Haptic space expresses the topology of the transcendental field, the topology of 
bodies in or as the transcendental field, a field not of forms but of a continuous 
variation of unformed matter and forces: a ‘world of movements, of stirrings that are 
still deaf, blind, without memory, for draft-subjects20 neither yet qualified nor 
composed’ (Criton, 2007, 138). This world appears like the emergence of another 
world under the subjects, under the organisms. Figures, otherwise termed haptic 
visions, are the topologies of BwOs, “maps” of the Life that we are. As a specific 
and precise composition, the Figure is constructed as a ‘set of relations’, more 
precisely a set of differential relations. These differential relations are not relations 
between forms, they are differences which attest of the variations of unformed matter 
and invisible forces that A Life or the transcendental field is. Differential relations 
are expressed, as previously introduced, by the differential quotient )(
dx
dy
: for 
instance, the vanishing, minute and obscure perceptions of blue and of yellow enter 
in a differential relation )(
dy
db
, a differential relation which is the virtual, or 
conditions, determining an actual and clear perception of green. Differential relations 
in Deleuze’s ontology serve to articulate an infinite field that is neither simply 
homogeneous nor actual but that is constituted of continuously vanishing (and 
emerging) heterogeneities or quantities (for example dy and db ) between which 
relations are established ( )(
dy
db ). The transcendental field or A Life is an infinite and 
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 Translated from French: ‘sujets-ébauches’. 
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continuous variation of differential relations. This infinite and continuous variation is 
the ontological and genetic condition of the living or the lived21, and it is by virtue of 
its heterogeneities or quantities continuously vanishing and emerging, by virtue of 
being a variation, that the pure plane of immanence it constitutes is called A Life. 
Differential relations serve to articulate the determinations of a topology of the 
transcendental field, pure plane of immanence, A Life or chaosmos which again is 
not characterized by ‘the absence of determinations [and as such an homogeneity, 
but by] the infinite speed at which [these virtual determinations or differential 
relations] take shape and vanish’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 44). These differential 
relations, in other words the topology of the transcendental field, the topologies of 
BwOs, are expressed in the painting through the modulation of colour. 
modulation of colour and haptic sense 
There are evidently differential relations between the field and the body, and 
between different zones of the body. For example, the “nose” in Portrait of Isabel 
Rawsthorne is defined only in relation to other zones of simultaneously emerging 
and dissipating “organs”, and in relation to the field from which it emerges and tears 
itself open onto. The body’s head is not a collection of organs composed as an 
organism (mouth, two eyes, nose, two cheeks, chin, etc.), it is an ocean or Sahara of 
differential relations, Isabel Rawsthorne in or as the transcendental field. But 
ultimately all differential relations depend on the differential relation that colour is: 
‘“Colorism” is not only colours that enter in relation […], it is colour that is 
discovered as the variable relation, the differential relation on which everything else 
depends’ (Deleuze, 2002, 130). Through the operation of modulation of colour, all 
“other” differential relations are modulated: body-field, zones of the body to other 
zones of the body, ‘form-ground, light-shadow, bright-dark’: ‘if you bring colour to 
its pure internal relations (hot-cold, expansion-contraction), then you have 
everything’ (Deleuze, 2002, 130). It is colour that is “primarily” modulated. In the 
haptic space of Figural painting, in this Sahara of differential relations, everything is 
first and foremost colour. It is not that forms are given colours, an operation which 
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 For example an actual perception of the colour green )(
dy
db
 = G, a formulation Deleuze uses 
(Deleuze, 1988, 117), where “= G” signifies the actualization of a clear perception of green 
determined by the differential relation between vanishing quantities of blue and of yellow. 
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remains figurative. The modulation of colour, the modulation of the differential 
relation that colour is, the continuous variation of its pure internal relations, serve to 
express in a sensation all the other differential relations that the BwO constitutes. 
The resemblance of forms is only consequential: a ‘secondary figuration which 
depends on the neutralization of all primary figuration’ (Deleuze, 2002, 42). The 
diagram is not only the emergence of asignifying lines, marks and patches, ‘the 
diagram is then also a colour map, or a map of sensation’ (O'Sullivan, 2006, 63). The 
nose in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne: the broken tones, from a red-orange to a 
bluish grey, modulate differential relations of a semi-formed or vanishing organ to 
other zones of the body, and these broken tones against the monochromatic black 
simultaneously modulate a body to field differential relation. Red, orange, blue, grey 
and black, and potentially an infinity of variations within colour, is all that is needed 
for a body without organs to appear, a body which appears through colour. Through 
a haptic vision, one sees not the universe in colours but the universe through colour: 
‘objects no longer appear in optical space, but are “in” the eye, constructed from 
colors that exist “within sight itself”’ (Zepke, 2005, 202). 
The modulation of differential relations, and primarily of colour, is the operation of 
the diagram, it is through this modulation (and the emergence of the line without 
contour) that chaos is composed and A Life expressed. Modulation is the operative 
function of analogical language, a ‘language of [differential] relations’ (Deleuze, 
2002, 147), and that by which it can express unformed but specific continuous 
variations: nonorganic spasms, contortions, expansions, deformations of the body, 
continuously vanishing and emerging differences “of differences” which maps the 
Life that a body is. Analogical language, and the Figure it serves to compose, works 
directly on the nervous system (Deleuze, 2002, 107). It does not “communicate” a 
representation (figurative painting), it does not model a form, it modulates 
differential relations giving rise to the Figure which itself is and gives to “feel” a 
sensation directly on the nervous system (Figural painting). The Figure expresses the 
action of forces on the body, and these forces directly act upon the BwOs that we, as 
viewers, are. The haptic sense  
liberates the eye from its belonging to the organism, from its character as a 
fixed and qualified organ: the eye becomes virtually the polyvalent 
indeterminate organ that sees the body without organs, i.e. the Figure, as pure 
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presence. Painting gives us eyes everywhere: in the ear, in the stomach, in the 
lungs (the painting breathes …) (Deleuze, 2002, 54). 
This “liberation” induced in us by the artwork opens us, our organism, our eyes, onto 
A Life. The haptic sense through which we have a vision is the process by which we, 
viewers, are “forced” to experience our conditions of real experience. The artwork, 
the Figure, is A Life, it both is and gives a sensation to the viewer. Through the 
aesthetic experience of the artwork, an indiscernibility is produced between the 
viewer, the artwork and A Life. The viewer through her encounter with the Figure is 
to a certain degree dispersed in and as A Life, in and as chaosmos. Liberated from 
her organism, the viewer through the sensation becomes, she goes through 
nonorganic movements, dissipations, contractions, deformations, she is pushed into 
A Life, she becomes A Life as A Life becomes through what “she” now is: ‘In a 
sensation, in its rhythmical flesh the chaosmos destroyed me, and constructs me 
anew as a BwO, and in and through it I become with the world, I become-universe, 
but only as the universe creating itself’ (Zepke, 2005, 210). 
affect and percept 
In Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? DG discuss art, referring to painting, literature and 
music, through the concepts of percept and affect. The two are intrinsically linked 
and as a couple form a bloc of sensation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 158). The 
viewer through his aesthetic experience of the artwork reveals the sensation: he is 
caught up by A Life captured and expressed in the materiality of the artwork, he has 
a vision and is launched forward into becoming. A bloc of sensation is said to be the 
‘tearing out’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 158) of percepts from perceptions and of 
affects from affections. A bloc of sensation is the non human torn out of the human, 
the conditions of real experience torn out of real experience, the non organic Life 
torn out of the living, the body without organs torn out of the organism. The 
composition of the bloc of sensation in the artwork, the percept and affect, fulfills the 
task of art to liberate (tear out) A Life where it is imprisoned. A Life is torn out of 
the living not as the expression of A Life “in and of itself”, but as an indiscernibility 
between the living and A Life, as A Life expressed in reciprocal presupposition with 
the living: from an absolute monochromaticism to the produced or consequential 
resemblance of organs. The Figure is affect, a ‘non human becoming of man’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 159), the Life in reciprocal presupposition with our 
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affections, the affection being that which is ordinarily experienced of the affect. The 
affect is in a sense a means to refer to A Life (and as such to the Figure) as forces, as 
becoming. Becoming is what Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne expresses, the action of 
Life forces upon the body, the Life that the BwO is. The Figure is also 
simultaneously percept, a ‘non human landscape of nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 159). The percept is a means to refer to A Life (and as such to the Figure) as 
landscape, as vision: a radical ontological vision of the world entirely decentred from 
humans, us in the transcendental field and the transcendental field in us. A sensation 
or bloc of sensation, and as such the Figure, is an indiscernibility between vision and 
becoming. The viewer simultaneously has the vision of a non human landscape of 
nature (percept) and goes through a non human becoming of man (affect), as the Life 
she has a vision of passes through her, launching her forward into becoming. The 
synchronicity of or simultaneity between the affect and the percept is like when 
hearing a piece of music: to be “taken” or “transported” by it (becoming or affect, 
forces) and simultaneously “seeing” the landscape onto which the piece opens itself 
(vision or percept, landscape). As the viewer is dispersed through a becoming, as she 
crosses a ‘threshold of consistency’, liberated from the organism that she was, she is 
taken, transported, into a universe: 
In short, affect is not a question of representation and discursivity, but of 
existence. I find myself transported into a Debussyst Universe, a blues 
Universe, a blazing becoming of Provence. I have crossed a threshold of 
consistency. Before the hold of this block of sensation, this nucleus of partial 
subjectivation, everything was dull, beyond it, I am no longer as I was before, 
I am swept away by a becoming other, carried beyond my familiar existential 
Territories (Guattari, 1995, 93). 
 
vision or Figure as possible universe 
The Figure or haptic vision, as the opening of the living onto the Life which 
conditions it, ‘constitutes a world’ (Deleuze, 2002, 129). The vision is, opens itself 
onto and leads (the viewer) to a universe: a possible universe (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 168). Possible universe is a concept highly relevant to this text since it is 
fundamental to the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art. Possible universe is a 
concept which stems from Deleuze’s work on Leibniz in Le Pli. Leibniz et le 
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Baroque (Deleuze, 1988) and which DG use more specifically in relation to art in 
Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?.  
Art creates possible universes. Possible universes are territorializations of chaos 
actualized in the materiality of the artwork, they are possible consistencies given to 
chaos. Nature, the living or the actual universe is also a territorialization of chaos, 
one which is actualized in the materiality of the universe and as such said to be ‘real’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, 140). ‘God chooses a world amongst an infinity of possible worlds’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, 140): the actual universe is a possible universe (one amongst an 
infinity) that has become real, or more precisely that is in the continuously renewed 
process of realizing itself. On the other hand, possible universes are actual but they 
are not real, for example ‘Adam who does not sin or Sextus who does not rape 
Lucretia’: ‘there exists an actual that remains possible, and that is not forcibly real’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, 140). In Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? the most explicit conceptual 
formulation of possible universes does not qualify them as ‘actual’ in order to 
emphasize their status as ‘possible’ and to oppose them to the actual universe: 
These universes are neither virtual nor actual, they are possible, the possible 
as aesthetic category (“the possible or I shall suffocate”), the existence of the 
possible, whereas events are the reality of the virtual, forms of a thought-
Nature that surveys every possible universe (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 
168). 
The ‘reality of the virtual’, ‘events’, ‘forms of a thought-Nature’, is A Life. A Life 
surveys every possible universe in the sense that it is in reciprocal presupposition 
with every possible universe, that it is the ontological and genetic condition of every 
possible universe. Universes come into existence, whether they are “only possible” 
or real, through a genesis by which chaos is given a consistency, through a 
territorialization of chaos. Whereas the actual universe is that which is ordinarily 
experienced of the genesis that the chaosmos is (creation), the possible universes that 
art creates come into existence through the geneses that compositions of chaos are 
(co-creations). Art operates in co-creation with A Life in that, like A Life (creation) 
which is the continuously renewed consistency given to chaos, art operates a genesis, 
a composition of chaos by which chaos is given consistency and by which A Life is 
rendered sensory. 
34 
 
The crucial difference between the actual universe and the possible universes art 
creates (following DG’s conceptualization of art, for example the two paintings by 
Bacon discussed above) is that a possible universe expresses and as such gives to 
experience something completely different to that which the actual universe is 
ordinarily experienced as. As such, a haptic vision or Figure (to refer to Figural 
painting) as possible universe is not as if the representation of another imagined or 
fantasized universe that could have realized itself (instead of our actual universe) like 
‘Adam who does not sin’, a haptic vision is not a narration, a symbolization or a 
figuration. A haptic vision expresses and as such gives to experience Life forces 
which are the onto-genetic conditions of our actual universe, and it is as such that it 
opens itself onto a universe, a possible expression of A Life. A haptic vision as 
possible universe is a composition of chaos which has the specific quality of 
expressing the absolute that A Life is. It can be said to be a specific 
“territorialization” on and of the absolute that A Life is, and it is as such that the 
artwork is said to be a ‘finite which restores the infinite’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 186). The painting constitutes a territory: a specific type of territorialization 
termed possible universe which accounts for, expresses, is and gives the vision of the 
absolute that A Life is. 
The possible universes art creates are not “possible representations” of A Life, they 
are A Life (and not representations of A Life). It can however seem easy to read 
Bacon’s broken tones as symbolic of virtual movements or forces (A Life) and his 
shores of bright tones as representative of the non human landscape that the 
transcendental field is (A Life). Considered in isolation, it is nearly as if we have to 
convince ourselves that Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne is not the representation of A 
Life in the living but its capture and as such its expression. The important point to 
remember about a haptic vision, as that which is and as such renders A Life sensory, 
is that it can be achieved through an infinity of ways. How could it be representative 
since it always emerges as a composition of chaos neither foreseen nor 
preconceived? How could it be representative since it is only one possibility amongst 
an infinity? The territorializations on and of the absolute that A Life is can be 
achieved through an infinity of diagrams each modulating differential relations 
uniquely, through an inexhaustible amount of possible universes; it is not the 
reserved domain of Bacon and Cézanne which Deleuze discusses in his logic of 
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sensation. It is like with music, there remains an infinity of melodies and harmonies 
which by constituting and opening themselves onto possible universes will make us 
sense the insensible forces of A Life, not through representation but through 
expression. 
painting and music 
The operation of the diagram, i.e. the modulation of differential relations, is 
rhythmic. To establish a relation with music, colour is electromagnetic waves of 
which the frequency, amplitude and phase are varied and combined through the 
diagram by modulation: the diagram as modulation of waves, or the diagram as 
synthesizer.22 From the diagram results a territorialization, modulation, composition 
or synthesis (synthesizer) of chaos, which renders the genesis and the absolute that A 
Life is sensory. The Figural painting as possible universe is like a piece of music as 
possible universe, a universe that opens itself to us as it opens us to A Life when the 
piece is heard. The analogy in Figural painting (as in music) is not representational, 
it is expressive: the Life that Isabel Rawsthorne is “played” once more, A Life 
expressed anew, a piece of music that has nothing to represent but “everything” (A 
Life) to express. The possible universes of Pierre Boulez or Francis Bacon: geneses 
operated through modulations of waves or territorializations of chaos, and which 
replay and give to experience the genesis that A Life is through visions and 
becomings of A Life beyond any of its previous conditions of existence. 
                                                 
22
 Deleuze on the musical instrument of the synthesizer (the term Cosmos needs to be understood as A 
Life): ‘Varese’s approach, at the dawn of this age: a musical machine of consistency, a sounds 
machine (not for reproducing sounds), which molecularizes and atomizes, ionizes sound matter, and 
captures an energy of the Cosmos. If this machine must have an assemblage, it will be the synthesizer. 
By assembling modules, source elements and elements for treating sound, oscillators, generators and 
transformers, by arranging micro-intervals, the synthesizer renders audible the process of sound itself 
[‘le processus sonore lui-même’], and the production of that process, and puts us in relation with 
others elements that exceed sound matter’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 423-424). The synthesizer 
does not reproduce sounds, it renders audible sound itself (‘the process of sound itself’) and the 
genesis of sound (‘the production of that process’) putting us in relation with its virtual or conditions: 
the transcendental plane of immanence, the infinite realm of differential relations between vanishing 
quantities of sound and non-sound matter (‘others elements that exceed sound matter’). 
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Figure: medium-specific mode of practical engagement to embody the paradigm of 
commitment to A Life termed A Life in the living 
The Figure is the expression of A Life in the living. The Figure is as such defined as a 
medium-specific mode of practical engagement by which painting embodies the 
paradigm of commitment to A Life termed A Life in the living. The paradigm A Life 
in the living is not exclusively defined by the Figure, it is not exclusive to the 
medium of panting: as discussed in the following section, cinema can also be said to 
engage with the paradigm A Life in the living through its own medium-specific mode 
of practical engagement termed crystal-image. The paradigm A Life in the living is 
not defined by medium.23 This is also true of the three other paradigms of 
commitment to A Life conceptualized to operate the expansion of DG’s 
conceptualization of art. 
 
Cinema is not in this analysis considered to form part of DG’s conceptualization of 
art, it is considered as a separate field of engagement.24 Deleuze’s conceptualization 
of modern cinema, of a ‘cinema of the seer’25 (Deleuze, 1985, 9), is however related 
to art since it can also be said to embody a commitment to A Life by following the 
paradigm A Life in the living in that like the Figure, although differently, it gives 
visions of A Life in the living. For this reason, and because it seems crucial to, and 
will inform, the conceptualization of photography as medium by which it is possible 
to embody a commitment to A Life, the following section engages with Deleuze’s 
writings on cinema. 
 
                                                 
23
 This text exclusively engages with the embodiment of the paradigm A Life in the living in painting 
and in cinema, but there could also potentially be conceptualizations of other mediums by which to 
embody this paradigm. For example, DG exemplify the way by which the ‘material passes into the 
sensation’ and as such expresses A Life with ‘a Rodin sculpture’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 164). 
Furthermore, their discussions of literature in the chapter Percept, Affect and Concept of the same 
book can be described as the embodiment of the paradigm A Life in the living in literature. 
24
 This is reflected in the absence of any mention of cinema in DG’s discussion of art (they refer to 
painting, sculpture, literature and music) in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991). 
25
 Translated from French: ‘cinéma de voyant’ (Deleuze, 1985, 9). 
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Section 3 – Cinema and A Life in the living 
 
Through his conceptualizations of art and modern cinema, a cinema of the seer, 
Deleuze develops an ‘aesthetic of the virtual’26, an aesthetic of a materialism of the 
virtual, of a transcendental material vitalism. Deleuze conceptualizes art and modern 
cinema as different practices and mediums which engage with A Life by virtue of 
giving visions of A Life. Deleuze thinks, philosophizes, through art and cinema to 
develop what concerns him primarily: the philosophy of a transcendental material 
vitalism, the conceptual establishment of A Life in reciprocal presupposition with the 
living, of a pure plane of immanence as A Life. Deleuze is committed to A Life 
through philosophy, ‘the problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without 
losing the infinite into which thought plunges’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 45). Part 
of Deleuze’s philosophical commitment, and as a means to develop this 
commitment, is to conceptualize how art and modern cinema also engage with the 
problem of the infinite into which thought plunges, and are as such themselves 
modes of commitment to A Life. 
 
A Life as sensation or as the transcendental form of time 
Modern cinema, like Figural painting, can be said to follow a paradigm of expression 
of A Life in the living. Whereas painting embodies this paradigm through a mode of 
practical engagement termed the Figure, cinema embodies it through the crystal-
image. The crystal-image expresses an indiscernibility between the living and A 
Life, it is an indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual raising itself to the 
vision of A Life in the living (more precisely, as discussed below, it gives the vision 
of the ‘direct time-image or the transcendental form of time’ (Deleuze, 1985, 358)). 
Evidently, although both modes of practical engagement give visions of A Life in the 
living, by virtue of being embodied in different mediums, the Figure and the crystal-
image are very different types of engagement with A Life, they give very different 
                                                 
26
 Translated from French : ‘une esthétique du virtuel’; this expression is part of the title of a text by 
Buci-Glucksmann. p.95-111 BUCI-GLUCKSMANN, C. (1998) Les cristaux de l'art: une esthétique 
du virtuel. in ALLIEZ, E., COHEN-LEVINAS, D., PROUST, F. & VINCIGUERRA, L. (Eds.) Gilles 
Deleuze : Immanence et vie. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.  
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types of vision and as such types of experience. This difference is so profound that A 
Life itself as a concept is articulated by different terms according to which medium 
is discussed. A Life in relation to Figural painting is best articulated as sensation: the 
body without organs, the Life under the organism, the Life in the living or the Living 
in the lived. A Life in relation to the modern cinema is best articulated as the 
transcendental form of time or duration27 (as that which the crystal-image gives a 
vision of). Sensation and time (its transcendental form) are unequivocally “the same” 
Life, in other words A Life: Deleuze explicitly refers to the transcendental form of 
time in Cinéma 2. L'image-temps as ‘The powerful non organic Life that grips the 
world’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109). Both Figural painting and the cinema of the seer gives 
to experience different visions of A Life: either the constitutive difference of levels 
that the sensation is (painting), or ‘the gushing of time as dividing in two, as 
splitting’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109), in other words the transcendental form of time 
(cinema).  
a new aesthetic the virtual, a new “image” or conceptual articulation of the 
relationship of reciprocal presupposition between the living and A Life 
The living in its reciprocal presupposition with A Life is perhaps most usefully 
described in relation to a discussion of cinema as (Deleuze quotes Blanchot): the 
‘“dispersion of the Outside”’ (Deleuze, 1985, 235). The Outside is time, the 
transcendental form of time, and the living emerges or is dispersed from time 
splitting in two. Time ‘splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the 
present pass on, while the other preserves the past’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109). A Life, as 
“feedback” process, as repetition of difference, is in terms of time now “imaged” as 
both dispersion of the Outside (which makes the present pass on) and “preservation” 
(of the present which becomes past) into the Outside. This can also be understood in 
terms of the living: the Outside relentlessly disperses itself as the living 
simultaneously as the living incessantly falls back into the Outside, incessantly 
changing its very own onto-genetic conditions, i.e. the Outside. The term dispersion 
(and “preservation”) is a new term which describes the relationship of reciprocal 
                                                 
27
 Deleuze’s conceptualization of cinema is inspired by the philosopher Henri Bergson. It is beyond 
the scope of this text to engage in details with the conceptual relations between Deleuze and Bergson, 
it can simply be mentioned that the ‘transcendental form of time’ directly relates to Bergson’s concept 
of duration. 
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presupposition between the living and A Life, or more specifically the relation of the 
indirect representation of time (the living, the actual) to the transcendental form of 
time or duration (A Life, the virtual). It articulates a way by which “to image” A Life 
as genesis whilst denying any form of transcendence. Through cinema, Deleuze 
develops a way by which to conceptually articulate an aesthetic of the virtual. A Life 
as sensation (Figural painting) is best described in terms of genesis as consistency 
given to chaos and the simultaneous chaotization of all consistency. A Life as the 
transcendental form of time (modern cinema) is best described in terms of genesis as 
dispersions “dispersed” from the Outside simultaneously as they fall back into it. 
These are two ways by which to articulate or give an “image” to the actualization of 
the virtual (to give consistency, dispersion) and the virtualization of the actual 
(chaotization of all consistency, “preservation”), and consequently to the reciprocal 
presupposition or reciprocal determination between the actual and the virtual.  
modern cinema 
Cinematic images (perceptions, actions, affections, as embodied in movement-
images) are in classical cinema linked through an ‘operation of association’, ‘an 
uninterrupted chain of images each one the slave of the next’, with the purpose of 
forming a ‘whole’, a whole described as an ‘open’ (Deleuze, 1985, 233-235). This 
whole or open can be understood in its most simple terms as the “actual universe” of 
the film, the “actual universe” that the film constitutes through the association of 
movement-images, the “actual universe” in which the characters “exist” and which 
the viewers see. This open corresponds to or is actual movements used to describe 
the living, the movements of or in nature, it is the continuation of linear time and the 
constitution of actual space. This forms that which typifies classical cinema: the 
‘indirect representation of time’, the indirect representation of the transcendental 
form of time (Deleuze, 1985, 233). The whole described as open, the actual universe 
that the film constitutes through the association of movement-images, is the indirect 
representation of time, the indirect representation of the Outside with which it is in 
reciprocal presupposition. The movement-image is akin to ‘natural perception’ 
(Deleuze, 1983, 11), it is, and this is how Deleuze differs from Bergson in his 
conceptualization of cinema, a ‘middle image’ to which movement belongs to 
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intrinsically.28 The indirect representation of time or of the Outside embodied in the 
association of movement-images in that sense corresponds to that which we 
experience of time or the Outside through our ordinary experiences. This association 
of movement-images (the indirect representation of time) undergoes in modern 
cinema an upheaval, and a new type of image appears: the direct image of time 
otherwise termed time-image. This image corresponds to a new type of experience 
(and a new image of thought (Deleuze, 2005a, xvii)) that is properly modern and that 
is expressed in the cinema of the seer. The movement-image is defined by an interval 
between a perception-image and an action-image; through the movement-image, 
perception prolongs itself into action, defining a ‘sensory-motor’ link which 
characterizes movement (Deleuze, 1985, 50). That which the characters (and 
viewers) see prolongs itself into that which the characters do, and the repetition of 
such linkages constitutes the actual universe of the film, correlating to the 
continuation of linear time and the constitution of actual space inside which the 
character perceives and acts. In modern cinema, the sensory-motor link is broken. 
Perception no longer prolongs itself into action, perception becomes the vision of the 
direct image of time as the actual universe of the film becomes indiscernible from 
the Outside, from the Outside it presupposes as its onto-genetic condition. The actual 
or open and the virtual or Outside become indiscernible in, for example, an 
‘amorphous space […] in the style of […] Antonioni’ (Deleuze, 1985, 169). The 
character’s (and the viewer’s) perception leads not to an action, but he ‘has gained in 
vision what he has lost in action or reaction: he SEES, so the problem of the 
spectator [and viewer] becomes “what is there to see in the image?” (instead of 
“what will we see in the following image?”)’ (Deleuze, 1985, 356). 
In modern cinema, the ‘whole’ changes, it changes in nature. The whole is not the 
open anymore, it is not the actual universe that the film constitutes as in classical 
cinema, in modern cinema the whole is the Outside. The Outside is interstice or 
fissure (Deleuze, 1985, 234-235), it fissures the open or actual universe of the film 
and becomes interstices between the association of movement-images. The Outside 
                                                 
28
 In opposition, Bergson conceptualizes the cinematic image (or Deleuze’s movement-image) as a 
series of photograms to which is added an ‘abstract time’, and as such to which movement does not 
belong to intrinsically or ‘really’, it is the ‘false movement’ of the ‘cinematic illusion’ (Deleuze, 1983, 
10, 11). 
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correlatively fissures or breaks the sensory-motor link. Not only is it as if the open is 
fissured or torn open onto its Outside, but the ‘fissure has become primary’ 
(Deleuze, 1985, 235): the Outside has become primary in the sense that the open 
becomes its dispersion, and as such in a sense “secondary” to the Outside (although 
both are in reciprocal presupposition and become indiscernible in the crystal-image). 
The Outside is interstice between images, a ‘spacing that makes each image tear 
itself from the void and fall back into it’ (Deleuze, 1985, 234). In modern cinema, 
cinematic images tear themselves from the Outside into which they fall back 
following a genesis described as differentiation or dispersion (Deleuze, 1985, 234, 
235). The operation of association of classical cinema is replaced in modern cinema 
by an operation of dispersion. The whole, now Outside, is itself process of 
dispersion. The purpose of modern cinema is not anymore to form a whole of actual 
movements through an uninterrupted chain of images slave to one another, but 
between two images to ‘make the indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible’ (Deleuze, 
1985, 235). Its purpose is to make visible the indiscernibility between the Outside 
and its dispersions (the open), in other words to construct an indiscernibility between 
the open and its condition, i.e. the Outside or the transcendental form of time.  
This is achieved through the cinematic image termed the crystal-image. The crystal-
image is the moment when the image is not associated to, enslaved by, other images 
to constitute actual movements but when ‘the actual image enters in relation with its 
own virtual image as such’ (Deleuze, 1985, 358). The nature of movement has 
changed. Movement is no more actual, movement is no more the continuation of 
linear time and the constitution of actual space (actual movements, movements in or 
of nature). Through the constitution of an image, a crystal-image, that is ‘double-
sided, mutual, actual and virtual simultaneously’29 (Deleuze, 1985, 358) what is seen 
indiscernibly from the actual in the crystal is a movement that is virtual or absolute: 
‘the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time, Cronos and not Chronos. 
The powerful non organic Life that grips the world’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109). What is 
seen through the crystal-image is an indiscernibility between the actual and the 
                                                 
29
 The crystal is a metaphor for an actual perception that expresses its virtual, a metaphor for a view of 
the actual which is indiscernibly a vision of the virtual. The term crystal is used for such metaphorical 
purpose because the atomic properties of crystals means that their actual forms, as perceived through 
the naked eye, express their internal molecular arrangements which can be thought of as their virtual. 
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virtual, between the open and the Outside. What is seen is the Outside dispersing and 
“preserving” itself, simultaneously. This indiscernibility between the Outside and its 
dispersions is imaged in the crystal-image as a germ: ‘the germ is the virtual image 
which will crystallize a milieu that is actually30 amorphous; but on the other hand the 
latter must have a structure virtually crystallizable in relation to which the germ now 
plays the role of actual image’ (Deleuze, 1985, 100). The crystal-image or germ is 
simultaneously the (virtual) image of an actual amorphous space resulting from the 
germination, crystallization or dispersion of the virtual, and the (actual) image of the 
structure of the virtual “in the process” of crystallizing itself. These two images are 
indissociable, they are the two sides of a single image: it is to see the virtual through 
the actual and to see the actual through the virtual, two sides of the single image of 
genesis.  
Seen through the crystal is the transcendental form of time: modern cinema is not the 
indirect representation of time but its direct presentation (Deleuze, 1985, 358), the 
perpetual foundation or split of time, the incessant crystallization of the virtual or 
dispersion of the Outside. The split of time is simultaneously in the tearing of the 
images from the Outside, in the actualization of the virtual which makes all the 
present pass on, and in the images falling back into the Outside, in the virtualization 
of the actual which preserves the past. The crystal is this simultaneity, it is ‘without 
inside nor outside, in vertiginous planes and faces, where the frontiers of life and 
death, of the past and the present exchange themselves […]’ (Buci-Glucksmann, 
1998, 96). 
The conceptualization of a cinema of the seer “aestheticizes” the genesis that A Life 
is as Outside itself process of simultaneous dispersion (or differentiation) and 
“preservation”. Were it not for this “preservation”, for this “feedback” of the living 
into its very own onto-genetic conditions, the Outside could rightly be accused of 
being a form of transcendence, a transcendent to the open. The virtualization of the 
actual is the difference between Bergson (and Deleuze) and Kant, and is that which 
conceptually affirms the transcendental as pure immanence.31 
                                                 
30
 Translated from French: ‘actuellement’; Deleuze refers to this amorphous milieu as being actual. 
31
 Deleuze discusses the relation of Bergson to Kant in Cinéma 2. L'image-temps p.109 (Deleuze, 
1985). 
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example of crystals, cinema of the seer: La ronde 
Deleuze assigns the status of ‘perfect crystals’ to the images of film director Max 
Ophüls, in for example Madame de … (1953) and La ronde (1950) (Deleuze, 1985, 
111). It is true that ‘no outside subsists’ in La ronde (Deleuze, 1985, 111), meaning 
that the Outside becomes indiscernible with the open or actual universe of the film. 
The master of ceremonies is like an agent of dispersion of the Outside, the “rounded 
vision” he claims to have is this operation of dispersion. Outside or virtual himself, 
he finds his presence in the actual, in the “actual universe” the film constitutes, as 
interstices, as fissures between the different characters, decors and sequences. As he 
says when he is asked to identify himself: “No one. That is to say, anyone.”32; he is 
the Outside personified, no one and anyone, nowhere (outside the open which he 
disperses) and anywhere, which also means everywhere (in reciprocal presupposition 
with the open he disperses), he is the modern whole: the Outside. The master of 
ceremonies embodies the image of a man which Deleuze gives to the transcendental 
form of time: ‘the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self 
nor I, the “plebeian” guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered 
members gravitate around the sublime image’ (Deleuze, 2003b, 121). The actual 
movements of the characters, and the sequences of the film, are orchestrated, 
projected, dispersed by the master of ceremonies from the Outside he embodies. 
They turn in round with the Outside, turn in round with the master of ceremonies 
who operates the continuously renewed genesis of the open. The master of 
ceremonies operates the continuation of the plot through the projection of characters 
on the scene, through the dispersion of sequences as constitution or actualization of 
an open, and the simultaneous virtualization of these characters and sequences 
through their recuperation or preservation into the Outside he is. The master of 
ceremonies is genesis, an Outside itself genesis of the actual universe the film 
constitutes. The plot must go on, “La ronde” must turn as the continuous 
actualization of the virtual and virtualization of the actual: actual-virtual-actual-
virtual-…, or dispersion-preservation-dispersion-preservation-… etc. The master of 
ceremonies repeats and repeats, he is himself difference (Outside) and the repetition 
of difference (dispersion of the Outside). He is himself the relentless split of time as 
dividing in two: into the passing of the present (the actual, the continuation of the 
                                                 
32
 Translated from French: ‘Personne. C’est-à-dire n’importe qui.’ 
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plot taking place in the open), and the “preservation” of the past (the virtual, as he 
makes the characters fall back into the Outside that he is). The master of ceremonies 
is Outside and continuously renewed genesis, repetition of difference. 
Zabriskie Point 
The crystal-image can be exemplified, perhaps more potently than in Ophüls, with 
the visionary sex scene in Michelangelo Antonioni’s Zabriskie Point (1970). The 
scene exceeds ‘the horizon of event’, ‘man’s banal horizon’, the living or the open 
the film constitutes, in the attempt to construct an indiscernibility with the ‘always 
receding cosmological horizon’, the Outside (Deleuze, 1985, 28).33 The sequence of 
the couple kissing in the desert opens itself onto a plurality of couples, unknown to 
the viewer and to the plot; they are no one, anyone and everyone like the master of 
ceremonies in La ronde. Of the plurality of couples some are often mistaken for 
being the two protagonists, which as such, like all the others, become no one, anyone 
and everyone. Groups of them fight, sexually tease each other, bite one another; the 
romance is animalistic, sexual; their bodies are interlaced in masses of flesh on the 
desert sand of which they are covered and into which they seem to disappear. There 
are very slow movements randomly interrupted by rapid movements, changes of 
viewpoint and close focus. The sequence does not linearly develop the narrative, 
there is no clear progression of the sexual act, the couple exists in a time that is not 
chronological: they are nude, dressed, nude, dressed, and so on. The sequence does 
not associate images with the purpose of establishing the continuation of linear time 
and the construction of actual space. The sensory-motor link is broken, perception is 
not prolonged by an action (progression of the sexual act) but becomes the vision of 
a time that is not chronological and of a space that is ‘amorphous’, devoid of 
Euclidean co-ordinates (Deleuze, 1985, 169). Sand, organs, smiles, traces, hairs, 
sexual acts, dust, animals, teeth, fog, etc., interlaced at shifting speeds and unusual 
angles as an a-spatial space and an a-temporal time outside narration: an amorphous 
crystallized space itself vision. From the initial couple, the sequence repetitively 
moves to other unknown couples and groupings before going back to them, and like 
                                                 
33
 ‘Antonioni spoke of ‘the horizon of events’, but noted that in the West the word has a double 
meaning, man’s banal horizon and an inaccessible and always receding cosmological horizon’ 
(Deleuze, 1985, 28). 
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in La ronde, the sequence turns and turns between the actual image of the romance 
of the initial couple and the virtual image of the amorphous space in which they are: 
actual-virtual-actual-virtual-…, ‘one can only just turn in the crystal’ (Deleuze, 
1985, 111). A fog leads to traces of anyone’s and everyone’s sexual acts and 
animalistic combats on the grounds. The vision leads back to the view, there remains 
only actual traces of virtual movements on the sand floor, time is again linear and 
space actual. The open or actual universe of the film had torn itself open onto and 
became indiscernible with the reciprocally presupposing Outside of which it is the 
dispersion. Now the interstices or fissures which led to and gave the vision are 
closed again. The visionary sex scene is in the style Deleuze assigns to Antonioni: 
‘empty and amorphous spaces which lose their Euclidean co-ordinates, in the style of 
Ozu or Antonioni. […] crystallized space, when the landscapes become hallucinatory 
in a milieu which now retains only crystalline seeds and crystallizable materials’ 
(Deleuze, 1985, 169). 
Figural painting and a cinema of the seer 
This description of the indiscernibility between the open and the Outside, the direct 
image of the transcendental form of time, resembles to a certain degree the 
description of the body without organs expressed in a sensation: ‘as if the organisms 
were caught up in a whirling or serpentine movement that gives them a single 
“body”, or unites them in a single “fact”, independently from any figurative or 
narrative relation’ (Deleuze, 2002, 122). The loss of Euclidean co-ordinates in 
amorphous or crystallized space reminds us of the milieu Bacon composes through 
the radical invention of the Figure from chaos. One could begin to think of the 
modulation of colour in Figural painting, and as such the establishment of 
differential relations, as a process of crystallization. Figural painting, Portrait of 
Isabel Rawsthorne: composition of chaos, chaosmos, or crystallization of the virtual, 
dispersion of the Outside, rendered sensory. Connections can be made between the 
nature of haptic space given to experience by a Figure and the nature of an 
amorphous crystallized space perceived through a crystal-image. The liberation of 
the eye from its optical function through the haptic vision given by a Figural painting 
could surely be linked with the rupture of the sensory-motor link through which 
perception prolongs itself no more into action but opens itself onto a vision. But the 
distinctions between the vision that a Figure is and a vision perceived through the 
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crystal-image should not disappear through over simplified descriptions. The painter 
and the director both engage with A Life or the Outside, but, in concordance with 
their respective mediums, completely differently: sensation or transcendental form of 
time (and necessarily through different modes of practical engagement, the Figure or 
the crystal-image). Deleuze’s conceptualization of Figural painting and of a cinema 
of the seer helps to understand and appreciate the complexities of Deleuze’s 
ontology, and his own philosophical commitment to A Life. They define medium-
specific modes of practical engagement by which to embody a commitment to A 
Life, by which to express and give visions of A Life in the living. 
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Section 4 – Introduction to the paradigms of commitment to 
A Life 
 
motivation 
Two things have motivated me to operate the expansion of DG’s conceptualization 
of art. Firstly, the intuition that, like Bacon’s work, some works by Thomas Struth, 
Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter Doig34 embody a commitment to A Life. This 
intuition stems from the aesthetic experiences of these works, I feel that these works 
and the experiences they provide involve A Life, but in very different ways from 
Bacon’s Figural paintings (and the films which can be said to be encompassed by a 
cinema of the seer) which express A Life in the living. The works I am interested in 
are not, and as such do not give, visions of A Life. From this emerges the need to 
conceptualize other paradigms by which these works can be conceptualized to 
embody a commitment to A Life. Secondly, as previously discussed, DG’s 
conceptualization of art is, some might say, narrow, exclusive, and limited in relation 
to contemporary art practices. Most relevantly, their conceptualization of art rejects 
photography since, as further examined in the following section, it cannot attain to 
its own conditions, i.e. A Life, and express it in a sensation. And it rejects conceptual 
art because it ‘tends to be “informative”’, failing simultaneously the concept and the 
sensation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 187).35 Many contemporary art practices 
produce works which tend to be “informative”, it seems that we very often have to 
“read” works (information) rather than “feel” them (sensation), we have to make 
                                                 
34
 The main works discussed are: Struth’s New Pictures From Paradise series of photographs of 
jungles, 1998-on going, more specifically Paradise 6 Daintree, Australia, 1998; La saison des fêtes, 
2010, and A Journey That Wasn’t, 2005, by Huyghe; When Faith Moves Mountains, 2002, by Alÿs; 
and Untitled (Ping Pong), 2006-2008, and Paragon, 2006, by Doig. 
35
 DG indirectly refers to the conceptual artwork One and Three Chairs, 1965, by Joseph Kosuth: ‘a 
thing, its photograph on the same scale and in the same place’. In One and Three Chairs the ‘thing’ is 
a chair. The work fails to attain to the concept of chair, ‘reducing the concept to the doxa of the social 
body’, as if trying to attain to the concept by presenting infinitely reproducible perceptions or 
affections of the living. Conceptual art, by only giving to experience ‘ordinary perceptions and 
affections’, also fails to attain to the sensation, even to attain to ‘the sensation of the concept’ 
conceptual art might be thought to aim for, an objective DG find more appropriate to assign to 
abstract art: not the sensation of sea, not the Life that the sea is, not the BwO of the sea, but a 
‘dematerialized’ sensation, a sensation of the concept of sea. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 187) 
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sense of information embodied in or about the works in order to fully engage with 
them. Many contemporary works do not express a sensation but appear to express a 
concept, expressions which to different degrees demand a “reading”, and as such 
involve an ontology and modes of engagement and of aesthetic experience which 
completely depart from DG’s conceptualization of art. It would be difficult not to 
agree with the assessment that DG’s conceptualization of art has limitations in 
relation to contemporary art practices. It seems however that this should not be 
evaluated, at least primarily, as a negative aspect: on the contrary, the narrowness of 
their conceptualization is that which allows it to be a forceful and radical articulation 
of a commitment to A Life, the artwork is and gives A Life, it restores the absolute, 
the infinite. Evidently, this force and radicalism is overshadowed by their 
conceptualization’s incapacity to encompass most contemporary art practices. There 
definitely is in writings engaging with contemporary art practices a desire to 
overcome this limit, not by departing from DG but from within Deleuze’s and DG’s 
writings. And effectively, ‘there is no reason we cannot look to Deleuze’s other 
writings, on cinema and literature, for example and creatively apply concepts from 
these different mediums and milieus to the field of expanded visual art as it exists 
today’ (O'Sullivan, 2006, 144). Such creative applications of concepts to 
contemporary art practices in many cases give very interesting results, however my 
approach is to a certain extent different. My approach is not to apply to 
contemporary art practices concepts which DG have developed in relation to 
mediums and milieus other than art, it is to take their conceptualization as a point of 
departure and attempt to expand it whilst remaining close to its essence. This essence 
is argued to be a commitment to A Life: a commitment articulated radically in DG 
through a paradigm of expressions/visions of A Life. In the following section 
Struth’s work is analyzed through the creative application of concepts extracted from 
Deleuze’s writings on cinema (and on Nietzsche and Leibniz), but my approach is 
not fully rendered by such description. This is partly because Deleuze’s writings on 
cinema (and literature, music could also be included) involve the same paradigm of 
expression of A Life as DG’s conceptualization of art. My approach is not per se to 
use concepts through which DG have approached a paradigm of expression of A Life 
in mediums or milieus other than art and apply them to contemporary art practices, it 
is to conceptualize new paradigms by which art can commit to A Life beyond a 
paradigm of expressions/visions of A Life. Most obviously, the difference of my 
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approach is that it results in a new conceptualization of art and as such in a new 
definition of art. As it will be seen through its incapacity to (or “refusal” to) 
encompass contemporary works such as Gerhard Richter’s abstract and “blurred 
photograph” paintings and Pierre Huyghe’s work titled A Journey That Wasn’t, 
2005, my expanded conceptualization of art remains relatively narrow with rigid 
criteria defining its borders. Its purpose is not to encompass a high volume of 
contemporary art practices but practices of a high quality in their capacity to 
embody, and push the boundaries of what it means to embody, a commitment to A 
Life. 
From the engagement with specific works by Bacon, Struth, Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig 
emerges four different paradigms of commitment to A Life. The three newly 
conceptualized paradigms do not relate to A Life as radically as does the paradigm A 
Life in the living corresponding to DG’s conceptualization of art: the works which 
embody either one of these three paradigms do not express and give visions of A 
Life. The loss of radicalism of the three new paradigms is compensated for by the 
expansion they offer. Each of the three new paradigms is a departure from DG’s 
conceptualization of art, a departure which allows for the inclusion, in an expanded 
conceptualization of art, of other modes of aesthetic experience beyond vision: 
hallucination, view, narration, and of other mediums: photography, performance and 
figurative painting. The problem is how to be more inclusive of contemporary art 
practices whilst establishing rigid criteria by which an expanded conceptualization of 
art embodies the essence of DG’s conceptualization.  
As the three new paradigms of commitment to A Life emerged from the engagement 
with the artworks intuited to relate to A Life, I came to realize that a certain logic 
linked the four paradigms together. This logic is best articulated in relation to the 
notion of movement. 
movement, and the aesthetic experience a haptic vision 
In terms of aesthetic experience, a haptic vision (for example Portrait of Isabel 
Rawsthorne) not only is but can be said to lead to and open itself onto a possible 
universe. The aesthetic experience of art can as such be expressed in terms of 
movement, and movement in turn can be described in terms of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization.  
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Deterritorialization is ‘the movement by which “one” leaves the territory’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1980, 634). The deterritorialization is always necessarily in reciprocal 
presupposition with a reterritorialization since as soon as a territory is left, another 
territory (or the absolute, as it will be discussed) is necessarily entered, attained, 
conquered, etc.; and inversely so, a reterritorialization also inevitably involves a 
deterritorialization by which a previous territory was left. Through the aesthetic 
experience of a haptic vision the viewer can be said to go through a movement of 
deterritorialization from nature and of reterritorialization onto a possible universe. 
This movement can equivalently be described as: from the view of the living to a 
vision of A Life in the living; from real experience to conditions of real experience; 
from the finite to the infinite; from nature to a “territorialization” on the absolute that 
A Life is; from nature to a possible universe.36 
The movements of de- and re- territorialization do not only describe the aesthetic 
experience of the viewer. Movement also articulates the process by which A Life is a 
continuously renewed genesis, by which chaos is given a continuously renewed 
consistency, and as such by which nature as we perceive it through our views 
incessantly changes. Movement has what could be termed two components in 
reciprocal presupposition: a virtual component by which it is absolute and an actual 
component by which it is relative. Movement is simultaneously absolute and 
relative, it is simultaneously virtual movements and actual movements. DG discuss 
movement in Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux: 
Movement has an essential relation to the imperceptible; it is by nature 
imperceptible. Perception can grasp movement only as the displacement of a 
moving body or the development of a form. Movements, becomings, in other 
words, pure relations of speed and slowness, pure affects, are below and 
above the threshold of perception (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, 309). 
In this quote, movement is that which is here termed virtual movements (becomings, 
pure relations of speed and slowness, affects, etc.), and the displacement of a moving 
body or the development of a form is here referred to as actual movements. Relative 
or actual movements describe the living, the movements of or in nature, and absolute 
or virtual movements describe A Life, the infinite movements and speeds of chaos 
                                                 
36
 “Movement from nature to a possible universe” is a specific formulation which will form part of the 
new definition of art correlated to the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art. 
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and its genesis, the chaosmos. Relative movement is that which is ordinarily grasped 
of (absolute) movement through perception, it is absolute movement within the 
threshold of perception. ‘Threshold of perceptions are relative, there is always one 
capable of grasping that which elude the other: the eagle’s eye …’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1980, 344). What different perceiving subjects see of absolute movement 
depends on ‘the mediation’ which corresponds their specific threshold of perception 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 344, 345). But absolute ‘movement in itself continues 
to occur elsewhere’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 344) beyond the mediation of 
perception, beyond the threshold of perception: like the living is that which we 
perceive of A Life through our ordinary views, the relative actual movements are that 
which is perceived of the absolute virtual movements. A perceiving subject is in A 
Life, the transcendental field or pure plane of immanence, and looks directly at A 
Life but sees “only” that which her own threshold of perception allows for: not the 
infinite movements and speeds of chaos, virtual absolute movement, but the relative 
movements that form the nature she perceives or “mediates” absolute movement as 
(the nature she can perceive: neither the eagle’s nature nor the tick’s nature, her 
nature). 
Our ordinary movements in and experiences of nature are relative 
deterritorializations and reterritorializations. A relative de- and re- territorialization is 
a movement from one territory in nature to another territory in nature, for example 
from the room to the corridor. It also corresponds to our ordinary experiences or 
views of nature: from a view of the room to a view of the corridor. By virtue of 
reciprocal presupposition, a relative deterritorialization ‘requires an absolute for its 
operation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 636), meaning that a relative movement 
always necessarily supposes absolute movement. It is like saying, using DG’s quote 
above: the displacement of a moving body or the development of a form requires and 
as such reciprocally presupposes becomings, pure relations of speed and slowness, 
for its operation. But through a relative de- and re- territorialization this absolute is 
“missed” in experience like A Life is “missed” in our ordinary experiences of the 
living, like the vision is “missed” in the view, like the conditions are “missed” in real 
experiences.  
The aesthetic experience of a haptic vision involves a movement different to our 
ordinary movements in and experiences of nature, it involves a movement of 
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absolute deterritorialization: the viewer goes through a movement by which it leaves 
the territory in or of nature and attains to the absolute that A Life is. The absolute 
deterritorialization is coupled with what could be termed a “reterritorialization on the 
absolute”, from nature to A Life, from the finite to the infinite. There are no 
territories on the absolute that A Life is, hence the expression “reterritorialization on 
the absolute”, which is my own and not DG’s, might appear to be misleading. But 
since this text emphasizes the aesthetic experience of a haptic vision as a movement 
from nature to a possible universe, in other words as a deterritorialization from 
nature and a reterritorialization on a possible universe which itself expresses the 
absolute that A Life is, the expression “reterritorialization on the absolute” seems 
appropriate. A haptic vision can be said to be a territorialization on and of the 
absolute: a possible universe that gives consistency to the absolute and by which the 
absolute becomes sensory.  
In this case movement ceases to be related to the mediation of a relative 
threshold that it eludes ad infinitum; it has attained, regardless of its speed or 
slowness, an absolute but differentiated threshold […] It could also be said 
that movement ceases to be the procedure of an always relative 
deterritorialization, to become the procedure of absolute deterritorialization 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 345). 
The perceiving subject through her aesthetic experience of a haptic vision no longer 
sees the nature her relative threshold of perception gives or allows her to see, 
perception opens itself onto itself and as such onto its conditions as the threshold 
becomes absolute but differentiated: what is experienced is the infinite variation of 
vanishing and emerging differential relations determining the topology of the 
transcendental field, onto-genetic conditions, a Figure by Bacon for example. The 
threshold becomes, and correlatively the perceiving subject becomes one with, ‘the 
construction of this or that region of the continued plane’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1980, 345) or plane of immanence, the transcendental field, A Life. When the viewer 
is reterritorialized on the possible universe that a haptic vision is, she attains to the 
absolute, she goes through an absolute deterritorialization uniting with the absolute 
component of movement, establishing a unity with A Life. The viewer is, as 
previously discussed, dispersed in and as A Life, the viewer experiences the 
sensation that the artwork is, and liberated from her organism, she is given a haptic 
eye by which she becomes other than she was, she crosses a threshold of consistency 
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becoming A Life as A Life becomes through “her”. The absolute deterritorialization 
necessarily requires a relative for its operation ‘precisely because it is not 
transcendent’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 636). The absolute deterritorialization 
does not mean to attain to a transcendent universe as if leaving nature towards an 
exteriority transcendent to the pure plane of immanence. Absolute movement always 
operates through a relative movement (and inversely so), meaning that the viewer 
which goes through an absolute deterritorialization establishing a unity with A Life 
is and remains, for example, in front of the painting in the gallery space. The 
aesthetic experience of a haptic vision is the way by which a relative movement 
opens itself onto its absolute; in other words the way by which the living or nature 
opens itself onto itself and as such onto the Life that it is, the way by which the body, 
the view, the finite, open themselves onto themselves and as such onto the body 
without organs, the vision, the infinite.37 
three qualities or moments of movement 
Movement can be defined by three inseparable and presupposing qualities or 
“moments” which describe the interrelations or “incessant passages” between its 
relative and absolute components, between actual and virtual movements: the 
virtualization of the actual (actual – virtual); the reciprocal presupposition between 
the actual and the virtual, their inseparability; and the actualization of the virtual 
(virtual – actual). It is important to understand that there is only “one” movement, 
which can be thought as having both a relative and an absolute component, and as 
“being composed by” or as “in-between” the actualization of the virtual and the 
virtualization of the actual. Effectively movement can be described as actual-virtual-
actual-virtual-…, as the continuously renewed genesis of the actual (virtual – actual) 
and the incessant “preservation” or feedback of the actual into the virtual (actual – 
virtual). These two qualities or “moments” of movement presuppose each other and 
entail a reciprocal presupposition between the actual and the virtual. Hence 
movement can also be described as virtual-virtual-virtual-virtual-… (virtual 
movements) in reciprocal presupposition with actual-actual-actual-actual-… (actual 
movements). The former sequence corresponds to the absolute component of 
                                                 
37
 D. N. Rodowick provides an account of relative movement and absolute movement in relation to 
cinema, of the ‘relative and absolute as two perspectives on movement, inseparable yet quite different 
in their relation to images’ (Rodowick, 1997, 44-45). 
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movement and the latter to its relative component. virtual-virtual-virtual-virtual-… is 
A Life, and actual-actual-actual-actual-… is the living, that which we ordinarily 
experience or grasp of A Life.38 
The three qualities of movement respectively correspond to: absolute 
deterritorialization (from the living to A Life, the virtualization of the actual); the 
reciprocal presupposition between the absolute and relative components of 
movement (the living and A Life in reciprocal presupposition); and relative 
reterritorialization (from A Life to the living, the actualization of the virtual). In 
terms of genesis, the three qualities of movement respectively correspond to: the 
chaotization of all consistency or the dispersions falling back into the Outside; the 
“tension” between chaos and consistency, the “tension” between the Outside and its 
dispersions; and chaos being given consistency, the dispersion of the Outside. 
 
introduction to the four paradigms of commitment to A Life 
The artwork described by DG’s conceptualization of art (for instance Portrait of 
Isabel Rawsthorne), the artwork which embodies the paradigm of commitment to A 
Life termed A Life in the living, embodies the first quality of movement: absolute 
deterritorialization, from the living to A Life. This quality effectively corresponds to 
DG’s definition of art as the finite which restores the infinite, a movement from the 
finite to the infinite, from nature to a possible universe which expresses the absolute 
or infinite that A Life is. This quality of movement also describes the aesthetic 
experience of the artwork: the haptic vision as discussed above. This quality can be 
termed the haptic quality of movement, it is the quality by which movement always 
necessarily is, and opens its relative component onto, the absolute that A Life is 
(although it is not ordinarily experienced as such). The artwork which embodies the 
paradigm A Life in the living is said to embody and as such give to experience this 
haptic quality of movement. 
                                                 
38
 In these sequences, the “actual” can be replaced by “the living” or “nature”, and the “virtual” by “A 
Life”. Movement can be described as nature-A Life-nature-A Life-…; the relative component of 
movement, that which we ordinarily experience of A Life, as nature-nature-nature-nature-…; and the 
absolute component of movement as A Life-A Life-A Life-A Life-… . 
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The logic by which there is a relation between the first three paradigms of 
commitment to A Life is that each paradigm corresponds to a quality of movement: 
each of these paradigms embodies and as such gives to experience one of the three 
qualities of movement. The first three paradigms are as such intrinsically related 
since the three qualities of movement are in an ontological sense inseparable. 
Works which embody the second paradigm of commitment to A Life (the paradigm 
termed the living as point of view on and from A Life) embody and as such give to 
experience the reciprocal presupposition between the absolute and the relative 
components of movement, between the living and A Life, in other words the tension 
between chaos and consistency or between the Outside and its dispersions. As 
discussed through the development of an ontology of the photograph and Struth’s 
New Pictures From Paradise series of photographs, the experience of the reciprocal 
presupposition between the living and A Life involves an experience of the living as 
point of view on and from the Outside or A Life. How is an engagement with the 
reciprocal presupposition between the living and A Life a commitment to A Life? 
Through the works which embody this second paradigm, the living is simultaneously 
experienced as point of view on A Life, meaning that the living is that which is 
perceived of A Life (in accordance with our respective threshold of perception), and 
as point of view from A Life, meaning that it is from and through A Life or the 
Outside that the living is perceived. This engagement does not give visions of A Life 
in the living, hence it is less radical than the paradigm A Life in the living, but it 
“relates” the living to the Life that it is, and as such it is a commitment to A Life. 
Works which embody the third paradigm of commitment to A Life (new living 
emerging from A Life) embody and as such give to experience the relative 
reterritorialization corresponding to the quality of movement by which movement is 
from A Life to the living. This living or nature is not the same as the one prior to the 
movement, it is a new living or new nature which emerges from A Life or the 
Outside. The third quality of movement is the one by which movement always 
necessarily results or (re-)emerges from the continuously renewed creation that A 
Life is, the quality of movement by which nature continuously renews itself, by 
which nature continuously re-emerges anew. An embodiment of this quality of 
movement is a commitment to A Life because it gives to experience a new living or 
nature which emerges from A Life, giving to experience the renewing force and 
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creative potential that A Life is. In comparison to the first two paradigms, this 
paradigm is a more pronounced departure from DG’s conceptualization of art: as it 
will be further discussed the new living or nature which emerges from A Life 
opposes itself to the ‘new earth and […] people’ that art ‘calls for’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1991, 104), and involves through its aesthetic experience no unity with A 
Life as do works which embody the first two paradigms. Consequently this third 
paradigm corresponds to a less radical commitment to A Life in comparison to the 
first two paradigms. 
The fourth paradigm of commitment to A Life (to live A Life) does not relate to 
either one of the three qualities of movement encompassed by the first three 
paradigms. The first three paradigms are concerned with the “nature” of movement, 
with the qualities of movement which describe the interrelations between its relative 
and absolute components, qualities which define how our ordinary experiences of the 
living relate to A Life and inversely so, how A Life relates to our ordinary 
experiences. The fourth paradigm concerns itself with a different type of problem: 
not the “nature” of movement but the “performance” of movement. The fourth 
paradigm is like the three others a paradigm of commitment to A Life, in other words 
a paradigm of commitment to the absolute component of movement. Concerning 
itself with the “performance” of movement and being a commitment to the absolute 
component of movement, the fourth paradigm concerns itself with the performance 
of absolute movement. The performance of absolute movement means not to perform 
the relative movements we ordinarily perform, but as it will be discussed through 
works by Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig, it means to perform absolute movements, not to 
ordinarily live the living (as we ordinarily do), but to live A Life (which we rarely 
do). This fourth paradigm is the most pronounced departure from DG’s 
conceptualization of art. As it will be further discussed, this paradigm involves the 
narrations of “stories” of figures who live A Life. Narration, and its intrinsic links to 
figuration (Doig’s paintings for example are said to narrate through figuration, Doig 
paints figuratively), is in complete opposition to DG’s conceptualization of art. The 
paradigm A Life in the living always involves expression (Figural painting for 
example) in diametrical opposition to the representational practices of both 
figuration and narration. This fourth paradigm nevertheless corresponds to a 
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commitment to A Life since A Life is that which is lived, the artworks narrate stories 
about the possibilities of living A Life. 
Why exactly are these three new paradigms said to constitute an expansion of DG’s 
conceptualization of art? Because like DG’s conceptualization of art, at the core of 
each of these three paradigms is A Life, each concerns itself first and foremost with 
A Life (and inevitably with its reciprocal presupposition with the living). Following 
a concern with the visionary expression of A Life in the living, the concern with A 
Life then shifts: A Life is that which “gives to see” the living and that which is 
“gazed at” (but not seen) when seeing the living, the living is simultaneously point of 
view on A Life and point of view from and through A Life. The concern with A Life 
shifts again: A Life is that which renews the living and that which the living 
continuously re-emerges from, A Life is the creative potential which leads to new 
possibilities. And finally, in a shift that can be said to be more drastic, A Life is that 
which is lived, beyond, although necessarily through, the living which we ordinarily 
live. 
no medium specificity 
By definition, the expression of A Life in the living as a conceptualization of art 
encompasses many different mediums as it is clearly articulated in Qu'est-ce que la 
philosophie? (it applies to painting, literature, sculpture and music), although it 
needs to be precisely conceptualized in relation to each medium (for example 
painting as Figural painting). Each of the four paradigms of the expanded 
conceptualization of art is also not medium specific. A specific medium can embody 
different paradigms. For example, some of Doig’s paintings are conceptualized to 
embody the paradigm to live A Life. Doig’s work does not fail art following DG’s 
conceptualization of art because it is figurative and fails to express A Life. Doig uses 
the medium of painting to embody another paradigm by which his work embodies a 
commitment to A Life, although not as radically as Figural painting does. And 
correlatively, a paradigm can be embodied by many different mediums. For example, 
Alÿs performances and their documentations are also said to embody, like Doig’s 
work, the paradigm to live A Life. 
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set of properties defining each paradigm of commitment to A Life, the paradigm A 
Life in the living 
Each of the four paradigms is defined by the same set of five properties. The 
paradigm A Life in the living encompasses the mode of practical engagement with 
painting termed Figure39; but since a paradigm can encompass many different modes 
of practical engagement, a paradigm is not defined by these modes. The first 
property of a paradigm is a mode of aesthetic experience (the set of five properties 
defining a paradigm are in this paragraph italicized). The paradigm A Life in the 
living is defined by the mode of aesthetic experience termed vision. This paradigm is 
defined in terms of movement by the absolute deterritorialization (and the 
reterritorialization on the absolute). The description of experience correlated to this 
paradigm is nature opened onto itself and as such onto the absolute that A Life is. Its 
corresponding quality of movement is the haptic quality of movement (as previously 
mentioned the fourth paradigm has no corresponding quality of movement). The 
final property is the type of possible universe the artwork which embodies a specific 
paradigm is said to lead to or to open itself onto. As it has already been discussed the 
haptic vision involves a deterritorialization from nature and a reterritorialization on a 
possible universe which itself expresses the absolute that A Life is. The paradigm A 
Life in the living is defined by a type of possible universe termed haptic vision. These 
five properties constitute the set of properties by which all paradigms are defined. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Cinema, although not explicitly categorized as art as previous discussed, could be said to embody 
the paradigm A Life in the living through a mode of practical engagement termed crystal-image. 
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Section 5 –Photography and the second paradigm of 
commitment to A Life: the living as point of view on and 
from A Life 
 
The interest in conceptualizing photography as medium by which it is possible to 
embody a commitment to A Life stems from the intuition that the aesthetic 
experience of Thomas Struth’s New Pictures From Paradise series of photographs of 
jungles and forests40 relates to A Life or the Outside. This intuition cannot find its 
conceptual explanation in Deleuze since for him a photograph cannot express A Life 
in a sensation, it cannot give a vision of A Life in the living. 
Deleuze and photography 
Following DG’s conceptualization, art is the expression of A Life in the living, it 
expresses A Life in a sensation, giving to experience a percept and an affect. The 
photograph cannot achieve this because, as previously mentioned, it cannot express 
the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is. The photograph is not a 
vision but a view, it is unable to express an indiscernibility between that which it 
gives to see (the sensed, the lived, a single level) and its conditions (the sensing, the 
Living in the lived, the difference of levels).  
Deleuze establishes a link between our ordinary human views and photographs. 
Photographs ‘impose themselves upon sight and rule over the eye completely’ 
(Deleuze, 2002, 87). Photographs condition sight, photography ‘is what modern man 
sees’ (Deleuze, 2002, 19). It seems that Deleuze means two things here: that modern 
man is conditioned to see clichés (and as previously mentioned that the modern 
painter faces the danger of painting the preexisting clichés that already cover the 
white surface of the canvas), but also that photographs condition sight “to perceive 
on a single level”. Photography participates in denying us visions, it works against 
the possibility of experiencing the constitutive difference of levels that sensation is, 
                                                 
40
 Thomas Struth produces a series of photographs titled Paradise 1, Paradise 2, etc., followed by the 
region and country in which they were taken. As of 2002, 25 photographs formed the series; each 
were reproduced in the book New Pictures From Paradise (Struth et al., 2002). The series is formed 
of photographs taken from jungles and forests of Australia, Japan, USA, China, Germany, and Brazil. 
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(in painterly terms) against the constitution of a haptic sense. An x-ray photograph of 
the body does not express the body without organs which accounts for the difference 
of levels that the sensation is, on the contrary, it flattens it, it actualizes it onto a 
single level. To introduce a relation between science and photography, a relation that 
is more my own than DG’s: the photograph catches the BwO in a system of 
reference by which it “gives” organs to it, by which it measures it as organs. 
 
Plate 62, Horse Catering, Annie G. With Jockey (.056 second) by Eadweard Muybridge, 
1887 
 
And yet, paradoxically, Deleuze writes that ‘Muybridge’s photo-images’ manage to 
include within their sensation the constitutive difference of levels (Deleuze, 2002, 
87). Deleuze does not tell us how the photo-images manage to do so, but through this 
proposition he opposes them to photographs. This proposition appears like a 
contradiction since Deleuze rejects the ‘hypothesis’ that ‘levels of sensation would 
be like stops or snapshots of movement, which would recompose movement 
synthetically, in its continuity, speed and violence, as in synthetic cubism, futurism, 
or Duchamp’s Nude’ (Deleuze, 2002, 44). Effectively, levels of sensation are not 
instantaneous snapshots decomposing movement into stills, they are, as previously 
discussed, that which the body without organs accounts for. This tension in 
Deleuze’s writings with regards to the capacity of Muybridge’s photo-images serves 
as a clue explaining my intuition that Struth’s New Pictures From Paradise series 
relates to sensation and as such to A Life. 
Removed due to copyright
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photography and movement 
The difference between photography and cinema in terms of that which they give to 
see is obvious: the photograph has no movement whereas cinema, as previously 
discussed, gives the movement-image, a middle image akin to natural perception 
since (actual) movement belongs to it intrinsically. (Actual) movement is a ‘mobile 
cut of duration’ or mobile cut of virtual absolute movement (Deleuze, 1983, 22); in 
turn, the photograph is an instantaneous image, an ‘immobile cut of [actual] 
movement’ (Deleuze, 1983, 22). Photographs perhaps condition sight in terms of 
pre-mediating our views with clichés and conditioning our sight “to perceive” on a 
single level, but that which the photograph gives to see is not what is experienced 
through human or natural perception. Human perception, as Deleuze writes in his 
discussion of the movement-image, is not the successive perceptions of static points 
of view, it is not the successive perceptions of immobile cuts of actual movement 
(Deleuze, 1983, 11). Human perception is not photographic, its continuously 
renewed genesis is not the serial actualization of static points of view. As for the 
movement-image of cinema, movement belongs to human perception intrinsically. It 
is as such impossible for human perception (without the photograph) to experience a 
static point of view. Simply by virtue of being static, of being an immobile cut of 
actual movement, the photograph is ontologically different to that which human 
perception “perceives”. The photograph gives to see a view beyond the threshold of 
human perception. This formulates that which we all know intuitively on a pragmatic 
level: the photograph gives to see something different to what we see through human 
perception, as it is clearly exemplified by the work of Muybridge (even by a single 
photo-image in isolation from the others on the same plate)41. The photographic 
apparatus (or camera) has its own relative threshold perception by which it “sees” 
(that which we see in the photograph) beyond the threshold of human perception. 
But this does not mean that the photograph gives to experience a vision of A Life, 
the photographic apparatus’ threshold of perception remains relative, it is not 
absolute as through the haptic vision and absolute deterritorialization. As DG writes: 
‘in relation to the photograph, the [virtual absolute] movement and the affect [A 
Life] once again took refuge above and below’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 344) the 
                                                 
41
 It is as such that Muybridge was able to respond to the challenge that was given to him and prove 
that there is a point at which a galloping horse does not touch the ground. 
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photographic apparatus’ relative threshold of perception. The photograph does not 
give to see A Life, it gives to see a view of the “nature” the photographic apparatus 
can perceive, a view of the “nature” that constitutes that which the photographic 
apparatus can perceive of absolute movement, in other words a view of that which 
the photographic apparatus perceives A Life as according to the mediation it 
operates. 
 
 
5.a – Ontology of the photograph 
 
The ontological shift of the photograph (in comparison to our ordinary views) can be 
summarized as: the photograph relates the living in its point of view to its genesis, 
and it achieves this by virtue of ‘sharing’ its genesis with the living. 42 
The photograph relates nature to its genesis, the living to A Life, it relates the living 
to the Life that it is. This does not mean that the photograph expresses the Life of 
that which is in its point of view. I agree with Deleuze, the photograph cannot 
express A Life in a sensation. But by virtue of sharing with the living (in its point of 
view) the same genesis, the photograph, more potently the extra-ordinary 
photograph, relates nature to the Life or genesis that it is, leading to an aesthetic 
experience that is very different to both our ordinary views and the experience of a 
haptic vision. 
horizontal line of actual movements and vertical line of genesis 
A constant paradigm in Deleuze’s ontology is the opposition of two imbricated, 
reciprocally presupposing lines. They are a horizontal line of actual movements 
(history, movements in or of the living, actual relative movements) and a vertical 
line of genesis (becoming, movements of A Life, virtual absolute movements).43 
                                                 
42
 The term “sharing” is borrowed from André Bazin (as further discussed below): ‘The photograph as 
such and the object in itself share a common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint’ (Bazin, 1990, 8). 
43
 The qualifications horizontal and vertical are taken from Deleuze’s discussion of Baroque music 
which he characterizes by two lines, an horizontal melody and a vertical harmony (Deleuze, 1988, 
174). 
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These lines are in reciprocal presupposition, ‘one does not know where one finishes 
and where the other begins’ (Deleuze, 1988, 174). Their reciprocal presupposition 
conceptualizes the relation of actual movements to their genesis and inversely so, the 
relation of genesis to the actual movements it incessantly gives rise to. The vertical 
line of genesis “traces a line” from the infinite speeds of chaos “all the way up or 
down” to its actualization, from the infinite to the finite, from the absolute to the 
relative we perceived through our ordinary experiences. This vertical line is “traced” 
through the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation, it “maps” the sensing 
(conditions of experience) all the way up or down to the sensed (experience). It is 
effectively that which the Figure expresses, Figural painting opens the view, or the 
horizontal line of actual movements, onto itself and as such onto its vertical line of 
genesis.  
That which the photograph gives to see is not only an immobile cut or cut across the 
horizontal line of actual movements, it is also simultaneously a cut across the 
vertical line of genesis of that which is in its point of view. It is as such that the 
photograph shares its line of genesis with that which is in its point of view (nature) 
and inversely so, nature shares its genesis with the photograph. In other words, both 
the photograph and the part of nature that was photographed have or share the same 
vertical line of genesis. 
Bazin’s ontology of the photograph 
André Bazin, a considerable influence on Deleuze’s writings on cinema (especially 
in Cinéma 2. L'image-temps (Deleuze, 1985)), conceptualizes this “sharing” or 
“ontological imbrication” in Ontologie de l’image photographique (the first article in 
the first volume of Qu'est-ce que le cinéma? (Bazin, 1990) originally published in 
1958). The photographic image or the photograph in relation to the ‘object’ it has 
captured is effectively ‘the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time 
and space that govern it’ (Bazin, 1990, 8). It is so because ‘the image [the 
photograph] can be blurred, deformed, discolored, without documentary value, it 
proceeds, by its genesis, from the ontology of the model [the object]; it is the model’ 
(Bazin, 1990, 14). The photograph is the model, the photograph is the object, it 
‘share[s] the same being’: ‘the photograph as such and the object in itself share a 
common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint’ (Bazin, 1990, 8). The photograph is 
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that which is in its point of view, and ‘therefore, photography actually contributes 
something of the order of natural creation instead of providing a substitute for it’ 
(Bazin, 1990, 16). The photograph is not representational of nature (it does not 
provide ‘a substitute for’ nature), it ‘contributes’ or gives to see ‘something of the 
order of natural creation’. This “contribution” for Bazin is the ‘revelation of the real’ 
(Bazin, 1990, 16), the photograph gives to see the ‘real’: this is where this 
development of an ontology of the photograph departs from Bazin. What Bazin calls 
‘natural creation’ is in this development genesis, A Life, the “natural creation” that A 
Life is. The photograph does not reveal the real, it is a cut across the Life that the 
object in its point of view is, a cut across its vertical line of genesis, giving to see 
that object in a view beyond the threshold of human perception. For Bazin the 
photograph is to nature that which the fingerprint is to the hand, it is revelation of the 
real. Bazin’s metaphor of the fingerprint is, as discussed below, relevant to this 
ontology but in a way that is unrelated to a concept of the real. The problem is to 
conceptualize how this ontology of the photograph, and as such the ontological shift 
from human perception, relates not to a revelation of the real but contributes to 
articulate a relation between the living and A Life. Similar is Deleuze’s stance 
towards Bazin. Deleuze acknowledges Bazin’s influence on him in the beginning of 
Cinéma 2. L'image-temps with a discussion of the ‘“fact-image”’ (Deleuze, 1985, 7). 
The fact-image is a conceptualization by which the cinematic images developed in 
Italian neo-realism produce an ‘“additional reality”’ (Deleuze, 1985, 7). Deleuze 
expresses his reservations about such a notion of reality, he is not ‘convinced that the 
problem […] poses itself at the level of the real’ (Deleuze, 1985, 7). Deleuze goes on 
to conceptualize the time-image to relate the cinematic image not to the real but to 
the transcendental form of time, i.e. duration. 
photography and science 
That the photograph shares with nature the same line of genesis corroborates the 
relation of photography to science. Science renounces the infinite movements and 
speeds so as to give them references. It measures A Life with relatives unities 
determining extensive quantities as nature. However small or large these extensive 
unities are, science is forever unable to “attain” to the reciprocally presupposing and 
‘indivisible’ intensive realm that A Life is (Deleuze, 2003b, 306). Science’s 
threshold of perception is by definition relative (and not absolute). Science ‘is a 
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fantastic slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter actualizes itself, but 
also that scientific thought is able to penetrate it by proposition’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1991, 112). Its act of thought or creation is through the genesis that A Life 
is, through the chaosmos, by cutting across it to gain points of view inside it. 
Equally, the photograph is not point of view onto things ‘providing a substitute for 
[them]’ (Bazin, 1990, 16), but it is, like science, point of view ‘inside things 
themselves’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 126). Photography and science measure or 
give reference to the chaosmos, to A Life. The photographic apparatus measures the 
chaosmos, operating a ‘spatialization of time inseparable from science’ (Deleuze, 
2008, 88) and from photography. Like science, the photograph is a ‘freeze-frame’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 112) on absolute movement and proceeds with a plane 
of reference. The photographic apparatus “freezes” the infinite movements and 
speeds into its “frame” or plane of reference, it is itself a plane of reference and gives 
to see that which is perceived from the point of view of the plane of reference that it 
is. DG explicitly discuss this relationship between photography and science in 
Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? when they discuss ‘those qualities devoid of all 
subjectivity, sensorial data distinct from all sensation, sites established in states of 
things, empty perspectives belonging to things themselves’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 125). DG tell us that these ‘unsensed sensibilia’ given to be seen by scientific 
instruments such as the ‘photographic plate, camera, mirror’ are the ‘sensory that 
qualifies […] a scientifically determined state of things, thing, or body’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1991, 125). This passage in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? is complex, and 
in it DG tells us something rather strange, but especially relevant: ‘geometrical 
figures have affections and perceptions’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 125). DG uses 
geometrical figures to exemplify fonctifs, the objects by which science thinks44, the 
functions and variables by which it traces planes of reference on chaos, by which it 
cuts across the chaosmos. Scientific instruments, like the photographic apparatus, 
give to see the unsensed sensibilia which are perceived and determined by their 
corresponding planes of reference. The photographic apparatus gives to see from the 
point of view of a plane of reference by which it, or science, “scientifically 
determines” nature. It gives to see from its point of view, a point of view which can 
                                                 
44
 Equivalent to the “concept” as the object through which philosophy thinks, and the percept and 
affect, or bloc of sensation, as the object through which art thinks. 
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be imaged as a geometrical figure “in the middle of” (and which as such cuts across) 
the chaosmos, a triangle in “in the middle of” the transcendental field, a square “in 
the middle of” the pure plane of immanence. To use DG’s strange proposition, the 
photographic apparatus gives to see that which geometrical figures perceive and feel 
(perceptions and affections). Different photographic technologies correspond to 
different planes of reference, and as such to different ways to cut across the 
chaosmos, giving different points of view inside things themselves. This proposition 
is not only relevant to highly technological cameras such as those used for x-ray 
photography that literally sees inside things, it is relevant to the ontology of the 
photograph and as such to all photographs. As Bazin writes, the photograph is the 
model, and it is so because it is point of view inside the model, it is cut across the 
line of genesis of the model. 
the photograph as “fingerprint” 
A Life captures itself as the living simultaneously as it captures itself in the plane of 
reference or cut across that the photographic apparatus is. In terms of perception, the 
same vertical line of genesis, the same Life, captures itself as a human perception 
simultaneously as it captures itself in the photograph (which has the same point of 
view as that human perception). Critically however, the photograph gives to see a 
view unavailable to human perception. Of the object (or the living) in its point of 
view, the photograph gives to see a static view from a cut across its vertical line of 
genesis beyond the threshold of human perception, hence the photograph’s 
ontological shift. It is as such that the photograph can be understood as a 
“fingerprint” of the object in its point of view, in the sense that a fingerprint is 
commonly understood as being beyond some threshold of perception and only 
revealed through a technical process. The photographic process expresses the Life 
that the object is in an actualization that presents a view (and not a vision) beyond 
the threshold of human perception, in a view ordinarily unavailable to human 
perception. 
The ontological shift from human perception to photograph, from ordinary view to 
“fingerprint”, corroborates to a change in the unity between the elements in the point 
of view. This means that our experience of the unity or relationship between objects 
in a single point of view is different in a photograph in comparison to a human 
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perception. This is obvious in for example the relationship between the horse and the 
ground in any single photograph in Muybridge’s Plate 62. What the photograph 
gives to experience that is beyond the threshold of human perception is a specific 
type of unity between objects in a point of view, an unity that ontologically defines 
these objects as dispersions of the Outside. As it will be further discussed through an 
engagement with Paradise 6 Daintree, Australia by Thomas Struth, a view through 
human perception ordinarily gives to experience what can be termed a smooth 
continuity of space, whilst in the photograph this smooth continuity is to some extent 
“broken” by virtue of the elements in the point of view appearing to a certain degree 
heterogeneous to one another (for example the horse and the ground in Muybridge’s 
Plate 6245). It is also as such that the metaphor of the “fingerprint” is appropriate to 
define that which the photograph gives to experience: the “fingerprint” to some 
extent breaks the smooth continuity of space, the finger, by decomposing it in parts 
that are to a certain degree heterogeneous (the different lines – which represent 
epidermal ridges – that constitute the print). 
 
                                                 
45
 In the photograph, the horse and the ground became, to some extent, heterogeneous to one another, 
allowing Muybridge to confirm that they were at some point “separated” (the instant when the horse 
doesn’t touch the ground at all), and to some extent “breaking” the smooth continuity of space proper 
to human perception. This example seems perhaps rather obvious because the horse is moving rapidly 
and the instantaneous image evidently allows to perceive a view that could not otherwise be seen 
through human perception. But even in a photograph from inside a jungle where effectively “nothing 
move” (Paradise 6 Daintree, Australia discussed below), the smooth continuity of space is also to 
some extent broken by virtue of the elements in the point of view appearing to a certain degree 
heterogeneous to one another. As ontological shift of the photograph, the change in the unity between 
elements in the point of view is necessarily true of all photographs. 
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Paradise 6 Daintree, Australia by Thomas Struth, 1998 
 
Paradise 6, formal description 
Paradise 6 is considered to be extra-ordinary, it is considered to be exemplary of 
extra-ordinary photographs, the specific mode of practical engagement by which 
photography embodies a commitment to A Life.46 Paradise 6 is composed of a series 
of different and interweaving elements of all shapes: leaves, trunks, branches, stems, 
etc. The depth of field is shallow, only in a few small areas is the sky visible as 
oversaturated white light, making the picture plane extremely flat and as if having no 
background per se. Hues are mainly green and brown, and the tones vary widely. It is 
hard to follow the length of a single plant or tree, or to locate precisely where it 
begins and where it ends. There are lines which link together certain elements which 
                                                 
46
 Paradise 6 is here used to develop the ontology of the photograph which by definition concerns all 
photographs; the specific characteristics of extra-ordinary photographs are specifically engaged with 
further below. 
Removed due to copyright
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are not directly juxtaposed on the picture plane. No single element or object seems 
more important than any other, creating a form of equality between all elements with 
no specific element to focus on. The depth of field is slightly deeper in the middle of 
the picture plane, to some extent leading the eye towards the centre. There is no 
background per se and as such no specific figure – ground or object – background 
relationship. The different elements are imbricated, interweaved, as if paradoxically 
of a single fact and simultaneously as a variety of more or less randomly distributed 
and heterogeneous elements. This simultaneity can be termed a field of more or less 
accidental and heterogeneous variations. It seems that there is no precise aesthetic 
intent with regards to the specific distribution of the field, the only apparent aesthetic 
intent being to capture the field itself, to a certain degree, regardless of its specific 
distribution. In other words, the specificities of the composition do not seem to be of 
great relevance except from the fact that they embody a field. 
dispersive unity versus associative unity 
The ontological shift of the photograph (in comparison to a human perception) 
corroborates to a shift in the unity between the elements in a point of view. The unity 
shifts from being primarily associative (human perception) to being primarily 
dispersive (photograph). The associative unity references Deleuze’s 
conceptualization of cinema when he discusses the process of association of 
classical cinema by which it produces ‘an uninterrupted chain of images each one the 
slave of the next’ with the purpose of forming the unity of an actual whole, the open 
or “actual universe” the film constitutes, the unity of the continuation of linear time 
and the constitution of actual movements (Deleuze, 1985, 234-235). The dispersive 
unity references the process of differentiation or dispersion by which, in modern 
cinema, cinematic images find their unity in the Outside of which they are the 
dispersion and into which they fall back. In Paradise 6 this shift is further 
emphasized by the diversity of different objects (leaves, trunks, branches, stems, 
etc.) which appear to emerge from and plunge back into obscurity. Furthermore, 
most of these objects appear as a multitude of shifting tones breaking each of them 
into collections of smaller distinct tonal planes, into small figures of light, related to 
an obscurity. Through human perception the unity of the elements in a point of view 
is primarily associative, the unity is experienced as smooth and continuous, in 
occurrence a smooth continuity of space along the depth of field and across the 
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viewpoint. In the photograph the unity of the elements in the point of view is 
primarily dispersive: the elements primarily find their unity in the Outside of which 
they are the dispersion and into which they fall back. Through human perception, the 
relation of the living to the Outside can be said to be deferred through, missed in or 
confused with the relentless passing of relative and actual movements. We perhaps 
have a presentiment of the Outside, but it feels that this intuition is always deferred 
through or confused with our ordinary experiences of the living. Similarly, the 
dispersive unity of the elements in a point of view is through human perception 
confused with their associative unity. To “have removed movement from human 
perception” and as such give to experience a view beyond the threshold of human 
perception (since, as previously discussed, movement is intrinsic to human 
perception), the photograph reveals the dispersive unity of the living with which it 
shares its genesis. The associative unity of the elements in a point of view perceived 
through human perception is in the photograph “broken up” by their dispersive unity, 
in a “kind of cubism of the transcendental” which relates each element to the Outside 
of which it is the dispersion. The photograph gives to experience a kind of cubism 
where what is perceived is not many facets of an object in actual space (analytic 
cubism) but a myriad of facets that are themselves actual dispersions of the Outside 
which itself remains absent from the picture. 
the dispersive unity and fissures or interstices 
Paradise 6 embodies a diversity, a multitude of more or less heterogeneous elements 
or variations. The living or nature is dispersed from the Outside as a diversity where 
each element or variation has its own vertical line of genesis, and all are separated 
from one another by interstices or fissures in-between which they tear themselves 
from (actualization of the virtual) and fall back into (virtualization of the actual) the 
Outside. There are in the photograph, like in the cinema of the seer, interstices or 
fissures which link the living to the Outside. Obviously these interstices are not 
between movement-images, they are between the elements or variations which 
constitute the field captured in the static view. In the photograph these interstices do 
not open themselves onto the Outside, as through the crystal-image, giving to 
experience a vision. In Paradise 6 for example, they exist between the leaves, trunks, 
branches and stems, but the Outside is nowhere to be seen. The interstices or fissures 
are not “wide open”, they are there in Paradise 6 but they are infinitely small and as 
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such as if closed, like a broken and fissured piece of glass that has not collapsed or 
that has been re-glued. The interstices do not open themselves onto visions of the 
Outside, they simply relate each element to the Outside of which it is a dispersion, 
they relate each element to its transcendental background. The associative unity (in a 
sense proper to human perception) is in the photograph fissured by the interstices 
between elements, interstices in-between which they tear themselves from and fall 
back into their transcendental background, the Outside. The elements are said to be 
more or less heterogeneous not simply in terms of occupying different positions in 
actual space but in terms of being, to a certain degree, separated by interstices which 
relate them to the Outside. The elements come to appear as more or less 
heterogeneous in the photograph because their dispersive unity is revealed. The 
expression “more or less” heterogeneous is used because the associative unity never 
completely disappears (Paradise 6 still present a continuity of space across the 
viewpoint), it simply becomes subordinated to the dispersive unity.  
The photograph does not express the Life that the living is in a vision (sensation), it 
does not express an indiscernibility between the living and its onto-genetic 
conditions. That which it gives to see that is beyond the threshold of human 
perception is the Life that the living is, expressed in a view which reveals the 
dispersive unity of that living. The photograph relates the living to A Life, to the 
Life that it is, in that it reveals its dispersive unity, in other words it reveals the living 
as dispersion of the Outside or A Life. 
the photograph experienced as point of view on the Outside or A Life 
The Outside is nowhere to be seen in the photograph but by revealing or expressing 
the dispersive unity of the elements in its point of view the photograph can be said to 
“set” the point of view “against” its transcendental background or Outside. Paradise 
6 appears like a thin screen or plane beyond the threshold of human perception onto 
which the Outside has captured itself as it captured itself as the living (and 
hypothetically as a human perception of the same point of view). Paradise 6 is like a 
thin screen between us and the Outside, as if “affixed onto” or “set against” the 
Outside. This corroborates Struth’s own assessment of the pictures from his New 
Pictures From Paradise series: ‘the picture stands like a screen in front of another, 
invisible image’ (Struth, 2002). The experience is as if facing the Outside as it 
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disperses or projects itself towards our eyes. The point of view is as such revealed 
and given to experience as point of view on the Outside or A Life: the experience of 
looking at Paradise 6 is not per se of looking at nature, it is of looking at the Outside 
but “only” perceiving nature (since the Outside is nowhere to be seen). What is 
revealed in the photograph is that the living is that which we ordinarily perceive of 
the Outside, that which we ordinarily perceive the Outside as. The photograph 
reveals the living as dispersion of the Outside and correlatively as that which we 
ordinarily experience of the Outside, it can as such also be said to reveal the living as 
point of view on the Outside that is itself in the process of dispersing itself. 
photography and expression, the photograph as a point of view from the Outside 
The photograph does not reveal the ‘real’ of the object, the ‘real’ that the object is 
(Bazin). Whereas a concept of the ‘real’ aligns itself with a notion of truth, the 
photograph reveals itself, and correlatively the living with which it shares its genesis, 
as affirmation of the power of the false.47 This ontology of the photograph is a 
conceptualization of photography which is not based on a logic of representation, it 
thinks photography in relation to expression, in other words in relation to genesis, 
consistency given to chaos, or dispersion of the Outside. The photographic apparatus 
is a plane of reference or cut across the Outside of which it captures the dispersion, 
and the photograph is the point of view from, and mediated or determined by, this 
cut across. The photographic apparatus is not in a pre-determined nature capturing 
points of view onto pre-determined things (its operation is as such necessarily not 
representative of a pre-determined nature). The photographic apparatus is in the 
Outside capturing points of view onto un-determined things which it as such 
determines according to that which it can, i.e. according to its respective threshold of 
perception. The photographic apparatus is in the previously discussed immense, 
obscure and dizzying Nature, and that which it gives to see depends on the 
(differential) relations it assumes and privileges between an infinity of minute 
perceptions or vanishing quantities. “Un-determined things”, the Outside, are 
determined or actualized by the plane of reference that the photographic apparatus is. 
The photographic apparatus is in the Outside, and as such gives a point of view from 
                                                 
47
 The “power of the false” is a concept developed by Nietzsche and used by Deleuze in his discussion 
of cinema; it will be further engaged with through the analysis of the aesthetic experience of the extra-
ordinary photograph. 
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the Outside. That the photograph gives, and comes to be experienced as (as it will be 
discussed below), a point of view from the Outside, whilst it is simultaneously 
experienced as a point of view on the Outside in the process of dispersing itself, 
forms the core of the definition of the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary 
photograph: an experience of the living as simultaneous point of view on and from 
the Outside. 
the accident of nature, nature as accident 
Revealed in the photograph is that the living is the Outside or A Life capturing itself 
as the materiality of the universe, that the living comes into existence as a neither 
foreseen nor preconceived consistency given to chaos or dispersion of the Outside. 
The photograph reveals nature as “accident”, “accident” understood as ‘fruit of 
chance in the Nietzschean sense’ (Deleuze, 2007, 45), as result of a throw of dice, as 
result of chance. Chance for Nietzsche is affirmation (Deleuze, 2007, 30), 
affirmation of the creative power that A Life or the Outside is, affirmation as throw 
of dice, affirmation as (in Deleuzian terms) repetition of difference.48 From chance, 
from affirmation, results necessity: the resulting, and “accidental”, combination of 
dice. The incessant throw of dice and the ever changing resulting combinations is a 
Nietzschean image of the continuously renewed genesis or repetition of difference 
that A Life or the Outside is. The photograph does not reveal an accident in nature, it 
reveals the accident of nature, i.e. nature as accident. The photograph captures not 
only an accident in nature which “takes place” along the horizontal line of actual 
movements (cut across the line of actual movements), it also reveals and gives to 
experience the reciprocally presupposing accident of nature which “takes place” 
along its vertical line of genesis (cut across the line of genesis). The photograph 
relates the living to the throw from which it results, to the Outside of which it is the 
dispersion. 
 
 
                                                 
48
 It is not the purpose of this text to established detailed relationships between Nietzsche and 
Deleuze’s concept of repetition of difference, but it seems appropriate to suggest that a strong 
relationship exists between this concept and Nietzsche’s concepts of chance and affirmation. On the 
throw of dice, “in the Nietzschean sense”, in relation to the eternal return and chaos p.29-31 (Deleuze, 
2007). 
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5.b – The extra-ordinary photograph and its aesthetic experience 
 
As an ontology of the photograph, the development above necessarily concerns all 
photographs. It is obvious however that it is not all photographs that can 
unequivocally be said to relate the living to the Life that it is, revealing and giving to 
the experience of the living as dispersion of the Outside, as that which we ordinarily 
experience of the Outside, or as point of view on the Outside in the process of 
dispersing itself. As previously mentioned, the interest in conceptualizing 
photography as a medium which can embody a commitment to A Life stems from 
the intuition that the aesthetic experiences of photographs from Struth’s New 
Pictures From Paradise series relate to or involve A Life. Photographs such as 
Paradise 6 are called extra-ordinary photographs. The extra-ordinary qualifies 
photographs which emphasize most explicitly that which defines them ontologically, 
their ontological shift, the revelation of the dispersive unity of that which is in their 
point of view. It is through such emphasis that they most obviously relate the living 
to the Life that it is. Terminologically, extra-ordinary photographs are extra-ordinary 
for two reasons: amongst the vast amount of photographs that we experience daily, 
extra-ordinary photographs are extra-ordinary in that they are rare; but also, if the 
living is understood as that which is ordinarily experienced, extra-ordinary 
photographs give an experience that is more than simply ordinary, they give an 
aesthetic experience which involves A Life. The photographs in the New Pictures 
From Paradise series are extra-ordinary to different degrees. There could be a scale 
of extra-ordinariness onto which all photographs could be positioned, and of which 
Struth’s jungle and forest photographs would occupy the high end. Paradise 6 
appears as one of the most extra-ordinary photograph of the series; it is used to 
define the set of principles and formal characteristics by which a photograph is 
qualified as extra-ordinary, defining the specific mode of practical engagement with 
photography by which it embodies a commitment to A Life. 
two interrelated non formal principles of the extra-ordinary photograph 
The extra-ordinary photograph has two interrelated non formal principles: it avoids 
subject matter and narrative, and has no illustrative or documentary aim.  
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The extra-ordinary photograph reveals not an event or accident in nature but the 
event of nature, the event of the actualization or coming into existence of nature. The 
extra-ordinary photograph avoids emphasizing any object or event in nature of any 
relevance or interest which would detract attention towards itself, become a specific 
subject matter and inevitably lead to a narrative. Paradise 6 embodies this concern 
through a form of equality between the elements of the composition by having no 
actual background per se, no figure – ground relationship, preventing the focus on 
any specific element. The photograph also avoids emphasizing an event in nature: in 
Paradise 6, nothing is happening. The photograph avoids capturing any specific, 
relevant or interesting event in nature, it as such avoids emphasizing itself as a cut 
across actual movements, all the better able to emphasize itself as cut across the 
vertical line of genesis, to emphasize the event of nature (its actualization or coming 
into existence). Avoiding to emphasize an object or an event, and as such a subject 
matter, the extra-ordinary photograph also prevents a narrative to emerge. 
Correlatively, the extra-ordinary photograph has no illustrative or documentary (or 
journalistic) aim, it does not aim to communicate a view of specific relevance or 
interest that would otherwise be unavailable to an audience. The extra-ordinary 
photograph does not “reveal nature” in the sense of making available an otherwise 
unavailable view to the viewer (in the sense that journalistic or reportage 
photography “reveals nature”). On the contrary, the extra-ordinary photograph 
reveals the event of nature, and the specific view through which it does so has no 
specific relevance or interest (beyond possessing formal characteristics by which it is 
extra-ordinary). This seems to go against an instinctive “reading” of the photographs 
from the New Pictures From Paradise series which capture remote points of view 
from inside jungles and forests around the world, views certainly unavailable to 
most, views which “reveal nature”. What is meant however by saying that the extra-
ordinary photograph, Paradise 6 for example, has no illustrative or documentary 
purpose is that it is without consequence, the view of the specific location where 
Paradise 6 was taken has no explicit relevance, and it has no more relevance than 
any of the other captured points of view in the series. There is in fact a principle of 
equivalence at play between the different photographs of the series, each of them is 
without consequence, without specific relevance, it is irrelevant whether a specific 
photograph was taken in Brazil, China, Australia or Japan, etc. The photographs are 
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in a sense equivalent in that they are not per se of specific locations in nature, they 
are of nature, meaning of the event of the coming into existence of nature, of the 
accident of nature, of nature as accident. 
conceptual principle of the extra-ordinary photograph: no actual background but a 
transcendental background absent from that which the photograph gives to see 
The formal principles of the extra-ordinary photograph derive from a focus not on a 
figure – ground relationship in nature, but on the nature – “transcendental ground” 
(or Outside) relationship of nature. To think through the usual figure – ground 
relationship, for the extra-ordinary photograph the figure is nature or the living itself, 
and the ground is the Outside, the transcendental field or A Life. The extra-ordinary 
photograph is concerned with the nature – Outside relationship. This informs the 
conceptual principle by which there is no actual background in the extra-ordinary 
photograph but only a transcendental background absent from that which the 
photograph gives to see. The extra-ordinary photograph emphasizes the “behind” or 
“outside” of that which it gives to see not as a continuation of actual space but as the 
Outside (for example the “behind” or “outside” of the lush vegetation of Paradise 6 
is experienced as Outside as opposed to the continuation of actual space)49. In 
Paradise 6 this is emphasized by the literal absence of an actual background (except 
small and oversaturated areas of the sky), preventing to focus on a figure – “actual 
ground” relationship, better allowing for the experience of a “behind” or “outside” 
that is transcendental (“transcendental ground” or the Outside). 
formal principles of the extra-ordinary photograph  
The quintessential formal principle of the extra-ordinary photograph, as previously 
observed in Paradise 6, is that it embodies a field of more or less accidental and 
heterogeneous variations. This principle constitutes three different although 
interrelated formal characteristics:  
                                                 
49
 A principle which again corroborates Struth’s comment on the photographs from the New Pictures 
From Paradise series: ‘the picture stands like a screen in front of another, invisible image’ (Struth, 
2002). However, as it will be further discussed, this formulation is to a certain degree inappropriate 
for the conceptualization of the extra-ordinary photograph in relation to the reciprocal presupposition 
between the living and the Outside. 
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 the extra-ordinary photograph embodies a diversity of elements that appear as 
more or less heterogeneous to one another,  
 its composition is more or less accidental, and without any specific relevance or 
consequence, and  
 its elements, its more or less heterogeneous and accidentally composed variations 
are intrinsically linked as a field, and in that sense appear to be related to a single 
fact. 
first characteristic: diversity and heterogeneity 
The extra-ordinary photograph embodies a diversity, a multitude of elements 
between which an heterogeneity is emphasized. It serves to emphasize the dispersive 
unity which the photograph expresses, accentuating between the elements the 
fissures or interstices revealed by the ontological shift of the photograph. In Paradise 
6 this diversity is embodied by the multitude of objects present in the composition 
and by the myriad of shifting tones breaking each object into many facets or small 
figures of light, emphasizing interstices within objects themselves. Interstices 
leading to the Outside exist not only between objects, in other words at their edges, 
but also within each object itself, at the edges of each of the small facets into which 
they are divided. The dispersive unity revealed in the extra-ordinary photograph 
“breaks” the smooth continuity of space, and consequently “breaks” not only the 
smooth continuity of space between objects but “breaks” the objects themselves 
(since each object contributes to constitute the smooth continuity of space). Fissures 
or interstices exist not only between objects but within objects themselves. This 
corroborates the ontological fact that the living (or objects) is opened onto the 
Outside (as expressed for example in a Figural painting), and consequently 
potentially infinitely fissured by the Outside; the Outside is in each object 
simultaneously as each object is in the Outside. Evidently, an object, as dispersion of 
the Outside, does not tear itself from and fall back into the Outside “at its edges”, “at 
its actual edge” which it only gains once actualized, an object tears itself from and 
falls back into the Outside at an infinity of points, or through an infinity of 
interstices, within itself. 
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second characteristic: more or less accidental, tension between the Outside and its 
dispersion 
The composition of the elements in the field is more or less accidental, it appears as 
an accident, as a result of chance. There is no specific relevant order according to 
which the elements are distributed, their composition is without any specific 
consequence or relevance except from the fact of embodying a more or less 
randomly distributed field. The expression “more or less” accidental is used because 
there is a tension between chance and necessity: the composition appears as it could 
have been otherwise, and yet it is as such (in the sense that a throw of dice for 
example can result in any combination, and yet it results in a specific one). This 
tension the extra-ordinary photograph expresses is a tension between A Life and the 
living, between the Outside and its dispersion, between chaos and consistency, it is 
the tension proper to the chaosmos (between chaos and cosmos), the tension of the 
continuously renewed consistency given to chaos and the incessant chaotization of 
all consistency. In relation to Paradise 6, this characteristic is emphasized by the fact 
that the jungle appears as a more or less random composition of objects. It is also 
emphasized by the fact that it is part of a series, each photograph in the series 
emphasizing in relation to one another the fact that it could have been otherwise and 
that yet it is as such (because each photograph in relation to another shows how it 
can be otherwise). This emphasizes the fact that each photograph presents a 
composition of the living that is “more or less” accidental, and that each composition 
is linked to all the others by virtue of resulting from the “same accident”, the same 
repetition, the same affirmation.  
third characteristic: the same affirmation 
Although heterogeneous, the diversity of elements are related to one another through 
a single fact, their more or less accidental distribution appears to stem from the same 
affirmation. The elements appear as heterogeneous dice emerging from a single 
throw. The diversity is both a multitude (many elements) and a plurality (elements of 
different kinds). The elements, although different in kind, appear as different facets 
of a same fact. This also expresses the tension between chaos and consistency, 
between the Outside and its dispersion, not in terms of random distribution but in 
terms of diversification, in terms a unity differentiating or dispersing itself into a 
plurality. The elements are intrinsically linked as a “dispersed field”, and in that 
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sense related to a single fact, the single fact of the Outside from which it is dispersed. 
In Paradise 6 this characteristic is emphasized by the plurality elements appearing to 
emerge from the same obscurity. It is also emphasized by the fact that most elements 
in the composition are of different hues of green, it is as if each element is an 
accidental variation of the same green hue, as if a powerful green light, projected 
towards the picture plane from behind, is diffracted into a multitude of hue variations 
when caught by the picture plane which can be imaged as a broken piece of glass. 
 
 
Tokamak Asdex Upgrade Periphery Max Planck IPP, Garching by Thomas Struth, 2009 
Removed due to copyright
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Tokamak Asdex Upgrade Periphery Max Planck IPP, Garching 
Many obvious formal links can be established between Paradise 6 and Tokamak 
Asdex Upgrade Periphery Max Planck IPP, Garching, 2009. On one level, the 
distribution of the elements in Tokamak Asdex … expresses the single fact of a 
human and technical necessity. To discuss the photograph in terms of such necessity 
is on one level to consider its subject matter and documentary qualities. It is also to 
refer to the associative unity of the photograph by which it presents a relatively 
smooth continuity of space across the view point. But possessing the formal 
characteristics of the extra-ordinary photograph, on another level Tokamak Asdex … 
emphasizes the ontological shift of the photograph, it emphasizes its unity as being 
primarily dispersive. Related to the Outside of which it is the dispersion, the single 
fact that the composition of elements expresses appears not as a human and technical 
necessity but as the accident of nature, as a “non human necessity”, the necessity of 
the dispersion of the Outside or affirmation of chance. It is not only the smooth 
continuity of space that is in a sense “disturbed” by the revelation of its dispersive 
unity, it is also the photograph’s subject matter and documentary qualities. By being 
extra-ordinary, Tokamak Asdex … is experienced less as the representation of a 
human and technical necessity than as the accident of nature by which all subject 
matters become irrelevant. Not the event of a technical production in nature but the 
event of nature emerging from and plunging back into the Outside. Struth establishes 
a relation between an order of natural creation and an order of technological 
development. When Struth reveals or expresses human technological development as 
dispersion of the Outside, he constitutes an indiscernibility between the “artificial” 
and the “natural”. From the radical ontological view of the world entirely decentred 
from humans, i.e. from the point of view of the Outside50, nothing is “artificial”, 
everything is “natural” (or nothing is “natural” and everything is “artificial”): as 
when one entertains the thought that atomic bombs are natural phenomena, or that 
the exploration of the moon by humans is as natural as the growth of a flower. When 
the living is through the extra-ordinary photograph revealed as dispersion of the 
Outside, categories of artificial and natural become irrelevant, all that is perceived, 
                                                 
50
 A point of view which, as previously mentioned and further discussed below, the extra-ordinary 
photograph reveals and gives to experience in correlation to the fact that the photographic apparatus is 
in the Outside. 
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all that is lived (the living), is neither natural nor artificial but simply genesis, simply 
dispersion of the Outside. 
summary: the non formal principles and formal characteristics of the extra-ordinary 
photograph 
The non formal principles and formal characteristics of the extra-ordinary 
photograph are: it avoids subject matter and narrative; it has no illustrative or 
documentary purpose; it has no actual background, it only has a transcendental 
background which is absent from that which it gives to see; it embodies a diversity 
of elements that appear as more or less heterogeneous; its composition is more or 
less accidental, it appears as it could have been otherwise; and finally its elements, 
its more or less heterogeneous and accidentally distributed variations, are 
intrinsically linked as a field, and in that sense they appear to stem from the same 
affirmation. 
 
the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph 
the living as point of view on and from the Outside 
The extra-ordinary photograph, by emphasizing the ontological shift of the 
photograph through its specific characteristics, by emphasizing the dispersive unity 
the photograph reveals, is experienced as a thin screen or plane as if “set against” the 
Outside, capturing its dispersion in a view unavailable to human perception. The 
experience is as if looking at the Outside but “only” perceiving nature. Through the 
extra-ordinary photograph, the living is experienced as point of view on the Outside 
or A Life; the Outside is not given to be seen in the static view, the living is 
experienced as that which we ordinarily perceive of the Outside, that which we 
ordinarily perceive the Outside as. This constitutes the first aspect of the aesthetic 
experience of the extra-ordinary photograph. But there is a second aspect to this 
aesthetic experience by which the point of view is simultaneously reversed. 
Following this second aspect the living is not only experienced as point of view on 
the Outside but also, simultaneously, as point of view from the Outside. The first 
aspect supposes a subject in nature looking at nature as if looking towards the 
Outside: nature is revealed as that which the subject can see of the Outside. The 
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second aspect supposes a subject in the Outside looking at nature, in the Outside 
looking effectively at the Outside but “only” seeing nature. Effectively, the 
photographic apparatus is in the Outside, it gives a point of view from the Outside. 
the scientific eye or slicing eye, and the viewer as geometrical figure 
Through the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph, the perception of 
the viewer becomes that of the photographic apparatus in the Outside. The eye of the 
viewer becomes the eye of the photographic apparatus itself in the Outside, seeing a 
point of view from the Outside. It is very different to the haptic eye given by a 
Figural painting, the eye the viewer is given by the extra-ordinary photograph could 
be called a scientific or slicing eye which cuts across the Outside. The viewer can 
perceive nothing else than that which is captured by her scientific or slicing eye, but 
she experiences being in the Outside of which her perception is a cut across. To refer 
to the previously established links DG make between photography and science, and 
to create an interesting image of the ontology of the viewer: in her aesthetic 
experience of the extra-ordinary photograph, the viewer becomes one of these 
‘geometrical figures [which] have affections and perceptions’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 125), it is as a geometrical figure that the viewer perceives. Through her 
aesthetic experience, the viewer is not dispersed as it is through the haptic vision. 
She is in a sense given the consistency of the plane of reference from which she 
perceives, as if a geometrical figure in the Outside, frozen in time at the 
instantaneous moment of capture (of capture of the dispersion of the Outside). The 
scientific eye can also be called a slicing eye because it cuts or slices across the 
Outside actualizing itself as a point of view beyond the threshold of human 
perception. The viewer experiences an instantaneous slice or cut across the Outside 
in the process of dispersing itself as a nature, a nature which as discussed below 
“encloses her” whilst she simultaneously, and in a sense paradoxically, experiences 
being in the Outside. The slice or cut across is not the Outside and as such not a 
vision, it is a view of nature but a view that comes to be experienced as from the 
Outside. 
alienation and vertigo 
The aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph involves a form of 
alienation from nature, nature which ordinarily is experienced through human 
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perception as a closed form which encloses us. The associative unity, corroborating 
to a smooth continuity of space between the elements in a point of view, means that 
nature is experienced as closed and enclosing. Its subordination to the dispersive 
unity revealed in the extra-ordinary photograph changes this. The aesthetic 
experience of the extra-ordinary photograph is of being in nature which is closed and 
encloses us whilst simultaneously being in the Outside, it is of being simultaneously 
in nature looking towards the Outside and in the Outside looking towards nature. To 
this form of alienation corroborates an experience of vertigo. It is as if the subject of 
this experience, inside a closed and enclosing nature, suddenly loses its footing to 
find itself inside an infinite Outside, a vertigo triggered by an experience of a fall 
into an infinite obscurity. This vertigo is however continuously, or simultaneously, 
“remediated” by the fact that the viewer is given to see nothing else than a view of 
nature which to a certain degree encloses her. The viewer simultaneously 
experiences being in the infinite whilst “never leaving” the finite nature in which she 
is enclosed, the living being experienced simultaneously as point of view on the 
Outside and point of view from the Outside. 
nature perceived from and through the Outside, denying transcendence 
To experience the living as point of view from the Outside (more specifically 
simultaneously as point of view on and from the Outside) corroborates to the 
ontological fact that we effectively perceive nature from and through the Outside or 
A Life. We perceive nature from and through the Outside in that it is A Life, our 
bodies without organs, as onto-genetic conditions of real experience, that give us the 
living to experience. To experience the living as point of view from and through the 
Outside simultaneously as point of view on the Outside is the conceptual 
requirement by which to think the photograph in relation to pure immanence. As 
long as the photograph is only thought to give a point of view on the Outside (as in 
Struth’s formulation: ‘the picture stands like a screen in front of another, invisible 
image’ (Struth, 2002)), the Outside remains arguably transcendent to that which the 
photograph gives to see, to the living and to the position of the viewer in a closed 
and enclosing nature. To insure a relation of pure immanence and reciprocal 
presupposition between the Outside and the living, the Outside also needs to be 
acknowledged as that from and through which the living is perceived: it is the 
Outside which gives us to see nature “in the first place”. We are not only in nature 
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looking towards the Outside which appears as if “hidden behind nature”, crucially 
we simultaneously are in the Outside, looking at the Outside, but “only” perceiving 
nature. Through the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph, nature is 
not only that which appears to hide the Outside behind it, it appears like an 
hallucination experienced from the Outside. 
nature as a hallucination: nature hallucinated 
To experience the living from and through the Outside is not how nature is ordinarily 
experienced through human perception. Given to experience is undeniably a static 
view of nature, but through the extra-ordinary photograph nature is perceived or 
experienced as what can be termed a hallucination. The term hallucination is 
borrowed from Deleuze who uses it, in a context unrelated to photography, in his 
book on Leibniz Le Pli. Leibniz et le Barqoue (Deleuze, 1988). ‘The Baroques know 
well that it is not the hallucination which feigns presence, but that presence is 
hallucinatory’ (Deleuze, 1988, 170). In this context, ‘presence’ can be understood as 
A Life or the Outside. What the ‘Baroques know’ can be re-phrased as follows: 
one’s relationship with A Life is not that of hallucinating A Life from the position of 
nature (‘it is not the hallucination which feign presence’), on the contrary, it is from 
and through A Life that we have our perceptions of nature that themselves can be 
called hallucinations (‘presence is hallucinatory’). A Life is hallucinatory, and it that 
sense “primary”, in that it is from and through it that one perceives, that one has 
perceptions of nature, that one experiences of the living. As Deleuze emphasizes in 
italics: ‘All perceptions are hallucinatory, because perception has no object’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, 170). ‘Perception has no object’ because that which is perceived 
comes into existence, and as such is perceived, simultaneously with it being 
perceived from and through A Life. Correlatively ‘perception has no object’ because 
one is in the immense, obscure and dizzying Nature that the transcendental field is, 
perceiving that which it can according to the differential relations it assumes and 
privileges between an infinity of vanishing quantities or minute perceptions (and not 
perceiving pre-determined objects). In simple terms, perception has no object 
because perception has no pre-determined object to look onto. That which is primary 
to all perceptions is not a closed and enclosing nature, it is A Life or the Outside 
from and through which we have them. The photographic apparatus is apparatus of 
perception like human perception (although it gives to see something completely 
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different), and neither operate in a pre-determined nature gazing onto pre-determined 
things. That which the hallucinatory (presence, A Life, the Outside) gives to see can 
be termed hallucinations. Our ordinary human perceptions are hallucinations, only 
they are not experienced as such, they are not experienced as hallucinations. In other 
words, our ordinary human perceptions are not experienced as points of view from 
and through the Outside. It is the extra-ordinary photograph which gives us an 
experience of the living as a hallucination. Revealing the living as point of view on 
and from the Outside, on and from and through the Outside, the extra-ordinary 
photograph gives to experience the living “only” (and not a vision of A Life), but the 
living or nature as a hallucination, otherwise termed nature hallucinated. 
 
hallucination: mode of aesthetic experience corresponding to the paradigm the 
living as point of view on and from A Life  
Whereas the paradigm A Life in the living (DG’s conceptualization of art) was 
mainly developed through an engagement with Figural painting and the cinema of 
the seer, the second paradigm of commitment to A Life, which is termed the living 
as point of view on and from A Life and which constitutes the first level of expansion 
of DG’s conceptualization of art, is mainly developed through an engagement with 
the extra-ordinary photograph. 
The mode of aesthetic experience which corresponds to the paradigm the living as 
point of view on and from A Life is hallucination. This paradigm embodies a 
commitment to A Life since to give an experience of the living as point of view on 
and from A Life is to relate the living to the Life that it is, to its immanent 
transcendental Outside: the living is that which is ordinarily perceived of A Life and 
that which is perceived from and through A Life. In comparison to the paradigm A 
Life in the living, the second paradigm concerns not the finite which restores the 
infinite, it concerns the finite as that which is experienced of the infinite 
simultaneously as that which is experienced from and through the infinite. 
Hallucination is significantly different to the mode of aesthetic experience termed 
haptic vision, and as such a considerable departure from DG’s conceptualization of 
art. What is experienced through hallucination is a view, the extra-ordinary 
photograph, however extra-ordinary, is and remains a view, but a view that is 
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experienced as a hallucination, as from and through the Outside or A Life. On the 
other hand a vision expresses the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation, 
i.e. an indiscernibility between a view and its condition, A Life expressed in a 
sensation.  
movement from nature to nature hallucinated 
In terms of movement the mode of aesthetic experience termed haptic vision is, as 
previously discussed, a movement from nature to A Life, from nature to a possible 
universe which itself expresses the absolute that A Life is, a movement through 
which the viewer is dispersed as A Life, through which she establishes a unity with 
A Life. Hallucination on the other hand is a movement from an ordinary experience 
nature to an experience of nature as a hallucination. This movement is from an 
experience of nature as a closed and enclosing form, to an experience of nature as a 
point of view from and through the Outside (simultaneously as an experience of 
nature as point of view on the Outside) by which nature appears as a hallucination. 
The movement involves the form of alienation and vertigo discussed above. It can be 
termed movement from nature to nature hallucinated. The viewer is not 
reterritorialized on the absolute that A Life is, the viewer is not dispersed as A Life 
(haptic vision), the viewer is reterritorialized on the cut across the Outside which the 
scientific or slicing eye she is given corresponds to. But as for the vision, through her 
hallucination the viewer also establishes a unity with A Life or the Outside in that 
she experiences to be Outside, in that it is from and through the Outside that she 
experiences her perceptions of nature. The departure from, and expansion of, DG’s 
conceptualization of art is here obvious: although I agree with DG that photography 
cannot express A Life in the living, some (extra-ordinary) photographs allow for an 
aesthetic experience which involves the establishment of a unity with A Life. 
hallucinatory quality of movement, the tension or relation of territoriality between 
absolute movement and relative movement 
The mode of aesthetic experience hallucination described in terms of movement is 
best described as an experience of the reciprocal presupposition between absolute 
movement and relative movement, what can be termed the tension or relation of 
territoriality between absolute movement (the Outside) and relative movement (the 
living). The scientific or slicing eye, as geometrical figure or plane of reference “in 
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the middle” of the Outside, gives to experience this tension or relation of 
territoriality between the Outside and its dispersion, between the Outside and nature. 
The scientific or slicing eye gives to experience neither nature (as it is experienced 
through human perception) nor the Outside but the tension between the two. This 
tension corresponds to the second quality of movement: the reciprocal 
presupposition between the absolute and relative components of movement. Whereas 
the first quality was termed haptic51, the second quality can be termed hallucinatory. 
It is the quality of movement by which movement is always simultaneously both 
relative and absolute. It defines the fact that relative movements (the living) are 
always experienced from and through absolute movements (A Life or the Outside), 
and inversely so. The artwork which embodies the paradigm the living as point of 
view on and from A Life, for example Paradise 6, embodies and as such gives to 
experience the hallucinatory quality of movement. 
Whereas the paradigm A Life in the living corresponds to a movement from nature to 
the possible universe that the haptic vision is, the paradigm the living as point of 
view on and from A Life corresponds to a movement from nature to the possible 
universe that nature hallucinated is. 
 
 
5.c – Nature hallucinated: nature as possible universe 
 
Figural painting operates in co-creation with A Life in that, like A Life, it operates a 
genesis by which it gives a consistency to chaos, it is a genesis by which chaos is 
composed and which results in a possible universe. This possible universe is the 
haptic vision, a specific territorialization on and of the absolute that A Life is, 
meaning that it expresses, is and gives the vision of the absolute that A Life is.  
                                                 
51
 The quality by which movement always necessarily is, and opens its relative component onto, the 
absolute that A Life is. 
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nature as possible universe, the actual, the real and the virtual 
But as previously discussed when the concept of possible universe was introduced, a 
possible universe is not primarily defined as a haptic vision, a possible universe is 
defined as a possible consistency given to chaos or territorialization of chaos. The 
actual universe is a possible universe, a possible consistency given to chaos, only 
one which is in the continuous process of realizing itself as the materiality of the 
universe, as the living or nature. That the extra-ordinary photograph reveals the 
living as dispersion of the Outside, as a neither foreseen nor preconceived 
consistency given to chaos, as accident understood as ‘fruit of chance in the 
Nietzschean sense’ (Deleuze, 2007, 45), i.e. as affirmation of chance, is for it to 
reveal nature as a possible universe, as a possibility that is in the process of 
actualizing itself. That the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph is of 
the living or nature experienced simultaneously as point of view on and from and 
through the Outside (hallucination) corroborates the experience of nature as possible 
universe. Nature is experienced as a possible universe in two ways: as if in nature 
facing the Outside as it disperses or projects itself towards our eyes (point of view on 
the Outside), and as if in the Outside whilst it disperses itself through our eyes (point 
of view from and through the Outside). This experience encompasses the feeling that 
it could have been otherwise, that nature could have been the realization of another 
possibility. Correlated to the hallucination, to an experience of nature as a 
hallucination (nature hallucinated) is the experience of nature as accident, of the 
accident of nature.  
the hallucination of an alien world 
Through the extra-ordinary photograph, nature, the ‘body’ (for example the body of 
the jungle in Paradise 6), appears as ‘the most “surprising” thing’52 (Deleuze, 2007, 
45). Through Paradise 6, the living is experienced as the most surprising thing 
because it is as such whilst the experience of hallucination strongly suggests that it 
could have been otherwise. The amazement is not related to an accident in nature, it 
                                                 
52
 Deleuze quotes “surprising” from Nietzsche, footnote 3 (Deleuze, 2007, 45): ‘VP, II, 173: “The 
human body is a thought more surprising than the soul of the past”; II, 226: “What is more surprising 
is rather the body; one never ceases to be amazed at the idea that the human body has become 
possible.”’ Nietzsche refers to the human body, but this surprise, this amazement, can be related to 
effectively everything that comes into existence, in other words any affirmation of chance, any 
necessity, anything that constitutes the living or nature. 
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is not surprising that the leaves, trunks, branches, stems are arranged in such a 
composition. What is surprising is that from the infinity that the Outside is, that 
which Paradise 6 gives to see has emerged or come into existence. The amazement 
is at the accident of nature. Not only is nature experienced as a hallucination 
(experienced from and through the Outside), nature appears as alien. From an 
infinity of possibility, it is rather strange, surprising, amazing, that in Paradise 6 the 
vegetation is green, since it could have been blue, red, violet or orange, etc. The fact 
that the vegetation is green is experienced as being as surprising as if it would have 
been orange. A “green jungle” is as strange as an “orange jungle”, the former is as 
alien as the latter. Through the extra-ordinary photograph, the living is experienced 
as the hallucination of an alien world. 
the power of the false and the extra-ordinary photograph 
As Deleuze writes of modern cinema, of a cinema of the seer, the extra-ordinary 
photograph ‘makes the image pass under the power of the false’ (Deleuze, 1985, 
179).53 The extra-ordinary photograph is completely different to the crystal-image, it 
does not give a vision of the transcendental form of time or the Outside constructing 
an indiscernibility between the Outside and its dispersion, but it gives an experience 
of the living as dispersion of the Outside which directly relates it to the power of the 
false. The power of the false is a concept created by Nietzsche. The concept relates 
to art: ‘art is the highest power of the false, it magnifies “the world as error”’ 
(Deleuze, 2007, 117). With the concept of the power of the false Nietzsche attempts 
to do away with any claims to truth: Nietzsche ‘substitute[s] the power of the false 
for the form of the true, and resolves the crisis of truth, wanting to settle it once and 
for all, but in opposition to Leibniz, in favour of the false and its artistic, creative 
power …’ (Deleuze, 1985, 172). In this context, the power of the false can be 
understood as dispersion of the Outside, the creative power of A Life54 and art’s 
operation of co-creation with it. The world is beyond any claims to truth because it 
continuously enters into becomings, it repetitively metamorphoses itself: it 
                                                 
53
 What Deleuze writes about Orson Welles can equally be said of Deleuze’s conceptualization of 
modern cinema. 
54
 It is beyond the scope of this text to develop detailed conceptual relations between Nietzsche and 
Deleuze, but it seems appropriate to suggest that a very strong relationship exists between A Life and 
Nietzsche’s concept of the power of the false. 
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continuously falsifies itself. Truth allies itself with being, whereas the false allies 
itself with becoming. Whereas a concept of truth relies on a notion of being and 
affirms being, in Nietzsche (and Deleuze) it is becoming and the being of becoming 
(being = becoming) that is affirmed55 and described as artistic and creative power of 
the false: ‘Beyond the true and the false, becoming as power of the false’ (Deleuze, 
1985, 360). 
What is affirmed through an experience of nature as possible universe is this very 
fact: that nature is only a possibility that has realized itself, an accident, the extra-
ordinary photograph magnifies “the world as error”. That the image passes under the 
power of the false is exactly that through the extra-ordinary photograph nature is 
experienced as a hallucination, as from and through the Outside, as its accidental 
dispersion. There is no stable truth to look upon, no pre-determined things to 
perceive, as Deleuze writes perception has no object (Deleuze, 1988, 170). That 
which is perceived, and perception itself, are dispersions of the Outside, affirmation 
the power of the false, points of view hallucinated from the Outside. The 
photographic apparatus is not in the truth of a pre-determined nature, it is in the 
Outside capturing its dispersion. The photographic apparatus has no truth to 
represent, only the unforeseeable dispersion of the Outside to capture and render 
sensory (the photograph) according to the differential relations it can assume and 
privilege between an infinity of emerging and vanishing quantities or minute 
perceptions. 
 
haptic vision and the power of the false 
A haptic vision, for example Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne, is also an affirmation of 
the power of the false: a haptic vision never makes any claims to the truth of the 
transcendental field, the Outside or A Life, as it would were it to operate by 
                                                 
55
 ‘We have to reflect for a long time to understand what it means to make of becoming an 
affirmation. Without doubt it is to say, in the first place: there is only becoming. Without doubt it is to 
affirm becoming. But we also affirm the being of becoming, we say that becoming affirms being or 
that being affirms itself in becoming. Heraclitus has two thoughts which are like ciphers: one 
according to which there is no being, all is becoming; the other according to which being is the being 
of becoming as such. A working thought which affirms becoming, a contemplative thought which 
affirms the being of becoming’ (Deleuze, 2007, 27). 
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representation and take the Outside to be a transcendent universe. As opposed to the 
representation of a transcendent universe a haptic vision is the expression of the 
purely immanent transcendental. A haptic vision captures and expresses the very 
same forces which compose and transverse nature (A Life), and as an expression that 
always results from an accident or catastrophe (the diagram) rendering sensory A 
Life beyond any of its previous conditions of existence, a haptic vision magnifies 
“the world”, and its onto-genetic condition, “as error”. In relation to Bacon’s haptic 
visions, Deleuze discusses how man experiences itself as ‘accident’ (Deleuze, 2002, 
117, 127). The co-creation of possible universes that art operates magnifies the 
creation of the actual universe as accident, as error, as affirmation of the power of 
the false.  
It is also necessarily as affirmation of the power of the false that a haptic vision can 
be achieved through an infinity of ways, through an infinity of diagrams each 
modulating differential relations uniquely, through an inexhaustible amount of 
possible universes: the expression of the power of the false against the 
representation involved in any claim to truth. Infinite expressions of the affirmation 
of the power of the false against the representation of a singular truth. Art is not 
representation but fabulation, it has no pretense to truth, nor is it the representation 
of a memory, a fantasy or even an imagination (‘Bergson analyzes fabulation as a 
visionary faculty very different to imagination’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162)). 
What DG write of literature is equally true of painting: ‘One does not write with 
childhood memories, but by blocs of childhood that are becomings-child in the 
present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 158). A haptic vision can be achieved through 
an infinity of ways because there is an infinity of potential becomings the writer or 
the artist can go through. Fabulation is the expression of such becomings. Against 
representation, the writer writes, the painter paints, not with memories, fantasies or 
imaginations, but with or as becoming-other in the present. It is impossible ‘to 
dissociate the becomings which literature [or painting] carries or creates from the 
becoming writer [or the becoming painter] which necessarily overtakes the one who 
writes [or paints] since it is him that invents or has experienced the becomings that 
he brings back to us and that it is by bringing these becomings back to us that he 
becomes writer [or painter]’ (Mengue, 2007, 163). The artist expresses her 
becomings in her medium and it is (only) in doing so that she becomes artist. In this 
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complex of becoming: the becoming artist of the one who expresses her becoming-
other, the becoming expressed in the artwork, and eventually the becoming the 
viewer goes through during his aesthetic experience of the artwork, an 
indiscernibility between the artwork, the artist, the viewer and A Life (becoming) is 
established. 
 
alien and foreign worlds, the first two paradigms of commitment to A Life 
It would be hard to confuse works which either embody the paradigm of 
commitment to A Life A Life in the living or the paradigm the living as point of view 
on and from A Life, and their relation to the power of the false, in view of the 
aesthetic experience they give. Without any claims to truth, without representation, 
Bacon through the Figure renders sensory A Life or the Outside in reciprocal 
presupposition with the living. He gives us visions which open nature onto itself and 
as such onto its absolute, an infinity which perhaps initially was only ‘the impression 
of a fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this 
world is already ours, and those creatures, ourselves’ (Deleuze, 2005d, 35): us in the 
transcendental field and the transcendental field in us. On the other hand, Struth 
through the extra-ordinary photograph reveals the living as point of view on and 
from the Outside, giving us views of nature by which nature is experienced as the 
hallucination of an alien world. The living through the extra-ordinary photograph 
appears as an ensemble of foreign bodies, creatures (for example the jungle) 
perceived from and through the infinity of the Outside. The paradigm A Life in the 
living gives us fabulated visions of the Outside whereas the paradigm the living as 
point of view on and from A Life gives us views of the living as dispersions of the 
Outside. In terms of aesthetic experience, such is the extent of the expansion of, and 
departure from, DG’s conceptualization of art operated by the second paradigm of 
commitment to A Life: the paradigm A Life in the living gives us a foreign world 
entirely decentred from humans, a transcendental Outside as the world inside which 
we live, of which we are the creatures, and which lives inside us; and the paradigm 
the living as point of view on and from A Life gives us the world of humans as an 
alien world perceived from and through the Outside, an alien world experienced as 
an hallucination.  
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movement from nature to a possible universe 
A haptic vision is a type of possible universe, an universe which is a territorialization 
on and of the absolute that A Life is. Nature hallucinated encompasses the 
experience of nature as the possible universe that it is. Nature hallucinated is another 
type of possible universe, a possible universe which has realized itself as nature and 
that is experienced from and through the Outside (or as hallucination). Through the 
modes of aesthetic experience vision and hallucination, the viewer is deterritorialized 
from nature and reterritorialized onto a possible universe: either onto a haptic vision 
or onto nature hallucinated. Both modes of aesthetic experience involve a movement 
from nature to a possible universe. 
the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life is not medium specific 
The paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life is not specific to the 
medium of photography. It is, like the paradigm A Life in the living which is not 
specific to the medium of painting, not medium specific. It does not need to be 
embodied by the extra-ordinary photograph like the paradigm A Life in the living 
does not need to be embodied by the Figure. Photography by virtue of its ontology is 
highly suited to serve as a medium by which to embody the paradigm the living as 
point of view on and from A Life. But there is also space for the conceptualization of 
how other mediums, for example sculpture, might be able to operate a cut across the 
Outside, capturing its dispersions, its genesis, in a view beyond the threshold of 
human perception. How could sculpture give the viewer a scientific or slicing eye by 
which he would experience the living as point of view on the Outside in the process 
of dispersing itself whilst simultaneously experiencing it from and through the 
Outside? How could sculpture give the viewer an experience of the living as the 
hallucination of an alien world perceived from an obscure infinity? These questions 
are a subset of a new set of questions or problems completely different to the ones 
which emerge when thinking of the capacities of different mediums to embody a 
commitment to A Life following the paradigm A Life in the living (or DG’s 
conceptualization of art). With the paradigm the living as point of view on and from 
A Life emerges a whole new set of possibilities as to how different mediums can 
embody a commitment to A Life. 
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Section 6 – The third paradigm of commitment to A Life: 
new living emerging from A Life 
 
the world as theatre or illusion versus presence 
Deleuze writes: ‘For a long time the world has been considered as a theatre, dream or 
illusion […] but the essence of the Baroque is neither to fall in the illusion nor to get 
out of it, it is to realize something in the illusion itself, or to communicate to it a 
spiritual presence that restores to its pieces and fragments a collective unity’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, 170). To ‘communicate’ a ‘presence’ to the ‘theatre, dream or 
illusion’ that the world is, is exactly what the first two paradigms of commitment to 
A Life (A Life in the living and the living as point of view on and from A Life) 
describe and what the artworks that embody these paradigms are concerned with and 
achieve. Again, in this context, ‘presence’ needs to be understood as A Life or the 
Outside, and the theatre or illusion that the world is as that which I have termed 
nature or the living.  
Deleuze expresses this “communication” (‘to communicate’) of a presence to the 
world with two propositions: ‘to realize presence in the illusion’ or to ‘to convert the 
illusion in presence’ (Deleuze, 1988, 170). ‘To realize presence in the illusion’ can 
be said to correspond to the paradigm A Life in the living. Bacon “realizes presence 
in the illusion”, Bacon operates this realization through the opening of the illusion 
(the living) onto itself and as such onto presence (A Life), Portrait of Isabel 
Rawsthorne is the realization and as such revelation of presence (onto-genetic 
condition) in the illusion (the conditioned). On the other hand, ‘to convert the 
illusion in presence’ can be said to correspond to the paradigm the living as point of 
view on and from A Life. Struth “converts of the illusion in presence”, his extra-
ordinary photographs reveal and give the experience of the illusion (the living) as 
that which is perceived of presence (A Life), as that which presence is perceived as, 
as that which is perceived from and through presence. The living is related to the 
Life that it is and as such experienced as the Life that it is, and in that sense can be 
said to be “converted” into A Life. 
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The artworks which embody each of these paradigms give completely different 
aesthetic experiences: vision and hallucination. These paradigms are however linked 
in that they both, in different ways, “communicate a presence to the world” and it is 
as such that their respective aesthetic experiences both involve the establishment of a 
unity with presence, a unity with A Life: the viewer is reterritorialized onto A Life, 
dispersed as A Life (vision), or the viewer experiences the living from and through 
A Life or the Outside (hallucination). 
The third paradigm of commitment to A Life is termed new nature or new living 
emerging from A Life. It is neither related to the realization of presence in the illusion 
nor to the conversion of the illusion in presence. An artwork which embodies this 
paradigm operates a metamorphosis of the illusion or theatre that the world is (the 
living or nature) into a new illusion or theatre (new living or new nature). It is 
concerned with what the essence of the Baroque is not: to get out of the illusion, to 
get out of the living or nature. To get out of the illusion that the living is does not 
mean to get to or attain to a unity with the Outside: this concerns the first two 
paradigms of commitment to A Life by which two different types of unity with the 
Outside are established (vision or hallucination); nor does it mean to get out of the 
living or illusion in movements towards death or towards a transcendent universe 
(Paradise for example). It means to get out of the illusion by virtue of operating the 
metamorphosis of the illusion which results in a new illusion, a new living or nature, 
a new possibility for nature.  
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La saison des fêtes 
Pierre Huyghe constructed what can be termed a garden for his work La saison des 
fêtes, 2010, at the Palacio de Cristal part of the Museo Nacional Centro de Arte 
Reina Sofia in Madrid. The garden fills a circle. Divided in twelve parts (in the 
manner of a pie chart) for each month of the calendar year, the circle contains plants 
which act as symbols for celebrations, anniversaries, festivities or rituals (for 
example pumpkins for Halloween, a coniferous tree for Christmas, roses for St-
Valentine, etc.). The work is a ‘collection of symbols, anniversaries, dates’ and 
charts a ‘cycle divided by twelve months’ (Huyghe, 2010). As Huyghe says, the 
garden in a sense is not designed by him, it is of the illusion or theatre that the world 
is, in the sense of being part of the “scenario” or “script” by which the world is 
understood as an illusion or a theatre. The garden is designed not by Huyghe but ‘by 
how the year is entered by these celebrations’ (Huyghe, 2010). Huyghe in his work 
seems to be sensitive to a notion by which the form of the exhibition, its extent in 
space and time, is understood as the form of the artwork itself. Beyond the obvious 
relation to “gardens”, La saison des fêtes can be related for example to the exhibition 
Jardins d’hiver, 1974, by Marcel Broodthaers which Huyghe has, according to 
Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, cited as an influential figure (Christov-Bakargiev, 
2004, 404). La saison des fêtes, like Jardins d’hiver, ‘played with and choreographed 
elements like characters in play’, both works activate ‘the exhibition space as both a 
theatrical space and a space of reality’, conflating a space of reality, the world, and a 
theatrical space, a theatre or illusion. These artworks achieve this through an 
engagement with formal devices such as scenarios, scripts or sets which reflect both 
an understanding of the world as theatre or illusion, and of us living in the world as 
characters in a play. The artwork/exhibition is a bloc of time and space theatricalized 
through the use of scenarios, scripts or sets, and inside it the viewer is a character: 
this constitutes a formal approach to the artwork and the exhibition (or the 
artwork/exhibition where both become indiscernible) which in and of itself reflects 
the Baroque notion of theatrum mundi, or the world as theatre.  
The “scenario” of dated celebrations is not “scenarized” by Huyghe, but represents 
parts of the scenario by which the world is considered to be a theatre. Huyghe calls 
the scenario(s) inside which we live ‘fictions’: ‘Every day we move around in 
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fictions, which give rise to realities’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 31).56 What 
interests Huyghe in La saison des fêtes is ‘how you position yourself within this 
rhythm’ (the rhythm of time passing, of the twelve months cycle) which ‘history has 
colonized’ through the creation of ‘dates’ for celebrations (Huyghe, 2010). History 
has colonized this rhythm of time passing because ‘days have been replaced by 
dates’, by dates of celebrations (Huyghe, 2010). ‘These questions of festivities and 
ritual is again this idea of how you attach yourself within the return’ (Huyghe, 2010); 
one ‘attaches’ oneself to festivities, to the fictions that dates are, one becomes a 
character in the theatre that the world is. In La saison des fêtes, Huyghe engages with 
the ‘appearance and disappearance’ of that which returns endlessly, including 
‘natural returns like the tide or like spring’ (Huyghe, 2010), as that which we ‘attach’ 
ourselves to. Like the tide returns, Christmas, Halloween and St-Valentine return, 
and we attach ourselves to them as Huyghe says like characters attach themselves to 
the scenarios or fictions “inside” which they live and which as such ‘give rise to 
[their or our] realities’, the realities of us playing characters in the illusion or theatre 
that the world is considered to be. 
Huyghe planted in the garden of La saison des fêtes a Green Romantica flower, a 
green rose, as the ‘morphing of the traditional forms’ of the two celebrations St-
Valentine and St-Patrick’s day (Huyghe, 2010). The green rose embodies the 
morphing of the vegetal symbols of these two celebrations: the morphing of the rose 
                                                 
56
 Huyghe’s work exposes a general interest in the form of the scenario or fiction. In some works, this 
takes the form of an interest in the literal form of the scenario or fiction, the scenario of a film or the 
fiction that a film is for example. The scenario or fiction is not in these works the scenario or fiction 
by which the world is defined as theatre or illusion (like is the list of dates of celebrations which La 
saison des fêtes embodies), they are the literal scenarios or fictions of cinema for example. In 
Blanche-Neige Lucie, 1997, L’ellipse, 1998, The Third Memory, 2000, and No Ghost Just a Shell 
(initiated in 1999), characters, real or not, go through processes by which they escape, “get out” of, 
the scenario or fiction inside which they were “caught” as characters, or predestined to be caught (No 
Ghost Just a Shell). To take the scenario or fiction in its literal form as it is in these works appears as 
a strategy of Huyghe by which to embody a metaphor of “getting out” of the scenarios or fictions by 
which the world is defined as theatre. In other words, the character of a film emancipates itself from 
the scenario or fiction of the film as metaphor for our potential emancipation from the theatre or 
illusion that the world is considered to be.  
La saison des fêtes seems more interesting in that the scenario or fiction of dates of celebrations is not 
the fiction of a film but the fiction of the world, and as such the work need not function 
metaphorically but can function literally. In other words, if La saison des fêtes is engaged with 
“getting out” of the scenarios or fictions by which the world is defined as theatre, it can do so literally 
and not through the metaphorical use of the scenario or fiction of a film for example. 
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flower (St-Valentine) and the colour green (St-Patrick’s day). The Green Romantica 
is a new vegetal symbol for a new celebration between St-Valentine and St-Patrick’s 
day, a new date that adds itself to the calendar of dates (the 17th of March to coincide 
with the opening of the exhibition). 
 
La saison des fêtes and the paradigm new living emerging from A Life 
A constant in Huyghe’s work seems to be that it engages with the notion of theatrum 
mundi, that we live or ‘move around in fictions which give rise to [our] realities’, 
that we live in an illusion or theatre. In relation to Huyghe’s work, what is in this text 
termed the living or nature is the fictions we move around and the realities they give 
rise to. 
La saison des fêtes gives us the view of a new nature: a nature where the Green 
Romantica serves as a symbol for a new celebration. This new nature is our nature 
metamorphosed, it is a new possibility for nature, a new celebration has emerged 
between St-Valentine and St-Patrick’s day. The new nature is a metamorphosis of 
the fictions we live in, appearing to hope to give rise to new realities. La saison des 
fêtes embodies the paradigm new living emerging from A Life. Its mode of aesthetic 
experience is neither vision nor hallucination but view, the artwork which embodies 
this third paradigm gives to experience the view of a new nature. As for the first two 
paradigms, the aesthetic experience of an artwork which embodies this third 
paradigm corresponds to a movement from nature to a possible universe. The 
specific type of possible universe associated with this paradigm is termed new 
nature. The viewer is deterritorialized from (our current) nature and reterritorialized 
onto a new nature, a new nature which itself is a metamorphosis of (our current) 
nature. La saison des fêtes presents the view of a new nature by virtue of presenting 
a new fiction or scenario. In the case of La saison des fêtes, the movement from 
nature to a possible universe, the movement from nature to a new nature, is a 
movement from our current fictions to a metamorphosis of these fictions.  
This mode of aesthetic experience does not involve the establishment of a unity with 
the Outside. In terms of movement, it corresponds to a relative de- and re- 
territorialization through which no unity with the Outside is established. This 
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experience is nevertheless different from our ordinary experiences and movements, 
themselves relative de- and re- territorializations which always inevitably “lead us” 
to our actual universe, in that through this experience a possible universe is attained: 
a new nature, a metamorphosis of our nature (for example, the new nature where the 
Green Romantica serves as a symbol for a celebration on the 17th of March). The 
type of possible universe termed new nature is said to emerge from A Life or the 
Outside in that the movement that leads to it necessarily requires an absolute for its 
operation. This movement is described as [nature] – [A Life or the Outside] – [new 
nature]. No unity is established with the Outside through the aesthetic experience but 
nevertheless the new nature, our nature metamorphosed, emerges or results from A 
Life or the Outside. An artwork which embodies the paradigm new living emerging 
from A Life gives to experience the third quality of movement: the quality by which 
our ordinary experiences or movements incessantly lead us to and give us to 
experience a renewed nature which emerges from A Life or the Outside. This 
renewed nature is said to emerge from A Life or the Outside in that the creative 
potential that A Life is incessantly operates the (re-)actualization and (re-
)virtualization of our nature, relentlessly giving rise to our nature as a renewed nature 
which (re-)emerges from the Outside. This quality of movement can be termed the 
renewing quality of movement. The artwork which embodies the third paradigm of 
commitment to A Life gives to experience the view of a possible metamorphosis of 
our nature, a new nature which is our nature metamorphosed or renewed. It 
embodies a commitment to A Life in that it gives to experience the renewing force 
and creative potential that A Life is. 
The Green Romantica in La saison des fêtes is that which embodies the 
metamorphosis of our nature, it is because of the green rose that the work gives to 
see a new nature, the green rose “opens itself onto”, “blossoms into” and as such 
“exists within” a new nature. The movement La saison des fêtes corresponds to in 
terms of the metamorphosis of the fictions we live in is described as: [… – St-
Valentine – St-Patrick’s day – …] – [A Life or Outside] – [… – St-Valentine – 
Green Romantica – St-Patrick’s day – …]. The Green Romantica (and correlatively 
the new nature it “exists within”) relates to A Life or the Outside in that it results or 
emerges from A Life or the Outside. The Green Romantica does not blossom from 
within nature into nature, it blossoms from the Outside into a new nature. This could 
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in a sense be said of all flowers, all flowers blossom into the actual universe which 
itself is the incessant (re-)emergence of a new nature from the Outside, but the 
difference with the Green Romantica is that it emerges not into a new (re-
)actualization of the actual universe, it emerges into a new nature that is itself a 
possible universe, a universe that is actual but not real. 
new nature versus new earth and people to come 
The paradigm of commitment to A Life new living emerging from A Life is so far the 
most pronounced departure from DG’s conceptualization of art. A new nature should 
not be confused with what DG term ‘a new earth and a people that do not yet exist’ 
and which art ‘calls for’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104). A new earth and a 
people ‘to come’57 relates to the absolute deterritorialization and the 
reterritorialization on the absolute (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 636). A haptic vision 
(for example Figure in movement), which is and gives A Life, ‘summons forth’ or 
calls for a new earth and a people to come (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 166). A Life, 
becoming, the forces of the future, art following DG’s conceptualization, calls for a 
new earth and a people to come because it opens us and nature to A Life, it gives us 
the vision and becoming that launch us towards the absolute and as such towards a 
future, the future of a new earth and people. However, us and nature, having become 
absolute and dispersed through the establishment of a unity with A Life, are 
inevitably eventually reterritorialized into the relative and actual universe that nature 
is. The new earth and people to come is consequently forever to come, because A 
Life will forever be this creative power which launches us and nature towards the 
absolute and the future. 
The new nature or new living discussed in relation to the paradigm new living 
emerging from A Life is exactly not this new earth and people to come. A new nature 
is not forever to come, it is a metamorphosis of our nature of which the artwork 
gives a view: it “has already come”. A new nature is akin to the result of a 
revolution, the emergence of a new nature. But precisely as such, it loses its 
radicalism. As DG write of revolution: ‘But the success of a revolution resides only 
in itself, precisely in the vibrations, clinches, and openings that it gave to the men 
                                                 
57
 The expression ‘to come’ is often used to refer to a new earth and a people. For example, ‘the 
language of sensations […] that summons forth a people to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 166). 
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and women at the moment of its making’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 167). The 
‘success of a revolution resides only in itself’ precisely because its success does not 
reside in that which it gives, in that which it results in: a new nature. The success of a 
revolution resides in the becomings and the openings these becomings allow for 
during the revolutionary process, and not after in the new nature the process gives. 
Nevertheless, a new nature embodies a commitment to A Life, like the result of a 
revolution embodies a commitment to revolution, since it results or emerges from it; 
such is the argument by which the third paradigm of commitment to A Life new 
living emerging from A Life is said to be a commitment to A Life, giving to 
experience the renewing force and creative potential that A Life is. 
 
commitment to pure immanence, and danger of transcendence 
The three paradigms of commitment to A Life are, and in terms of aesthetic 
experience correspond to, a movement from nature to a possible universe, from 
nature to either a haptic vision, nature hallucinated or a new nature. This movement 
results from the commitment to A Life, it is the consequence of the embodiment by 
the artwork of one of the three qualities of movement (haptic, hallucinatory or 
renewing). The commitment to A Life is a commitment to the pure plane of 
immanence that A Life is, and as such necessarily a commitment to immanence. 
Consequently, the movement from nature to a possible universe never describes a 
leap out of the pure immanence that A Life is, the movement is never from nature to 
a form of transcendence.  
When art is movement from nature to a haptic vision (paradigm A Life in the living), 
that which is attained is not a form of transcendence but the transcendental, A Life in 
reciprocal presupposition with the living. Expressed in Bacon’s paintings are figures 
of our nature given ‘giant dimensions as if they were swollen by a life that no lived 
perception can attain’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162). Nature opens itself onto A 
Life, and as such not onto a form of transcendence but onto itself. Nature as that 
which we ordinarily experience of the transcendental field or pure plane of 
immanence, opens itself onto the transcendental field inside which we live and 
which lives inside us. 
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Art as movement from nature (as it is ordinarily experienced through human 
perception) to nature experienced as a hallucination, from nature to nature 
hallucinated (paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life), does not 
either involve a form of transcendence. The hallucination, that nature is experienced 
from and through the Outside, involves no form of transcendence since nature is 
never “escaped” as if through a movement towards a transcendent exteriority from 
which nature is experienced (as if to experience nature from Paradise for example, or 
“the perspective of God on our world”). Nature as point of view from the Outside 
always also reciprocally presupposes nature as point of view on the Outside (from a 
position within nature) denying any possible form of transcendence. 
When art is movement from nature to a new nature (paradigm new living from A 
Life), the view is not of a form of transcendence in that the new nature is a 
metamorphosis of our nature “through its middle”. Each of the three paradigms in a 
sense involves a metamorphosis of nature “through its middle”. Following the 
paradigm A Life in the living, through a vision, it is through its middle that nature 
opens itself onto itself and as such onto A Life. Following the paradigm the living as 
point of view on and from A Life, through a hallucination, nature is not per se 
metamorphosed but it is through its middle that the extra-ordinary photograph 
operates its capture (on its vertical line of genesis beyond the threshold of human 
perception); and it is through its middle that the viewer experiences it simultaneously 
as point of view on and from the Outside, as if the viewer oscillates infinitely rapidly 
between nature and the Outside passing through the middle of nature. Following the 
paradigm new living emerging from A Life, nature is metamorphosed in its middle in 
that literally a new nature exposes a metamorphosis in the middle of nature, a new 
nature is our nature which embodies a change “in its middle” as it is clearly 
exemplified by the Green Romantica in La saison des fêtes (in the middle of St-
Valentine and St-Patrick’s day). A new nature is our nature metamorphosed and as 
such “a future” of nature, a new possibility for nature. 
three types of universe transcendent to nature  
Three types of form of transcendence, or what can be termed universes transcendent 
to nature, can be defined. An artwork which embodies a commitment to A Life 
corresponds to or gives a movement from nature to a possible universe that would by 
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definition (A Life being pure immanence) never lead to one of these three types of 
universe. The first type pretends to the Outside, not as a transcendental immanent 
Outside in reciprocal presupposition with nature (the transcendental field, A Life), 
but as a universe transcendent to nature (Paradise for example). The second type 
pretends to the Outside in reciprocal presupposition with nature, but by virtue of 
attempting to embody the Outside, to give the Outside “its own nature”, to represent 
or narrate the Outside as a world in itself, it makes the Outside a form arguably 
transcendent to nature. This type of universe results from the attempt to express the 
Outside as if “in and of itself”, meaning that its reciprocal presupposition or relation 
of immanence with nature is “lacking” (this type is further discussed below in 
relation to La saison des fêtes). The third type does not pretend to the Outside, nor 
does it pretend to nature in that it is not a metamorphosis of our nature through its 
middle (as is La saison des fêtes), it simply assumes itself as transcendent to our 
nature. This type can perhaps be described by what is commonly termed a parallel 
universe, a nature in parallel with our nature; it could be exemplified by the work of 
Charles Avery who since 2004 has developed an imaginary parallel world called The 
Island. Each of these three types corresponds not to the realization of ‘presence in 
the illusion’ (A Life in the living – haptic vision) nor to the conversion of ‘the 
illusion in presence’ (the living as point of view on and from A Life – nature 
hallucinated), but to an attempt to ‘get out of [the illusion]’, not through a 
metamorphosis of the illusion (new living emerging from A Life – new nature), but 
through a paradoxical “movement” towards a universe transcendent to nature. Each 
of them corresponds to a leap out of the pure plane of immanence (A Life), a 
“movement” which a commitment to A Life cannot encompass. They embody the 
attempt to get out of the illusion either by making of the Outside a universe 
transcendent to our nature, by making of the Outside another nature within our nature 
(but another nature which lacks a relation of immanence with our nature), or by 
making another nature outside our nature. 
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Alice’s Wonderland versus the Outside, in relation to the new nature and La saison 
des fêtes 
Huyghe talks of La saison des fêtes in relation to Alice from Through the Looking-
Glass (1871) by Lewis Carroll (Huyghe, 2010). Huyghe says that his interest in 
creating a new celebration in-between two existing celebrations is an interest in an 
‘outside’ (Huyghe, 2010), an outside of the fictions that the calendar of celebrations 
constitutes and by which the world is considered to be an illusion or theatre. Huyghe 
exemplifies this outside of fictions with the ‘unbirthday party’ Alice attends in 
Through the Looking-Glass: a celebration of every other day that is not one’s 
birthday (a celebration of the other 364 days). La saison des fêtes is through the 
Green Romantica what Huyghe calls the ‘negative exhibition’ of the fictions inside 
which we live, the negative exhibition of the fiction that the calendar of dates is, ‘a 
supplement of celebration’ (Huyghe, 2010). 
From Alice's Adventures in Wonderland to Through the Looking Glass to finally 
Sylvie and Bruno (1889), Deleuze sees a ‘progress’ (Deleuze, 1993, 35) in Carroll’s 
work. The progress has to do with the relationship between the ‘surface’ and the 
‘world of depths’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34, 35), in other words between nature and the 
Outside. The progress is that increasingly, through the three books, this relationship 
becomes one of reciprocal presupposition, a relation immanence between nature and 
the Outside. In Sylvie and Bruno,  
the previous depth has flattened itself out, and becomes a surface [the 
Outside] alongside the other surface [nature]. The two surfaces thus coexist, 
and two contiguous stories are written on them […]. Not one story within 
another, but one next to the other. Sylvie and Bruno is probably the first book 
to tell two stories at the same time, not one inside the other, but two 
contiguous stories, with passages constantly shifting from one to the other, 
sometimes owing to a fragment of sentence that is common to both stories 
[…] (Deleuze, 1993, 35). 
The Outside in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Alice’s Wonderland, emphasizes 
‘one story within another’, meaning a world (Wonderland) within another world (the 
“initial” nature Alice is in before she falls down the rabbit hole). Alice does not 
“constantly shift” between nature and the Wonderland, the two worlds are not 
contiguous, imbricated, a fragment of sentence could not be common to nature and 
the Wonderland. The Wonderland embodies the Outside within nature, but in a way 
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that the Outside is given “its own nature”, and through this embodiment the Outside 
remains arguably transcendent to nature.58 The “problem” is that the reciprocal 
presupposition between the Wonderland and nature is not expressed. Sylvie and 
Bruno operates a progress because the reciprocal presupposition between the two 
stories, between the two worlds, is more explicitly expressed. Alice's Adventures in 
Wonderland describes a single movement from nature to an arguably transcendent 
Outside and back to nature. In that sense, Alice falling down the rabbit hole could be 
accused to arguably be a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. 
Sylvie and Bruno explicitly expresses a relation of immanence between nature, i.e. 
the Victorian era of the narrator, and the Outside, i.e. Fairyland, through direct 
imbrications of the two (a sentence or a song can simultaneously pertain to both 
nature and the Outside) and through ‘passages constantly shifting from one to the 
other’: nature – Outside – nature – Outside – … . The Outside repeatedly actualizes 
itself in nature (as when the narrator first encounters Bruno, a fairy, in nature: ‘ 
“Those visions are destined to be linked with my waking life!” ’) and nature 
continuously falls back into the Outside (Sylvie and Bruno keep on disappearing 
back into the Outside). Sylvie and Bruno is not one story within another (Alice's 
Adventures in Wonderland), it is a single story which develops through an 
imbrication of nature and the Outside, explicitly expressing a relation of immanence 
between the two. 
transcendence or reciprocal presupposition in La saison des fêtes  
A way by which to imbue a form of transcendence to La saison des fêtes is to 
interpret the Green Romantica as embodying the Outside in the same manner that 
Alice’s Wonderland embodies the Outside. It is to interpret the work as creating a 
new fiction (a new date in the middle of the calendar of dates) which hopes to give 
rise to the reality of a yearly movement from nature to the Outside, but where the 
Outside is arguably transcendent to nature. It is as if Huyghe wanted to give rise to 
the reality of a yearly absolute deterritorialization towards and onto the Outside, but 
                                                 
58
 That Alice’s Wonderland is arguably transcendent to nature is proper to my analysis and not to 
Deleuze’s. It seems however obvious that there is a sense in which the ‘progress’ that Deleuze sees in 
Sylvie and Bruno from Alice in Wonderland holds within itself the argument that there is a lack of 
reciprocal presupposition or relation of immanence between the Wonderland and nature (Alice’s 
nature), and as such that there arguably is a relation of transcendence between the two (Deleuze, 
1993, 34-35). 
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as opposed to open nature onto itself and as such onto the absolute that the Outside 
is, Huyghe “opens” nature onto another world, a “Wonderland” arguably 
transcendent to nature.  
not yearly cyclical movement but a timeless linear movement 
It seems more appropriate and interesting however to interpret La saison des fêtes as 
being closer to Sylvie and Bruno than to Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. That the 
new nature is the metamorphosis of nature through its middle can be imaged as such: 
nature (the ‘surface’) tears itself open onto the Outside (the ‘world of depths’) 
simultaneously as the Outside “re-patches” the tear with its dispersion. New 
dispersions of the Outside emerge in the middle of nature, composing a new nature. 
The new nature does not give a vision of the Outside, but from the Outside 
something new has emerged, corroborating a metamorphosis of nature. Nature tears 
itself open in the middle of the calendar of celebrations, simultaneously as the 
Outside “re-patches” the tear with its dispersion, with the Green Romantica. This is 
to interpret the Green Romantica not as an embodiment of the Outside, but as an 
actualization of the Outside in nature, an emergence from the Outside, constituting a 
new nature. La saison des fêtes not as another story or world embodied by the Green 
Romantica within the story that nature is, but the single story of nature which 
incessantly tears itself open onto the Outside simultaneously as the Outside “re-
patches” it with new surfaces, continuously giving rise to a new nature. Not the 
yearly cyclical movement from nature to an arguably transcendent Outside, but the 
timeless linear movement from nature to a new nature. The Green Romantica does 
not embody the Outside, it (and the new nature it “blossoms into”) emerges from it. 
The new nature is never a “Wonderland”, but it is as if a “Wonderland” emerges in 
the middle of nature, that which emerges in nature (the Green Romantica for 
example) appears to come from a Wonderland: it is new, and as such appears as a 
strange foreign creature. A new nature is not a transcendent universe of strange 
creatures, it is the emergence or surfacing of new, unpredictable forms or creatures 
in the middle of our nature, to a similar effect as when in (the middle of) our nature 
are discovered new species that none could have preconceived.  
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the alien worlds art gives us 
Art gives to experience possible universes that appear to varying degrees alien. 
However alien these possible universes appear to be, art never gives us a universe 
transcendent to nature by which the commitment to A Life would correspond to a 
leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. Art, depending on which 
paradigm of commitment to A Life it embodies, gives us three types of possible 
universe. The haptic vision is the vision of the alien world that our world absolutely 
decentred from humans is, a vision of the Outside in reciprocal presupposition with 
our world. Nature hallucinated is our world experienced from and through the 
Outside and consequently experienced as the hallucination of a world that appears 
alien. The new nature is formed through the emergence in our world of new forms 
which as new necessarily appear alien. 
co-creation 
The paradigm new living emerging from A Life finds a commonality with the 
paradigm A Life in the living in that they both operate in co-creation with A Life. A 
haptic vision is a composition of chaos, a composed chaos or chaosmos which gives 
the vision of A Life in the living. A new nature is also a composition of chaos only it 
is not one which gives the vision of A Life in the living, it gives a view of a new 
nature or new living which emerges from A Life. Following the paradigm A Life in 
the living, the composition of chaos or co-creation has the purpose of rendering A 
Life sensory, leading the viewer to the absolute that A Life is. Following the 
paradigm new living emerging from A Life, the composition of chaos or co-creation 
has the purpose of operating metamorphoses in the middle of nature, or in other 
words of “re-patching” nature torn open onto the Outside with new surfaces, leading 
the viewer to a new nature. These two paradigms in that sense oppose themselves to 
the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life in that the latter does not 
operate in co-creation with A Life. The extra-ordinary photograph does not compose 
chaos, it cuts across the chaosmos (or the vertical line of genesis of the living), it 
captures chaos composing itself. An artwork which embodies the paradigm the living 
as point of view on and from A Life does not construct or give consistency to a 
possible universe because its purpose is to reveal nature as a possible universe (only 
one which “has realized itself” as the materiality of the universe). This artwork is not 
“less creative” because it does not operate in co-creation with A Life, it needs 
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exactly not to operate in co-creation with A Life if it is to achieve its purpose (the 
same could be said of science). 
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Section 7 – Three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A 
Life  
 
Three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life are conceptualized, they are 
termed: human-actual, imaginary-transcendent and chaotic-noise. These three 
paradigms threaten the embodiment of a commitment to A Life because although 
they fail such commitment, and as such fail A Life, they give the illusion that they 
embody such commitment, they give the illusion of A Life. Whereas a commitment 
to A Life results in a movement from nature to a possible universe, an illusion of 
commitment to A Life results in a “movement” which leads nowhere. The paradigm 
human-actual leads nowhere in that it (its corresponding “movement”) remains in 
nature; the paradigm imaginary-transcendent leads nowhere in that it gives to 
experience, or can be said to launch itself towards, a universe transcendent to the 
pure plane of immanence that A Life is; and the paradigm chaotic-noise leads 
nowhere in that it plunges towards death. 
 
the possible as aesthetic category and nature as suffocation 
The possible is for DG an ‘aesthetic category’, it is that which art gives: ‘the possible 
as aesthetic category (“the possible or I shall suffocate”)’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 168). DG write ‘“ […] or I shall suffocate”’, because nature is suffocation, it is 
suffocating. For DG, art “remediates” the suffocation that nature or the living is, the 
vision of A Life in the living expressed as a possible universe (Bacon’s Figures for 
example) is brought by, is and gives a breath of air: ‘a breath of air from chaos that 
brings us the vision’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 204). The suffocation of nature is 
remediated by the vision, a possible universe which expresses nature opened onto 
itself and as such onto the Outside, a breath of air: ‘When Kierkegaard’s hero 
demands “the possible, the possible or I shall suffocate,” when James longs for the 
“oxygen of possibility,” they are only invoking the a priori Other’ (Deleuze, 2004, 
356-357). 
The two new paradigms (the living as point of view on and from A Life and new 
living emerging from A Life) by which DG’s conceptualization of art is expanded 
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remain faithful to a commitment to A Life, and also to the possible. The embodiment 
of each of the three paradigms of commitment to A Life results in a movement from 
nature to a possible universe. The paradigm the living as point of view on and from A 
Life can be said to remediate the suffocation that nature is not by giving the vision of 
A Life, but by giving an experience of nature from and through A Life, and 
consequently involving a unity with A Life or the Outside. Nature is perceived from 
and through the Outside, “from and through a breath of air”. The paradigm new 
living emerging from A Life can be said to remediate the suffocation of nature in the 
sense that nature tears itself open and is “re-patched” with new dispersions of the 
Outside, a new possible nature, a new possibility for nature has emerged (in a strict 
sense however, it cannot be said to give a ‘breath of air from chaos’ since no unity 
with A Life or the Outside is established). On the other hand, each paradigm of 
illusion of commitment to A Life fails A Life and as such the possible, each fails to 
remediate the suffocation that nature is.  
‘Man imprisons Life’ Deleuze has said in L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze (Boutang, 
2004). It is in and by ‘man and his world’59 that A Life is imprisoned. Man cannot 
trust A Life to launch man and his world towards new possibilities, as if man was to 
sit back and watch himself and his world being captured by an absolute movement 
and made to go through an infinity of becomings as if launched towards a pre-
determined destiny. But this is not because man cannot trust A Life, it is because 
man cannot trust himself. 
Deleuze explains, through his writings on Nietzsche, that man and his world has for 
essence the imprisonment of A Life by the very fact of being an actualization of A 
Life (Deleuze, 2007, 192). In Nietzschean terms, man and his world are the 
‘becoming reactive’ of the reciprocally presupposing ‘active forces’ that A Life or 
the virtual is, and it is this becoming reactive which forms the essence of man 
(Deleuze, 2007, 192). The actualization of the virtual (the actualization of A Life) is 
the becoming reactive of active forces (from A Life to man and his world), and the 
virtualization of the actual is the becoming active of reactive forces (from man and 
his world to A Life). Man and his world, here termed the living or nature, are by 
                                                 
59
 ‘Man and his world’ is an expression used by Deleuze in his writings on Nietzsche, it needs to be 
understood as what has been termed the living or nature (Deleuze, 2007, 192). 
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essence reactive and it is as such that man is said to imprison A Life. Man and his 
world are by essence the becoming reactive of A Life, A Life which is itself active, 
active forces. 
the psychology of the cosmos and of man  
There is another inseparable sense by which man and his world needs to be 
understood as that which imprisons A Life. It is that, in a sense, this “ontological” 
condition by which man and his world are by essence reactive “informs or forms” 
the values of man (and as such his morals, beliefs, institutions, etc.) with a 
‘psychological’ equivalent: nihilism (Deleuze, 2005c, 26). ‘According to Nietzsche, 
the analysis of nihilism is the object of psychology, understood also as a psychology 
of the cosmos’60 (Deleuze, 2005c, 26). Nihilism is a psychology of the cosmos in the 
sense that A Life, by actualizing itself as man and his world, “annihilates” itself: the 
active forces that it is become reactive. Evidently this is not a “bad” condition per se, 
it is the condition by which man and his world come into existence and this 
“annihilation” (or actualization, from A Life to the living) is reciprocally 
presupposed by a “vitalization or affirmation” (or virtualization, from the living to A 
Life). But nihilism is also the ‘object of psychology’ of man, and not just of the 
cosmos or of the genesis that A Life is. Man embodies in his values a becoming 
reactive, a nihilism: for example, the figure of Christ epitomizes the becoming 
reactive of man by ‘valoriz[ing] only the sick and desolate aspects of life’, by 
‘judging life, and universalizing the condemnation of life’ in the name of divine 
values (Deleuze, 2005c, 44, 45). After the ‘death of God’, the ‘Higher Men’ replace 
these divine values with human values only to find new ways to annihilate Life: 
Higher Men ‘are “failed”, “wasted”, and know not how to laugh, to play, to dance’, 
they do not know the Life which they annihilate, they do not know how to embrace 
A Life, to unite with A Life (Deleuze, 2005c, 46). 
Art is man’s “fight” against himself and his world, for A Life and for himself and his 
world. Art fights against the psychology of the cosmos and of man. The task of art 
for DG is to express A Life in the living, to express the active forces in reciprocal 
presupposition with the reactive forces that man and his world are. For DG, art is 
defined by such an expression of active forces and it is through such an expression 
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 “cosmos” needs to be understood as A Life, as the genesis that A Life is. 
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that A Life is liberated from where it is imprisoned and given to us, given to us as 
visions and becomings through which we establish a unity with A Life. 
to resist the present  
When DG write that ‘we lack resistance to the present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 
104), they mean that we lack resistance to the prisons inside which man and his 
world imprison, constrain, obliterate A Life, and that it is as such that we suffocate. 
To resist the present through art is for DG to open the present (the living, nature, or 
man and his world) onto itself and as such onto A Life. It is to restore to nature its 
absoluteness, through the expression of the visions and becomings by which man, on 
rare occasions, (re-)finds the Life he annihilates by essence. In relation to each of the 
four paradigms of commitment to A Life (including the fourth paradigm to live A 
Life conceptualized in the following section), to resist the present is to give a 
movement from nature to a possible universe, a movement which remediates the 
suffocation that nature is. Each of the four paradigms of commitment to A Life is a 
paradigm of resistance, a paradigm of resistance to man and his world, but for man 
and his world, and for A Life. 
 
three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life  
paradigm human-actual 
An artwork which embodies the paradigm human-actual leads nowhere in that its 
“movement” remains in the actual universe, in the suffocation that nature is. The 
paradigm human-actual describes our ordinary experiences or relative movements. 
This paradigm of illusion of commitment to A Life reduces A Life to the living, it 
reduces the extent of A Life to nature, it reduces the absolute to the relative, the 
infinite to the finite. The artworks which embody this paradigm are filled with 
perceptions or figurations, affections, opinions, cliché, appropriation, journalism, in 
sum they represent, comment on, discuss, man and his world.  
In a sense, the paradigm human-actual does not pretend to A Life or to a 
commitment to A Life in that either: it denies the possibility to express, to give to 
experience or to establish a unity with A Life; or it does not consider A Life at all, it 
ignores A Life, or it takes it to be, and as such reduces it to, the living or the lived. 
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To use an example not directly related to art, we might be under the illusion that 
communication, that our new means of mobile and networked communications 
remediate the suffocation that nature is. But man’s incessant communications, his 
world of the ceaseless exchange of clichés, photographs, perceptions, affections, 
opinions and ready-made concepts provides none of the creation, vision and 
becoming that art as the expression of A Life in the living involves. Perceptions, 
affections and opinions are not A Life, they are that which A Life needs to be 
liberated from. ‘We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much 
of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991, 104). 
 
Mrs Niepenberg from Gerhard Richter, 1965 
Removed due to copyright
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Gerhard Richter’s “blurred photograph” paintings, as exemplified by Mrs 
Niepenberg, follow the paradigm human-actual. Painted from a photograph61, Mrs 
Niepenberg operates a negation of painting’s capacity to express and give visions of 
A Life by equating its potential to that of the photograph: Richter seems to affirm 
that painting cannot show or give to experience anything beyond that which 
photography can. Simultaneously, Mrs Niepenberg operates a second negation, a 
negation of our ordinary human perceptions presumed to correlate to that which the 
photograph gives to see: Richter appears to indicate by “further” blurring the 
photograph that our ordinary perceptions are already blurred with regards to ‘a 
reality that we can neither see nor describe’ (Richter, 1982, 121).62 Man and his 
world (and the potentiality of painting) is addressed through a negative critique 
which cannot give a movement from nature to a possible universe. If the incapacity 
to, or supposed impossibility of, operating a movement from nature to a possible 
universe can be termed suffocation, Mrs Niepenberg emphasizes and has for subject 
suffocation. It seems that the only manner by which to see the work in a positive 
light is to assert that it functions as a denunciation of the failure of the paradigm 
human-actual, but it as such remains a self-defeating activity: to paint to assert the 
failure of painting, to make “art”, what pretends to be art, to assert the incapacity of 
art to attain to the possible. Mrs Niepenberg embodies perception, cliché, 
appropriation and journalism to, at best, operate a negative critique of man and his 
world. As negation, it opposes itself to the affirmation that a commitment to A Life 
is. Richter’s negations of painting and of human perception/photography oppose 
themselves to the affirmative embodiments of a commitment to A Life through 
painting (the Figure, paradigm A Life in the living) or through photography (the 
extra-ordinary photograph, paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life), 
both of which involve the establishment of a unity with A Life. 
                                                 
61
 One of the photograph in Atlas Sheet: 10, 1962; from the ‘Atlas collection - the newspaper 
clippings, photos and sketches which are the source material for much of Richter's work’ (Richter, 
2010).  
62
 Beyond this double negation, Richter finds a positivity in his ‘abstract pictures’ (or abstract 
paintings) which ‘make visible a reality that we can neither see nor describe, but whose existence we 
can postulate’ (Richter, 1982, 121). 
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paradigm imaginary-transcendent 
An artwork which embodies the paradigm imaginary-transcendent leads nowhere in 
that its “movement” is of a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is, it 
leads to a transcendent universe. As previously discussed, there are at least three 
types of universe transcendent to nature: a transcendent outside (a Paradise), an 
embodiment of the Outside which lacks reciprocal presupposition with nature and is 
as such arguably transcendent to nature (Alice’s Wonderland), or another nature 
outside our nature (Charles Avery’s The Island). This paradigm leads nowhere in 
that it involves “a kind of” de- and re- territorialization, but it is an impossible 
deterritorialization outside the pure plane of immanence and a reterritorialization on 
a fictive, imagined or fantasized and transcendent universe. It is “a kind of” de- and 
re- territorialization but one which does not involve movement, since movement 
never launches itself outside the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. Evidently, 
movement, and as such A Life as the absolute component of movement, never 
launches itself outside itself (A Life never launches itself outside A Life, in other 
words the pure plane of immanence does not and cannot escape or transcend itself).  
projection-transcendent-fiction versus becoming-transcendental-fabulation 
The paradigm imaginary-transcendent corresponds to fiction and as such opposes 
itself to fabulation, ‘creative fabulation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161), a 
concept which Deleuze appropriates from Bergson. Fiction can be conceptualized 
(through an articulation proper to this text and not to Deleuze) as an umbrella term 
with different interpretations which all oppose themselves to fabulation: fiction can 
be a ‘fantasy’, an “imagination”, a ‘memory’, and it involves a “projection of the 
self”63 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161, Deleuze, 1993, 13). The universe given to 
experience by fiction can be said to be created through, and to involve a mode of 
aesthetic experience described as, a projection of the self onto a transcendent 
universe. In opposition, the universe given to experience by fabulation is created 
through, and involves a mode of aesthetic experience described as, a becoming of the 
self. The universe given to experience by fabulation is not a transcendent universe 
but an expression of the transcendental, i.e. becoming. Projection can be said to be 
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 ‘Creative fabulation has nothing to do with a memory, however amplified, or with a fantasy’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161); ‘[…] fabulation, the fabulating function, neither consist in 
imagining nor in projecting a self’ (Deleuze, 1993, 13). 
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the mode of operation of fiction. Projection is both the mode through which fictions 
are created, and the mode of aesthetic experience fictions correspond to, in other 
words fictions induce the viewer to project herself. On the other hand, becoming is 
the mode of operation of fabulation. Becoming is the mode through which 
fabulations are created, and fabulations give to the viewer becomings. Projection 
opposes itself to becoming, and correlatively fiction opposes itself to fabulation, and 
the transcendent opposes itself to the transcendental. The triad projection-
transcendent-fiction opposes itself to the triad becoming-transcendental-fabulation. 
to create through becoming, not through projection 
Projection corresponds to an illusion of commitment to A Life in that it is the 
operation of a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. And since A 
Life never launches itself outside itself, since the pure plane of immanence is pure 
and allows for no transcendence, projection cannot be a commitment to A Life. 
Becoming on the other hand is a mode of operation, or a mode of creation and of 
aesthetic experience, by which the artist creates not through his projections 
(imaginations, fantasies, memories64) but through his becomings. The artist paints or 
the writer writes through his becomings, and it is these becomings which the painting 
or the novel expresses. The artist paints or the writer writes the visions he attains to 
through his becomings, and not the fictions he “attains to” through his imaginations 
or fantasies: 
He [the artist, the novelist] has seen in life something too great and also too 
unbearable, and the mutual embrace of life with that which threatens it, in 
such a way that the corner of nature he perceives, or the neighborhoods of the 
town along with their characters, attain to a vision that composes through 
them the percepts of that life, of that moment, shattering lived perceptions 
into a sort of cubism, a sort of simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular purple or 
blue light, which have no other object or subject than themselves (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1991, 161-162). 
                                                 
64
 A memory can be associated to projection, it is a projection on the past. Memory opposes itself to 
becoming. For example a memory of being a child in the past opposes itself to a becoming-child in 
the present. Deleuze mentions many times, in relation to literature, how creation has nothing to do 
‘our small private lives’, with the memories of our private pasts, but with becoming-other in the 
present, with A Life (Boutang, 2004). 
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fabulation ‘goes beyond the real and the fictive’ 
In painting, fiction opposes itself to fabulation like abstraction (for example 
geometrical abstraction) opposes itself to haptic vision or the Figure. Abstraction as 
projection onto a transcendent universe opposes itself to the Figure as becoming 
which is and expresses the transcendental. Fiction (imagination, fantasy) sets itself in 
diametrical opposition with the real, whereas fabulation ‘goes beyond the real and 
the fictive’ by raising itself to ‘visions’, ‘becoming or powers’65 (Deleuze, 1985, 
196, Deleuze, 1993, 13). Fabulation is the function by which A Life in the living is 
expressed, it results in a vision/becoming, in characters or landscapes that are 
‘swollen by a life that no lived perception can attain to’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 
162). Fabulation is the affirmation of the power of the false that goes beyond the real 
and the fictive, it is the power of the false against representation. Representation is a 
mode proper to fiction: fiction represents imagination or fantasies, it represents 
transcendent universes. In opposition fabulation expresses becomings, it expresses 
the transcendental. Whereas fiction creates representative narrations of giant 
monsters living in transcendent universes (for example Gods in Paradise or Charles 
Avery’s Aleph Null in The Island), ‘fabulation creates visions that falsify received 
truths by rendering visible the intolerable [A Life], thereby critiquing the present, 
while those same visions loom like giant mythic figures of yet to be explored 
possibilities’ (Bogue, 2006, 220). These expressive visions in opposition to 
representative narrations are ‘dynamic but unspecified in their narrative possibilities, 
and hence temporal forces that may generate stories, but not themselves properly 
narrative elements’ (Bogue, 2006, 220). Terms can be added to the triads opposed 
above: projection-transcendent-fiction-representation-narration opposes itself to 
becoming-transcendental-fabulation-expression-vision. 
nature hallucinated and new nature versus fiction 
The universes that fabulation creates and gives to experience are, in relation to 
painting, the possible universes that haptic visions or Figures are. Haptic vision is the 
type of possible universe corresponding to the paradigm A Life in the living, and as 
fabulation, it opposes itself to fiction. But it is also the two other types of possible 
universe, nature hallucinated (paradigm the living as point of view on and from A 
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 ‘Powers’ is translated from French: “puissances”. 
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Life) and new nature (paradigm new living emerging from A Life), that oppose 
themselves to fiction. Nature hallucinated, as nature, is necessarily not a fiction, and 
it involves no projection outside the pure plane of immanence that A Life is, on the 
contrary it is nature experienced from and through A Life. A new nature is perhaps 
closer to fiction, for example La saison des fêtes as “fiction of a metamorphosis of 
nature”. But the mode of creation of a new nature is not through projection, it is not 
through a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. A new nature is 
created through A Life, through becoming, through a becoming which results in and 
opens itself onto a metamorphosis of our nature. A new nature, our nature torn open 
onto the Outside and simultaneously “re-patched” with new dispersions of the 
Outside (La saison des fêtes), opposes itself to a fantasy or imagination of a 
transcendent universe which is created through projection and projected onto 
(Paradise, Charles Avery’s The Island). La saison des fêtes evidently presents a 
nature that is very different to Charles Avery’s The Island, the former involves a 
metamorphosis of nature and as such a becoming of the pure plane of immanence 
whilst the latter involves an impossible leap or projection out of this plane.  
fiction and suffocation 
Through fiction, suffocation is perhaps remediated but through an illusion, through 
the illusion of a projection of the self onto a transcendent universe. Through fiction, 
nature is left unaffected by the projection, whereas through a commitment to A Life 
and as such through a movement from nature to a possible universe, nature is either: 
opened onto itself and as such onto A Life, experienced as a possible universe and as 
a hallucination, or made to go through a becoming by which it metamorphoses itself. 
Fiction, and projection as its mode of creation and aesthetic experience, transcends 
the pure plane of immanence and as such leaves this plane unaffected 
(correspondingly leaving nature unaffected, nature being that which we ordinarily 
experience of the pure plane of immanence). The remediation of suffocation is an 
illusion since nature is left as it is, unaffected. For example, for the ones who believe 
in the fiction of the bible and the transcendent universe it narrates (Paradise), 
suffocation is remediated through the illusion of a projection onto a form of 
transcendence (Paradise, God, etc.) until the afterlife when the projection can 
“realize” itself (“reaching Paradise, reaching God, etc.”). They believe in a 
fantasized or imagined life that is transcendent to the living and only attainable after 
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life. Surely the projection of the self onto a transcendent universe involves 
becomings of the self, but becomings which deny life, becomings which 
paradoxically deny A Life and as such themselves (becoming = A Life) until after 
life. These believers are opposed to the ones who believe in life and aim to go 
through becomings remediating the suffocation that nature is within life, embracing 
A Life within life. The ones who aim to go through becomings and who believe in 
Life as affirmation of the power of the false critiquing any form of truth oppose 
themselves to the ones who project themselves onto, believe in and affirm as truth a 
fantasized or imagined life. 
 
The conceptualization of the paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life 
imaginary-transcendent and chaotic-noise relate tightly to Deleuze’s discussion of 
respectively ‘abstract painting’ and ‘abstract expressionism or art informel’ in 
Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Deleuze, 2002, 96-102, 110-111). 
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On White II by Wassily Kandinsky, 1923 
abstract painting codifies A Life 
The “problem” of abstract painting according to Deleuze66 is that it takes the 
analogical, the ‘analogical flux’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110), A Life itself, as its object and 
in doing so separates A Life from the living or the lived in reciprocal presupposition 
with it, making of A Life a form of transcendence. Abstract painting pretends to the 
Outside, but through its engagement with the medium, it separates the Outside, the 
transcendental field or the pure plane of immanence from nature, “breaking” the 
reciprocal presupposition between the two. Abstract painting ‘proceeds by code and 
program: it implies operations of homogenization and binarization that are 
constitutive of a code’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110). The code functions as a digital 
language which opposes itself to the analogical language that serves to express A 
Life in reciprocal presupposition with the living as exemplified by Bacon’s use of 
the medium of painting. The paintings of Mondrian or even some works by 
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 In the specific context of his conceptualization of sensation in relation to and through Bacon’s 
work. 
Removed due to copyright
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Kandinsky67 proceed by code, their paintings are like languages of binarized code or 
collection of pictorial shapes “aimed” at codifying the analogical flux or A Life 
which it takes as its object. It is as if these painters attempt to create a pictorial 
syntax to “phrase” A Life outside its reciprocal presupposition with nature. Their 
digital or codified languages should not be confused with analogical language: 
through an ‘intrinsically pictorial code’ they digitally attempt to express the 
analogical (Deleuze, 2002, 110). The notion of a digital or codified language to 
express A Life describes well the purpose of Kandinsky’s chapter on ‘The Language 
of Form and Colour’ in Concerning the Spiritual in Art68 (Kandinsky and Sadler, 
1977): to articulate a pictorial code, a ‘language of form and colour’, to attempt the 
‘expression of the soul of nature and humanity, or, as Kandinsky terms it, the innerer 
Klang’69. Since the code results from operations of homogenization and binarization 
(for example Kandinsky’s ‘antitheses’ in ‘The Language of Form and Colour’ 
(Kandinsky and Sadler, 1977)), the code opposes itself to the analogical. What could 
be termed the “digital expression of the analogical” is ‘paradoxical’ and ‘a status that 
nears the impossible’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110). Through abstract painting, if A Life is 
said to be captured, it is captured through a code and not analogically, the capture is 
by codification and not by modulation of differential relations, in other words ‘the 
analogy passes by a code instead of passing by a diagram’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110). 
There certainly are rhythms in Mondrian and Kandinsky, but these exist through a 
code, a codified or digital rhythm which not only codifies A Life but also loses the 
reciprocal presupposition between A Life and nature. Their paintings do not include 
the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is. Bacon expresses the 
transcendental in reciprocal presupposition with nature whilst Mondrian and 
Kandinsky present codified universes transcendent to nature. Abstract painting, by 
                                                 
67
 DG associate Kandinsky to that which is characteristic, according to them, of abstract 
expressionism, or art informel: the ‘nomadic motif’ or nomadic line also present in Pollock [footnote 
35] (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 624). This is perhaps true of early works like Fugue, 1914, but latter 
works, for example On White II, 1923, exemplify a shift in Kandinsky’s work which seems to, by 
then, proceed by code: Kandinsky’s “motifs” become that of abstraction of clear and distinct pictorial 
shapes, if not only of geometrical shapes.  
68
 Originally published in 1911 in German as Über das Geistige in der Kunst. 
69
 ‘innerer Klang’ can be translated from German as “inner sound”. This quote is from the 
Translator’s Introduction p. xiii (Kandinsky and Sadler, 1977). The English translation was originally 
published by Constable and Company Limited in 1914 as The Art of Spiritual Harmony. 
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taking A Life as an object in separation to the living, remains a mode of creation and 
a mode of aesthetic experience linked to projection and the transcendent, to the 
representations of imaginations of A Life, in opposition to becoming and the 
transcendental, to expressions of A Life. The paradigm of illusion of commitment to 
A Life imaginary-transcendent threatens the embodiment of a commitment to A Life 
because although it fails such commitment and as such fails A Life, it gives the 
illusion that it embodies such commitment and gives the illusion of A Life. 
 
paradigm chaotic-noise 
The paradigm chaotic-noise is the third paradigm of illusion of commitment to A 
Life. Abstract expressionism or art informel (Jackson Pollock for example (Deleuze, 
2002, 99-102)) in opposition to abstract painting does not codify the analogical flux 
but leaves it as such, falling to make it pass through and re-emerge from the diagram 
to construct to the Figure and as such express A Life in the living. Pollock attains to 
‘the secret of the gothic line’ (Deleuze, 2002, 101), the ‘line without contour’ of 
abstract expressionism (Deleuze, 2002, 102), the same line which Bacon uses to 
compose the Figure. In Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux, Pollock is 
exemplary for having attained to this line characteristic of ‘nomad art’ which DG 
praise (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 624). However, discussed in the context of the 
analysis of Bacon’s work in Bacon. Logique de la sensation, in Pollock’s work it is 
‘as if the diagram was directed towards itself, instead of serving as a means. It no 
longer goes beyond itself through a code [as in abstract painting], but dissolves itself 
into a scrambling’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110-111). The line without contour, and 
Pollock’s work, expresses the analogical flux and as such A Life, but A Life is 
expressed as if “in and of itself”, lacking a reciprocal presupposition with the living. 
This expression results in a ‘painting-catastrophe: […] sensation is attained, but 
remains in an irremediably confused state’(Deleuze, 2002, 102). And what is a 
sensation irremediably confused if not chaos? It is at least chaotic, a rhythm that 
nears noise. Chaos is necessarily composed, Pollock composes chaos, but the Figure 
fails to emerge, the composition is a ‘“mess”’: ‘so much caution is needed to prevent 
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the plane of consistency from becoming a pure plane of abolition or death’70 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 330-331). An artwork which embodies the paradigm 
chaotic-noise is and leads to a plane of abolition or death, it leads to and is a mess, a 
catastrophe, a confusion, and it is in that sense that it leads nowhere.  
 
Abstract Painting from Gerhard Richter, 1987 
 
                                                 
70
 The plane of consistency refers to the virtual, A Life, in opposition to, yet in reciprocal 
presupposition with, the actual, the living or the plane of organization. 
Removed due to copyright
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The paradigm chaotic-noise can be exemplified by Richter’s ‘abstract pictures’71. As 
previously mentioned, for Richter, his abstract pictures ‘make visible a reality that 
we can neither see nor describe, but whose existence we can postulate’ (Richter, 
1982, 121). In Abstract Painting, 1987, chaos is necessarily composed, but since the 
Figure fails to emerge, the painting and as such this ‘reality that we can neither see 
nor describe’ loses its relation of reciprocal presupposition with nature. 
Consequently, not only does the painting is a mess which nears chaos, it also 
arguably makes of A Life a form of transcendence. By lacking an explicitly 
expressed relation of immanence with nature, the catastrophes Richter’s abstract 
pictures give to experience arguably remain as transcendent as the codifications of A 
Life that abstract painting operates. Whereas the paradigm imaginary-transcendent is 
an attempt to remediate the suffocation that nature is by launching itself towards a 
transcendent universe, the paradigm chaotic-noise is more appropriately described as 
attempting such remediation by plunging towards chaos. To follow the paradigm 
chaotic-noise is to consider chaos as if paradoxically in itself, and not as intrinsically 
linked to, and inseparable from, A Life or the chaosmos. The paradigm chaotic-
noise, like the paradigm imaginary-transcendent, fails the ‘“tension”’72 (Deleuze, 
2002, 102), in other words it fails to express the reciprocal presupposition or relation 
of territoriality between nature and A Life. The paradigm imaginary-transcendent 
neutralizes the tension because it launches itself towards a universe transcendent to 
nature, a universe detached from, lacking tension with, nature. The paradigm 
chaotic-noise neutralizes the tension because it launches itself towards death, a chaos 
in itself where all tension disappears. 
passage through chaos and the three types of possible universe 
Art never simply leads to chaos: art involves a passage through chaos in the 
movement from nature to a possible universe. But this passage through chaos always 
correlates to a genesis, to the genesis of a possible universe which the passage or 
movement through chaos leads to and opens itself onto: the genesis of the Figure 
                                                 
71
 ‘Abstract pictures’ is an expression used by Richter to refer to his abstract “paintings” (Richter, 
1982, 121). Paintings titled Abstraktes Bild are on Richter’s own “online catalogue raisonné” 
translated as Abstract Painting as per Abstract Painting, 1987, above (Richter, 2010). 
72
 ‘Kandinsky defined abstract painting by “tension”; but according to Bacon, tension, is what abstract 
painting lacks the most’ (Deleuze, 2002, 102). 
126 
 
itself composition of chaos, expression of A Life, expression of the genesis that 
nature is (haptic vision); nature as (vertical line of) genesis, nature as possible 
universe in the process of realizing itself, nature hallucinated from and through the 
Outside or A Life, as it is experienced through the extra-ordinary photograph (nature 
hallucinated); the genesis involved in our nature being metamorphosed into a new 
nature, a new living emerging from the Outside or A Life (new nature). 
table: the three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life  
The following table charts the three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life. 
Each paradigm is described through that which it leads to (in different ways 
nowhere), its mode of aesthetic experience, that which it gives to experience and its 
corresponding “movement” or illusion of movement from nature to a possible 
universe. 
 
Table 1. Paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life 
 
paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life 
paradigm of 
illusion of 
commitment to 
A Life 
leads nowhere in that 
from nature it leads to … 
mode of aesthetic 
experience 
gives to experience corresponding 
“movement”  
or illusion of movement 
from nature to a possible 
universe 
human-actual nature or the living suffocation 
 
the living or the lived: 
perceptions, figurations, 
affections, opinions, cliché, 
appropriation, journalism, 
etc. 
reduced to relative 
actual movements, i.e. 
no movement towards 
the possible 
imaginary-
transcendent 
transcendent universe projection  an imagination or a fantasy, 
or a memory, through a form 
of representation 
impossible “movement” 
of a leap out of the pure 
plane of immanence 
chaotic-noise chaos  
(chaos thought of as in 
itself, having lost its 
intrinsic relationship to 
A Life or the chaosmos) 
chaos 
(thought of as in 
itself) 
abolition, a mess, a 
catastrophe, confusion, death, 
a rhythm that is or nears 
noise, etc. 
a paradoxical 
“movement” by which 
movement stops or dies 
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Section 8 – The fourth paradigm of commitment to A Life: 
to live A Life 
 
This section conceptualizes the paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life, the 
third and last level of expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art, through an 
engagement with the following works by Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter 
Doig: 
 
A Journey That Wasn’t by Pierre Huyghe, 2005 
 
A Journey That Wasn’t, 2005, by Huyghe: 
On February 9th, 2005, seven artists and ten crewmembers set sail from 
the Port of Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, the southeast point of Argentina. 
Their journey centered on a search for an unknown island and an 
encounter with a unique solitary creature that was rumored to live only on 
the shores of an unnamed island somewhere at the height of the Polar 
Antarctic Circle (Public Art Fund, 2005). 
 
Removed due to copyright
128 
 
When Faith Moves Mountains by Francis Alÿs, 2002 
 
When Faith Moves Mountains, 2002, by Alÿs: 
On April 11th, 2002, five hundred volunteers were supplied with shovels 
and asked to form a single line at the foot of a giant sand dune in 
Ventanilla, an area outside Lima. This human comb pushed a certain 
quantity of sand a certain distance, thereby moving a sixteen-hundred-
foot-long sand dune about four inches from its original position (Alÿs, 
2002). 
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Untitled (Ping Pong), 2006-2008, and Paragon, 2006, by Doig: 
 
 
Untitled (Ping Pong) by Peter Doig, 2006-2008 
 
 
Paragon by Peter Doig, 2006 
Removed due to copyright
Removed due to copyright
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new problem: after the nature of movement, the performance of movement; to live 
the living and to live A Life 
These works do not embody any of the first three paradigms of commitment to A 
Life, A Life in the living, the living as point of view on and from A Life or new living 
emerging from A Life, and yet they engage with A Life, with the absolute component 
of movement. They are not however concerned with the nature of movement, they 
are not concerned with one of the three qualities of movement. To embody a 
commitment to A Life through a concern with the nature of movement is to embody 
and as such give to experience one of the three qualities of movement, qualities 
which are not ordinarily experienced: the quality by which movement always 
necessarily is, and opens its relative component onto, the absolute that A Life is 
(haptic quality); the quality of movement by which movement is simultaneously 
absolute and relative, by which our ordinary perceptions (perceptions of the relative 
component of movement, of the living or nature) are that which we experience of the 
absolute (of the absolute component of movement or A Life) according to our 
relative thresholds of perception, whilst these perceptions are experienced from and 
through the absolute (hallucinatory quality); the quality by which movement always 
is and results from the continuously renewed creation or genesis that A Life is, by 
which nature (or the relative component of movement) continuously emerges anew 
from the absolute (renewing quality). 
A commonality between the works mentioned above is that they are narrations, and 
each narrates one or many figures’ performance of an act or activity. The initial 
proposition is that they narrate a figure’s act or activity through which the figure 
performs an absolute movement. They narrate not a figure’s performance of an 
ordinary relative movement, they narrate a figure’s performance of an absolute 
movement.73 The problem has changed in comparison to the first three paradigms, it 
concerns not the nature of movement but the performance of movement. The 
performance of relative movements refers to our ordinary movements and 
experiences, they correspond to what can be termed to live the living. The works 
mentioned above are concerned with the performance of absolute movements, these 
                                                 
73
 An absolute movement to which, by virtue of reciprocal presupposition, in other words because 
absolute movement is not transcendent, necessarily remains a relative component. As discussed 
below, that which is narrated is the relative component of a movement that is itself absolute. 
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movements are different to our ordinary movements and experiences, they 
correspond to what can be termed to live A Life. The new problem these works 
engage with is expressed in the name of the paradigm of commitment to A Life they 
are said to embody: to live A Life. This problem does not concern the nature of 
movement or the nature of the relation between the living and A Life as the three 
other paradigms do: A Life in the living, the living as point of view on and from A 
Life, new living emerging from A Life. It concerns the performance of movement, 
the performance of the living: to live. The logic by which this fourth and last 
paradigm of commitment to A Life adds itself to the first three paradigms can be 
expressed as such: after investigating the nature of movement through an 
engagement with its three qualities, the problem becomes to perform movement. 
Equivalently: after investigating the nature of the relation between the living and A 
Life, the problem becomes to perform the living (to live) as performance through 
which A Life is lived (to live A Life). 
To live A Life equally means to perform an absolute movement, to establish a unity 
with A Life, to reterritorialize on the absolute; for example, through her aesthetic 
experience of a haptic vision, the viewer can be said to live A Life. By engaging with 
a figure’s act or activity, the paradigm to live A Life necessarily involves narration, it 
narrates the figure’s performance of that act or activity; and as engaging with the 
performance of absolute movement, this narration can be formulated interchangeably 
as: the narration of a figure’s act or activity through which the figure performs an 
absolute movement; the narration of a figure’s movement through which it 
establishes a unity with A Life or the Outside; the narration of a figure’s act or 
activity through which it reterritorializes itself on the absolute or the Outside; the 
narration of a figure who lives A Life; etc. 
 
to live A Life and the artist following DG’s conceptualization of art 
To live A Life is already the problem intrinsic to artistic creation following DG’s 
conceptualization of art. For DG, the artist lives A Life in that it is ‘a seer, a becomer’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161): becoming is A Life, the artist as becomer lives A 
Life, and as seer it has visions of A Life. The artist performs an absolute movement 
and by expressing this absolute movement in the materiality of the medium, it gives 
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absolute movement to the viewer. The artist lives A Life and gives to the viewer the 
experience of living A Life, of living absolute movement: visions of a non human 
landscape of nature, non human becomings of man, movements from nature to 
possible universes which express the genesis and the absolute that A Life is. 
the problem with the narration of absolute movement 
The fundamental shift of the paradigm to live A Life from DG’s conceptualization of 
art, from the paradigm A Life in the living, is that following this new paradigm 
absolute movement is not expressed and as such given, but narrated. In an artwork 
which embodies the paradigm to live A Life, absolute movement is narrated through 
the narration of a figure’s act or activity by which the figure performs an absolute 
movement. This raises a crucial problem. A hypothetical work embodying this 
paradigm, and taking for example Bacon as its figure, would narrate an act or 
activity through which Bacon performs an absolute movement: in occurrence his act 
of painting. But the narration of Bacon’s relative component of movement as he 
paints, the narration of the relative component of his absolute movement (a relative 
component which necessarily remains because absolute movement is not 
transcendent), “narrates nothing” of the absolute movement he performs. The 
narration is not of a figure who lives A Life, but simply of a figure who lives the 
living, of a figure who paints, the narration is not of absolute movement but of 
relative movements. A Life or absolute movement in the living escapes narration like 
the Figure escapes figuration or representation, like the Figure escapes the view, 
absolute movement cannot be narrated, it can only be expressed in visions. That 
absolute movement cannot be narrated is a problem that can be solved through an 
approach which, although directly inspired from DG’s writings, departs from DG. 
new category of movement: absolute movements of the living 
There are specific relative movements which can be said to express absolute 
movement, relative movements that are different to ordinary relative movements in 
that they express an absolute. These specific relative movements are like the ones 
DG typify as the ‘troubling […], more or less mysterious’ and ‘grandiose cases 
where the deterritorialization becomes absolute whilst losing nothing of its precision’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 401, 402). They give four examples:  
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(1) pilgrimages to the source, as among salmon; (2) supernumerary 
assemblies, such as those of locusts or chaffinches, etc. (tens of millions of 
chaffinches near Thourne in 1950-1951); (3) magnetic or solar-guided 
migrations; (4) long marches, such as those of the lobster (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1980, 401). 
That these grandiose relative movements are said to express absolute movement does 
not mean that they symbolize or are metaphors for absolute movement. In 
comparison to other ordinary relative movements, DG write that in these grandiose 
cases the ‘nature of movement changes’: ‘there is something of the Cosmos [or the 
absolute] in these more ample movements’74 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 401-402). 
These deterritorializations are absolute, and so are these movements. Crucially, there 
remains a relative component to each of these absolute movements by which they 
can actually be described and referred to: “pilgrimages”, “assemblies”, “migrations”, 
“marches”, etc. That absolute movements can be described, referred to and as such 
narrated by their respective relative component corresponds to a new category of 
movement which has not so far been discussed, a new category which differentiates 
itself from ordinary relative movements of the living as well as from absolute 
movements of A Life in the living.  
Relative movements of the living, for example moving from the room to the corridor, 
do not express an absolute, they do not describe or refer to absolute movement: even 
if these movements need an absolute for their operation (by virtue of the reciprocal 
presupposition between the relative and absolute components of movement), they 
remain relative components of movement which describe movements of relative de- 
and re- territorialization. The new category of movement in contrast encompasses 
relative components of movement which describe movements of absolute 
deterritorialization (and reterritorialization on the absolute). Absolute movements of 
A Life in the living on the other hand, as expressed in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne, 
cannot be described or referred to by their relative component: “Isabel Rawsthorne 
sits on a chair”. Again, this is because “Isabel Rawsthorne sits on a chair” is an 
ordinary relative movement which does not express an absolute. By definition 
absolute movements of A Life in the living cannot be described by their relative 
component because this relative component correlates to a view of the living (the 
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 ‘Cosmos’ needs to be understood as A Life or the absolute, as absolute movement. 
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view of Isabel Rawsthorne sitting on a chair), these movements can only be 
expressed in a vision of A Life in the living. 
The new category of movement is evidently inspired from DG, but also a departure 
from them (DG focus very little attention to these ‘grandiose cases’). This category 
of movement can be named absolute movements of the living. Neither relative 
movements of the living, nor absolute movements of A Life in the living, but 
absolute movements of the living. They characteristically are absolute movements of 
which the relative components express an absolute, and as such absolute movements 
which can be described, referred to and as such narrated by their relative components 
(“assemblies”, “migrations”, etc.). 
to “live the living” or to “live A Life”, in practical terms 
To perform ordinary relative movements is to “live the living”. To perform absolute 
movements of the living is to “live A Life”. But what does it mean in practical terms 
to “live the living”, for example for salmons, chaffinches, migrating birds or indeed 
for humans, and how does it compare to “live A Life”? What does it mean for the 
nature of movement to change, for the deterritorialization to become absolute? To 
“live the living” involves utilitarian functions and tasks such as ‘nutrition, 
reproduction, conservation, adaptation’75 (Deleuze, 2007, 47). Territorialization 
could be added to this list, to establish a territory so as to protect oneself. To “live 
the living” involves activities so as to protect, conserve and reproduce oneself as a 
living organism, to adapt oneself to the living environment. To “live the living” 
encompasses all the utilitarian tasks and functions that involve and are required to 
survive. But to survive is exactly not “to live A Life”, obviously not in the sense that 
to die is to live A Life but in the sense that these tasks and functions always involves 
processes of relative de- and re- territorialization. To find a land; to construct a nest, 
a house to protect oneself from external forces, forces of nature: the wind, the rain, 
the sun; to establish a territory to conserve oneself but also to reproduce oneself; and 
then relative movements from the nest or the house to other territories in order to 
fulfill utilitarian tasks and functions: to find food, or to find money to buy food or 
                                                 
75
 This quote is from Deleuze’s book Nietzsche et la philosophie. Relations between absolute 
movements of the living and Nietzsche’s concepts of the active and the reactive previously introduced 
are established below through the analysis of Alÿs’ work.  
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pay the rent (to “pay for the territory”), to find a mate to reproduce, etc. To “live A 
Life” on the other hand involves another type of movement, neither to find a 
territory, nor to leave the territory to simultaneously attain to another territory, but to 
leave the territory in a movement that is a ‘takeoff from the territory’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1980, 401) and that does not attain to any other territory that might 
otherwise serve for reterritorialization. The nature of movement changes in an 
absolute movement in that the figure which performs it ‘follows cosmic [or absolute] 
variables’: ‘In migration, the sun is no longer the terrestrial sun reigning over a 
territory, even an aerial one; it is the celestial sun of the Cosmos, as in the two 
Jerusalems, the Apocalypse’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 402). ‘ “Farewell!, I’m 
leaving without looking back” ’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 403), “my sight is not 
on the territories I pass through but on the cosmic variables I follow, on the celestial 
sun of the Cosmos”. From the territory, the figure reterritorializes itself not on 
another territory but on the absolute, the deterritorialization becomes absolute. The 
movement loses nothing of its precision, the movement is precisely localizable in 
nature (because the movement is not transcendent) but the ‘localization has become 
cosmic’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 402). The movement of some hypothetical 
figures performing a solar-guided migration ‘exceeds the capacities of any possible 
assemblage [or territory], to enter on another plane’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 
401). The figures necessarily pass through territories or from one territory to the 
other: this constitutes the relative component “which remains” to their movement 
that is itself absolute, they have attained to and travel on another plane. This relative 
component of movement, “a migration”, expresses an absolute, in other words it 
expresses their travel on this other absolute plane, and it is as such that this relative 
component can be used to describe and as such narrate an absolute movement, an 
absolute movement of the living. Their solar-guided migration express ‘the re-found 
or liberated forces of a deterritorialized Cosmos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 402), 
A Life, the absolute. A Life is not expressed in a vision, in an indiscernibility 
between itself and the living which it conditions (as in Figural painting), but it is 
expressed in what is termed an absolute movement of the living. The figures attain to 
A Life, they live A Life, as A Life lives through them; and that they live A Life can 
be narrated through the description or reference to the relative component of the 
(absolute) movement they perform. For example, Alÿs’ work When Faith Moves 
Mountains is analyzed below as the documentation of a movement different in nature 
136 
 
to the ordinary movements through which we “live the living”. Five hundred people 
move a mountain by shoveling it a few inches forward as they walk “over” it. 
Through such movement, these figures are argued to live not the living but A Life, 
similarly to the figures of a solar-guided migration who follow cosmic or absolute 
variables. This movement of another nature is described as an absolute movement of 
the living, and its documentation, i.e. the documentation of their action or 
performance (“five hundred people move a mountain”), is the narration of absolute 
movement, or more precisely the narration of the relative component which remains 
to a movement that it itself absolute. 
 
on the departure from DG, absolute movement of the living versus absolute 
movement of A Life in the living, narration versus expression 
 ‘Kafka often opposed two kinds of voyage, one extensive and organized, the other 
intense and by debris, wreck or fragments. This second voyage can be on the spot, in 
“one’s bedroom”, and as such even more intense […]’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 
65). In this passage, the “first kind of voyage” refers to relative and ‘extensive’ 
movements of the living whereas the “second kind” refers to absolute and ‘intense’ 
movements of A Life in the living. Through the mention of these ‘grandiose cases’ in 
Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux, although DG do not focus on them, 
they in a sense complexify the opposition they set up through Kafka in Kafka - Pour 
une littérature mineure (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975).76 Absolute movement is either 
on the spot, in one’s bedroom, in immobility: absolute movement is intensive. Or, 
following the mention of those grandiose cases, absolute movement can also occur 
through the performance of a movement that is ‘extensive and organized’: a 
pilgrimage, a migration, a march, etc. Absolute movement can also be of the living as 
well as being of A Life. It is as if a third kind of voyage adds itself to the first two: 
neither an extensive voyage where other places in nature are reached and explored, 
nor an intensive voyage on the spot, but an extensive voyage where other places in 
nature are necessarily passed through, but it is not them which are reached and 
explored, it is an absolute plane mapped by cosmic or absolute variables. The third 
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 Although the definition of, and emphasis on, absolute movements of the living belongs entirely to 
this text and not to DG’s writings. 
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kind of voyage is not a an extensive voyage in nature “when on some occasion” an 
intensive voyage on the spot is also performed, it is not a “combination” of the first 
two kinds of voyages, it is through and only through its extensity in nature that it is 
and can be absolute. 
 
Study after Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X by Francis Bacon, 1953 
 
These absolute movements of the living are very different to the absolute movements 
of A Life in the living expressed in a haptic vision. Bacon’s Figures are mostly 
passive in terms of relative, extensive or actual movements, and by avoiding the 
figuration and as such narration of relative movements, Bacon is all the more able to 
express absolute, intensive or virtual movements, i.e. the Figure. For example, the 
Removed due to copyright
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extensive actual passivity of the pope in Study after Velazquez's Portrait of Pope 
Innocent X, 1953, allows all the more for the visionary expression of intense virtual 
activity. The paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life relates to the problem 
of the performance of absolute movement through specific acts or activities. Bacon, 
and DG’s conceptualization of art, do not and cannot (and do not want to) engage 
with this problem. The problem Bacon is engaged with is the expression of absolute 
movements in reciprocal presupposition with the living, not the narration of figure’s 
act or activity as that through which it performs an absolute movement of the living. 
Engaged with the paradigm A Life in the living correlated to expression, Bacon is in 
diametrical opposition to the paradigm to live A Life correlated to narration. 
Effectively the narration of absolute movements of the living is in complete 
opposition to DG’s conceptualization of art, it is the diametrical opposite of the 
expression of a vision. The former concerns extensive actual relative activity as that 
through which absolute movement is performed (paradigm to live A Life), whereas 
the latter concerns extensive actual relative passivity as that ‘under’77 which absolute 
movement is expressed (paradigm A Life in the living). 
 
narration of absolute movements of the living 
The narration of absolute movements of the living is the approach which solves the 
problem according to which absolute movement cannot be narrated: to narrate an 
absolute movement of the living is to narrate absolute movement. The works by 
Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig discussed in this section are evidently very different on 
many levels. It seems however that each of them is engaged with the narration of 
absolute movements of the living. Each work seems to be engaged with the narration 
of a figure’s act or activity through which an absolute movement is performed, with 
the narration of a figure who lives A Life.  
                                                 
77
 As previously mentioned Deleuze refers to the body without organs as ‘a revelation of the body 
under the organism’ (Deleuze, 2002, 150). The BwO is the absolute movement of the body, the Life 
that the body is, ‘under’ the organism. 
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Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig: three ways to engage with the narration of absolute 
movements of the living 
Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig have different approaches to the narration of absolute 
movements of the living, with widely different results. Huyghe and Alÿs narrate 
movements that seem to relate more closely to DG’s grandiose cases of migration or 
march: Huyghe’s journey or “migration” to the Polar Antarctic Circle, Alÿs’ march 
through which a mountain is moved. Doig on the other hand narrates movements that 
are not “grandiose”, movements that correspond to common activities: to play ping 
pong or cricket. Through the analysis of their works, three different ways by which 
to approach the narration of absolute movements of the living are conceptualized: 
 the fictionalization of absolute movement (Huyghe), 
 the narration of relative components of movement which express an absolute, 
in other words the narration of absolute movements of the living (Alÿs), and 
 the narration of relative components of movement which do not in and of 
themselves (meaning outside this narration) express an absolute, but that are 
narrated as that through which absolute movement is performed; in other 
words, ordinary relative movements narrated as absolute movements of the 
living (Doig). 
 
Only Alÿs’ work is the narration of absolute movements of the living, and as such 
only his work will be discussed in close relationship to the conceptualization of these 
movements developed above. Huyghe and Doig approach the notion of absolute 
movements of the living in a very different way to Alÿs, and in that sense in ways 
that to some extent diverge from how these movements are conceptualized. Why 
then discuss their works in relation to such conceptualization? Because the narration 
of a figure who performs an absolute movement of the living, the narration of a 
figure’s act or activity as that through which it lives A Life, is considered to be 
exactly what they attempt to achieve in their works (in opposition to Doig’s work, 
Huyghe’s work A Journey That Wasn’t will be said to fail to embody the paradigm 
to live A Life). 
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tale of resistance 
Before the engagement with the different artworks, with the different approaches to 
the narration of a figure who lives A Life, the following introduces that which the 
paradigm to live A Life gives to experience, which is as such common to the three 
approaches: narrations, but more specifically what is termed tales of resistance. The 
paradigm to live A Life gives to experience tales of resistance. 
The paradigm to live A Life is a means by which to engage with the subject of the 
figure of resistance. To live A Life is to resist, the figure who performs absolute 
movements of the living is a figure of resistance. The figure, through its act or 
activity, overcomes the suffocation that nature is by attaining to a breath of air as it 
enters another plane in reciprocal presupposition with nature, as it begins to follow 
cosmic or absolute variables and establishes a unity with A Life. The figures’ act or 
activity is an act of resistance. 
The narrations of the acts or activities through which figures perform absolute 
movements of the living come to be experienced to different degrees as tales, the 
narrations form tales of resistance. By the term “tale” I mean a narrative which 
pretends to narrate an event which truly took place, but because of the nature of this 
event, the narration lends itself to have its veracity questioned. These narratives 
appear as tales because they are, like DG’s grandiose cases, always and inevitably, 
although to different degrees, troubling and more or less mysterious for the very fact 
that they are not ordinary movements but are rare movements of another nature. 
The figures of resistance, the protagonists of these tales, are very different to Figures, 
visions of A Life in the living. Figures are the results of acts of resistance, the acts of 
resistance of the painters who liberate A Life where it is imprisoned. But these 
Figures are not themselves figures of resistance, for example Portrait of Isabel 
Rawsthorne does not have for its subject a figure of resistance nor an act of 
resistance although it results from Bacon’s act of resistance. 
An artwork which embodies the paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life 
narrates an act or activity as that through which A Life is lived, making of the 
protagonist a figure of resistance, of its act or activity an act of resistance, and of the 
narration of this act a tale of resistance. 
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8.a – Huyghe: the fictionalization of absolute movement 
 
A Journey That Wasn’t is a work that needs to be understood as in three parts: first, 
‘the hypothesis of an elsewhere and a displacement’; second, ‘an encounter’; and 
third, ‘the mise-en-scène’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 32). 
 The first part is a scenario or fiction, and as a scenario, it was presented as a work 
(the scenario is the work) in L'Expédition scintillante, 2002, at the Kunsthaus 
Bregenz. A Journey That Wasn’t is the enactment of this scenario and the narration 
of this enactment. More specifically the work consists in firstly, the ‘hypothesis of an 
elsewhere and a displacement’: ‘to produce the conditions of apparition of a 
narration, to invent fictions’ which in this instance takes the form of ‘the hypothesis 
of a new island in Antarctica and a rumor about some unique creature’ (Huyghe and 
Leydier, 2006, 27). A voyage towards this hypothesized elsewhere, this new island 
conceived in the ‘narration’ or ‘fiction’, is performed in order ‘to acquire the real 
resources to see if they exist’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 27). In other words, the 
voyage has the purpose to see if the new island in Antarctica and the unique creature 
from the narration or fiction exist “in reality”. Secondly, ‘an encounter’: the voyage 
or journey leads to the sight of the island and of the unique creature, an albino 
penguin. Thirdly, the ‘mise-en-scène’: the island is ‘modelized and transformed into 
sound’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 27) in view of its exposition upon the return 
from Antarctica, in occurrence in Central Park, New York, in 2005. 
‘Regarding the Antarctic, we are in the non-constructed, whereas here, in the city, 
we are in a totally invented place with architecture, and social and legal rules. Every 
day we move around in fictions, which give rise to realities’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 
2006, 31). Antarctica for Huyghe is the ‘non-constructed’, and corresponds to an 
outside of the fictions around which we move and which give rise to our realities. 
interpretation of A Journey That Wasn’t 
As for La saison des fêtes, the way by which to imbue a form of transcendence to A 
Journey That Wasn’t is to interpret the new island and the albino penguin, like the 
Green Romantica, as embodying the Outside in the same manner that Alice’s 
Wonderland embodies the Outside, making of it a form arguably transcendent to 
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nature. It is to interpret the work as creating a new fiction which hopes to give rise to 
the reality of a movement from nature to the Outside (the new island and the albino 
penguin). It is as if Huyghe wanted to give rise to the reality of a movement of 
absolute de- and re- territorialization towards and onto the Outside, but as opposed to 
open nature onto itself and as such onto the absolute that the Outside is, Huyghe 
opened nature onto another world, a “Wonderland” arguably transcendent to nature. 
However, as for La saison des fêtes, it would seem more interesting to interpret A 
Journey That Wasn’t as being closer to Sylvie and Bruno than to Alice's Adventures 
in Wonderland: not one story or world within another, but two contiguous, 
coexisting and simultaneous worlds, two worlds in reciprocal presupposition. A 
Journey That Wasn’t not as hoping to give rise to the reality of a movement towards 
a “Wonderland” but as giving to experience our nature “re-patched” with new 
dispersions of the Outside, our nature metamorphosed, a new nature. Nature tears 
itself open onto the Outside as it is simultaneously “re-patched” with its dispersions: 
the new island and the albino penguin, understood as emerging from the Outside into 
the possible universe that a new nature is, like the Green Romantica. A new nature is 
not a transcendent nature of strange creatures, a “Wonderland”, it is the emergence 
of new forms or creatures in the middle of our nature, to a similar effect as when 
discovering new species, such as an albino penguin for example. 
This interpretation is however contradicted by two aspects of the work. Nature, as 
‘surface’ in reciprocal presupposition with ‘the world of depths’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34, 
35), the Outside, can as it were tear itself open onto the Outside and be 
simultaneously “re-patched” by its dispersions at any point on its “surface”. But in A 
Journey That Wasn’t, nature tears itself open onto the Outside in Antarctica and this 
leads to a confusion. Most evidently, it is not that nature tears itself open onto the 
Outside in Antarctica, it is that Antarctica is itself considered as “outside”, as 
Huyghe tells us.78 The Outside is transformed into or replaced by a terrestrial 
outside beyond man’s control and or reach. It is an un-territorialized part of nature, 
in Huyghe terms: an outside the fictions around which we move and which gives rise 
to our realities. Unmistakably a terrestrial outside opposes itself to the Outside itself 
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 As previously quoted: ‘Regarding the Antarctic, we are in the non-constructed, whereas here, in the 
city, we are in a totally invented place with architecture, and social and legal rules. Every day we 
move around in fictions, which give rise to realities’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 31). 
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a transcendental outside: not an un-territorialized part of nature but an absolutely 
deterritorialized Life in reciprocal presupposition with nature, not Antarctica but the 
transcendental field. This is the first aspect according to which the (more interesting) 
interpretation of A Journey That Wasn’t is contradicted: the movement seems not to 
be towards a new nature, towards nature metamorphosed in its middle exposing new 
dispersions of the Outside, but towards a terrestrial outside.  
The second aspect is the return. The journey returns back to apparently the same 
nature from which it departed, to operate the mise-en-scène (in Central Park, New 
York) of that which was discovered “outside”. The journey returns from an un-
territorialized part of nature back to the territorialized part of nature, from the ‘non-
constructed’ back to the constructed, ‘the city’, where fictions give rise to our 
realities (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 31). In contradiction to the interpretation 
above, the work embodies a cyclical movement from nature to a terrestrial outside 
back to the same nature. Through the linear movement from nature to a new nature, 
there is no return, there is no return since nature has changed, it has irreversibly 
become a new nature. A transcendent “movement” [nature] – [transcendent outside] 
– [same nature] or a terrestrial “movement” [nature] – [un-territorialized part of 
nature] – [same nature] oppose themselves to a movement [nature] – [the Outside] – 
[new nature]. The first two return to the same, whilst the latter does not return but 
advance through difference, it advances through the incessant repetition of 
difference. If there is a return from a new nature, it is necessarily a “return from the 
future”, a return from the future of a new nature. A Journey That Wasn’t does not 
embody such return from the future, it embodies a return from a terrestrial outside. 
metaphor and deformation of the Outside: A Journey That Wasn’t and the narration 
of absolute movements of the living 
Absolute movement, A Life, is that which, from nature, leads to a possible universe 
in a movement that can be described as: [nature] – [A Life or Outside] – [possible 
universe]. A commitment to A Life as such necessarily results in a movement from 
nature to a possible universe, and inversely so, to attain to a possible universe 
necessarily takes place through a commitment to A Life.  
With A Journey That Wasn’t, Huyghe attempts to fictionalize absolute movement. 
The fictionalization of absolute movement means to narrate, to make a story or 
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fiction of a movement from nature to a possible universe. The fictionalization of 
absolute movement can equivalently be termed the fictionalization of a movement 
from nature to a possible universe. This is the conceptualization of the way by which 
Huyghe with A Journey That Wasn’t approaches the narration of absolute 
movements of the living. It means to narrate absolute movement or a movement 
from nature to a possible universe as a relative journey or voyage, creating a 
metaphor of the absolute with the relative. The fictionalization of absolute movement 
could mean to make either one of three stories or fictions: stories or fictions of 
movements from nature to either one of the three types of possible universe. It could 
be the story of an extensive journey that serves as a metaphor either for a movement 
from nature to a reterritorialization on the absolute or Outside that A Life is, or for a 
movement from nature to nature hallucinated, or for a movement from nature to a 
new nature. Out of the three possibilities, it seems that A Journey That Wasn’t is 
closest to being a metaphor of a movement from nature to a reterritorialization on the 
Outside.79 This is problematic because the metaphor requires the Outside to be 
embodied as “a place that is reached”, as a location that is reterritorialized onto. In A 
Journey That Wasn’t, as previously discussed, there are two ways by which to 
conceive how the Outside is embodied: either the Outside is embodied as a 
“Wonderland”, an arguably transcendent outside (the new island and the albino 
penguin as “Wonderland”); or the Outside is embodied by a terrestrial outside 
(Antarctica as un-territorialized part of nature). In both cases, the transcendental 
outside is deformed by virtue of being embodied by the metaphor. The narration of 
an absolute movement of the living fails because absolute movement is deformed 
through the metaphor, through its fictionalization into either an arguably 
transcendent “movement” (movement to an arguably transcendent outside like 
Alice’s fall down the rabbit hole), or into a terrestrial “movement” (movement to a 
terrestrial outside). 
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 A Journey That Wasn’t cannot be considered as a metaphor of a movement from nature to a new 
nature following the two aspects of the work according to which it embodies both a terrestrial outside 
(as opposed to a new nature) and a return to the same (as opposed to advancing through different or a 
return from the future). 
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Huyghe’s approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living 
Huyghe’s approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living with A 
Journey That Wasn’t can be described as follows. First, the fictionalization of 
absolute movement (to make a story or fiction of absolute movement). Second, the 
performance by the living (the crew) of this fiction. Third, the narration of this 
performance. 
The crew however does not perform an absolute movement of the living. It is as if 
Huyghe wanted to make a fiction of absolute movement to give rise to an absolute 
movement of the living through the enactment or performance of this fiction. But an 
absolute movement of the living is not the performance by the living (a person or a 
crew) of a fiction or metaphor of absolute movement which deforms the Outside 
(and absolute movement itself). An absolute movement of the living is always literal 
and never metaphorical, it is an absolute movement which can be described and 
referred to by its relative component (like DG’s grandiose cases). The hypothetical 
figures performing a solar-guided migration do not perform a fiction of absolute 
movement, they perform absolute movement literally. 
DG’s conceptualization of art, the expression of A Life in the living, never involves 
metaphors. The Figure (Bacon’s work for example) is not a metaphor of A Life, it is 
A Life, it captures and expresses A Life, it is and as such gives A Life. Or in the 
cinema of the seer, the metaphor or ‘cliché’ is exactly what the crystal-image, which 
gives the vision, i.e. the direct presentation of the transcendental form of time, does 
away with: it ‘tears a real image [the vision] from clichés’ (Deleuze, 1985, 32) or 
metaphors, it gives the vision literally. In relation to the absolute movements of the 
living, the problem is to perform them literally, and not to perform a metaphor of 
absolute movement. The paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life never 
involves metaphors (this is true for all four paradigms of commitment to A Life). 
This is not merely a question of choice of stylistic form (“to use the metaphor or 
not?”): A Journey That Wasn’t, as metaphor of a movement from nature to the 
Outside, deforms the Outside and as such deforms A Life. The work follows 
paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life which threaten A Life or the Outside 
by pretending to it whilst deforming it: A Journey That Wasn’t is centered around the 
representation of an imagination or fantasy (the fiction of the new island and the 
146 
 
albino penguin) by which the Outside is either arguably transcendent (the paradigm 
imaginary-transcendent) or simply an un-territorialized part of nature (the paradigm 
human-actual). In both cases, the suffocation of nature is not remediated, and A 
Journey That Wasn’t fails to embody the paradigm to live A Life. 
 
 
8.b – Alÿs: the narration of absolute movements of the living 
 
Alÿs’ approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living is very different 
to Huyghe’s approach in A Journey That Wasn’t: it does not involve the 
fictionalization of absolute movement. Alÿs’ approach is the narration of absolute 
movements of the living as they are conceptualized above, the narration of a figure’s 
(or many figures’) act or activity which itself is the relative component of a 
movement that is absolute. For example, when Alÿs presents the video 
documentation of five hundred people moving a mountain (When Faith Moves 
Mountains), he narrates the relative component which necessarily remains to a 
movement that is itself absolute. 
If a constant in Huyghe’s work is that it addresses the notion of “theatrum mundi”, 
that we live in fictions which give rise to our realities, the constant in Alÿs’ work is 
the notion that we live in different types of territory, and that the world is not a 
theatre but a multitude of interwoven territories. Alÿs’ works are engagements with 
different types of territory: for example geographico-political territories (the 
Mexico/United States border in The Loop, 1997, the Palestine/Israel border in The 
Green Line, 2004, the Cuba/United States “separation” in Bridge/Puente, 2006, etc.), 
physical territories (a mountain in When Faith Moves Mountains, 2002, tornadoes in 
Tornado, 2000-2010, or the delimitation of a city guarded by dogs in Gringo, 2003, 
etc.), individual territories, meaning the territory that an individual physically and 
socially is, etc.80 
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 This list of types of territory is not exhaustive, it does not aim to encompass all the different types 
of territories that Alÿs’ practice as a whole engages with. 
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If Huyghe hopes to create new fictions which give rise to new realities outside the 
possibilities of existing fictions inside which we live and by which the world is 
defined as theatre, Alÿs narrates the movements of figures that embody a becoming 
active in their engagement with specific territories, against the becoming reactive 
which forms the essence of man and his world. 
A Life re-discovered, active negation or active destruction: transmutation 
As previously introduced in relation to the notion of nature as suffocation, A Life is 
active forces, and man and his world (nature, the living or the lived) are the 
becoming reactive of A Life. ‘Active negation, active destruction, is the state of 
strong spirits who destroy the reactive in them’ (Deleuze, 2007, 80). Through active 
negation or active destruction, the active forces of A Life are re-liberated, re-
discovered. Active negation or destruction ‘is the only way by which reactive forces 
become active’ (Deleuze, 2007, 80). This can be thought in terms of Bacon’s work 
and the expression of A Life (active forces) in the living (reactive forces). Bacon is a 
‘strong spirit’ who destroys the reactive in himself, hence he sees and becomes A 
Life. The process by which Bacon liberates A Life where it is imprisoned is through 
the active negation or destruction of the purely optical space associated with our 
ordinary views and correlatively through the active destruction of the organism, 
including the eye which gains a new haptic function. The catastrophe in Bacon’s 
process of painting is an active destruction of the living as the necessary step by 
which chaos is attained, confronted and composed, and as such by which A Life is 
expressed. The organism is itself a territory, it is A Life actualizing and 
territorializing itself in or as an organism, the organism is a becoming reactive of 
active forces. In order to attain to an expression of the body without organs, the Life 
or active forces that the organism reciprocally presupposes, the organism must itself 
go through an active destruction. The aesthetic experience of a haptic vision 
correspondingly involves a departure from and an active destruction of the organism 
that the viewer is. It is only at the expense of the organism that the viewer becomes, 
that she becomes other and re-discovers A Life. An active negation is in Nietzsche’s 
terms a transmutation. Transmutation is the ‘reversal’ of reactive forces into active 
forces, ‘strictly speaking it is the reversal of a reversal, since the reactive began by 
taking the place of the action’ (Deleuze, 2007, 81). Transmutation is the reversal of a 
reversal because reactive forces are (in the first place) the reversal of the active 
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forces that A Life is. In other words, the territories which constitute nature or man 
and his world ‘began by taking the place of’ A Life, and through a transmutation, A 
Life is re-liberated, re-discovered. These “processes” of reversal define 
transmutation but also the continuously renewed genesis that A Life is: the 
actualization of the virtual or the becoming reactive of active forces, and “its 
reversal”: the virtualization of the actual or the becoming active of reactive forces. 
An active force is only active in relation to a reactive force and inversely so, refuting 
any form of transcendence between active forces and reactive forces. Bacon’s 
process of painting can be said to corroborate to a transmutation of the organism and 
of the purely optical space through which is re-discovered the Life which they are, 
their onto-genetic condition. 
territories and the reactive, the active and the absolute movements of the living 
Evidently these notions need to be related to Alÿs’ work, to narrations of absolute 
movements of the living, very differently than to Bacon, than to expressions of 
absolute movements in the living. Alÿs’ works that are of interest to this analysis are 
commonly termed “actions” in art discourses. However, an “action”, in the sense of a 
“performance”, is not necessarily active in the conceptual sense delimited by the 
Nietzschean concepts of the active and the reactive. An “action”, if it embodies the 
essence of man and his world, is reactive in a Nietzschean sense. As such, an 
“action” as it is referred to in art discourses needs to remain an object of analysis to 
determine whether it is active or reactive, i.e. an action or a reaction. An “action” is 
active when it is an absolute movement of the living, when its relative component of 
movement embodies an absolute. Absolute movements of the living are active, and 
our ordinary relative movements are reactive. Our ordinary relative movements are 
the movements which correspond to the becoming reactive which forms our essence, 
through them we “live the living”. On the other hand, absolute movements of the 
living are movements of another nature, they express an absolute, they involve our 
becoming active, and through them we “live A Life”. 
Our movements inevitably operate within or across one or many imbricated 
territories. For example the organism, itself a territory, can be considered to be in 
physical territories: a house, a forest, a mountain, etc., and in geographico-political 
territories: a town, a province, a country, and so on. Territories are and as such 
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express the becoming reactive which constitutes our essence. To “live the living” is 
to submit to, to bear with, the reactive forces constituted by the territories inside 
which we live, it is to obey the prescriptions, directions or rules that territories 
impose on us. Like the territories that our organisms are can be thought of as 
imposing themselves upon us, upon the Life that we are (‘the organism is what life 
opposes to itself to limit itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 628)), a mountain or a 
country imposes itself upon us, it imposes directions (where to climb or pass around 
the mountain?) and rules (for example legal systems, what can be legally done in a 
country?). Territories limit the Life that we are.  
To “live the living” is to react, our ordinary movements are reactive to the territories 
in or through which we live. Absolute movements of the living are the 
transmutations of such reactive movements, they as such necessarily involve another 
type of relation to territories: one that is active. In a world by essence reactive, 
absolute movements of the living are ‘rare’, they are the rare events of a ‘“health”’ 
amongst the ‘“sickness”’ that man and his world are.81 An absolute movement of the 
living can be imaged as the rare event of Life flowing through the living, of active 
movements flowing through territories which ordinarily induce reactive movements. 
An absolute movement of the living does not express A Life in a vision establishing 
an indiscernibility between onto-genetic conditions and the living, it expresses A 
Life in the relative component of a movement which appears to different degrees as 
grandiose, troubling and mysterious, because it is itself absolute. What is “seen”, or 
what is narrated, of an absolute movement of the living is in a sense a “view” of the 
relative component which remains to a movement that is itself absolute, for example: 
“tens of millions of chaffinches near Thourne in 1950-1951”. The figure who 
performs an absolute movement of the living is liberated from the territory, and 
flows through it unaffected by the becoming reactive the territory ordinarily imposes. 
This image is appropriate to the movement of the figures of magnetic or solar-guided 
migrations: they necessarily pass from one territory to the other: from the grassland 
to the forest, to the mountain, etc., but they are not submitted to these territories, 
having entered another plane, they flow through these territories unaffected. The 
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 The terms ‘rare’ and ‘”health”’ are appropriated from their association to active forces, and 
‘”sickness”’ from its association to reactive forces (Deleuze, 2007, 128). 
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relative component of their absolute movement is imaged as the rare view of a river 
of active forces flowing on a sick earth of reactive forces. 
When Faith Moves Mountains 
on the contextual readings of an action 
Alÿs’ practice has been described as embodying an ‘allegorical force’ (Godfrey, 
2010, 15). Alÿs’ actions are often described as allegory, parody, allusion, reflection 
on, symbol of or metaphor for social, economic, political or artistic state of affairs, 
even by Alÿs himself. For example, Paradox of Praxis 1 (Sometimes Doing 
Something Leads to Nothing), 1997, is the video documentation of an action 
performed by Alÿs in which he pushes a block of ice in the streets of Mexico city 
until it completely melts, nine hours later. The work is interpreted by Alÿs and 
Medina as ‘a decisive moment in his [Alÿs] attempt to reflect on the logic of the 
peripheral economies of the South’, ‘a parody of the massive disproportion between 
effort and result in much of Latin American life’, and ‘a sly means to symbolize the 
melting of the generic object of contemporary art’ (Alÿs and Medina, 2010, 82). And 
When Faith Moves Mountains is described by Alÿs as a ‘social allegory’ (Alÿs, 
2002). The meaning or purpose of the actions, and their narrations, would be to 
create an allegory, a symbol, a metaphor etc., of or for something else, for instance, 
the complexities of ‘Latin American life’, its relation to modernization, to the 
economy, to the social, etc. It seems however that a contextualized reading of an 
action is not as interesting as the analysis of the action “in itself”, the action in terms 
of it being active (or in opposition reactive), of it being a movement different in 
nature to our ordinary movements. The reading of an action, as opposed to the 
analysis of the forces at play, necessarily asserts it as allegorical, symbolic, reflection 
on, metaphor, parody, etc. This “method” of contextualized readings of actions or 
movements (for example reading the action or movement “to push a block of ice in 
the street” in the contexts of the economies of the South and of the generic object of 
contemporary art) seems forced and neither relevant nor interesting in relation to the 
expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art. Of interest to this analysis is not such 
contextualized readings but the ontological analysis of a movement that is different 
in nature, and the narration of this movement. 
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another method of analysis 
Another method of analysis is required, not contextualized readings, but ‘Nietzsche’s 
method’: ‘relating a concept [or an action] to the will to power in order to make it the 
symptom of a will without which it could not even be thought (nor the feeling 
experienced, nor the action undertaken)’ (Deleuze, 2007, 88, 89). The will to power 
can be understood as A Life, it is ‘an ontological energy, the living power of 
everything; it is Nietzsche writes, “the unexhausted procreative will of life”’ (Zepke, 
2005, 12). The will to power is that which wills in life. And what does this will want, 
what does A Life want or will? It wants to grow, to expand itself, at the expense of 
that which resists: man and his world, the living. The will to power can be said to 
will itself in that it is becoming and it wants to become, forever, inexhaustibly. A 
Life as continuously renewed genesis is this will, incessantly overcoming and 
entering into becoming that which resists, the living. Such is the active negation or 
destruction of the living (the reactive) by A Life (the active) through which A Life 
expands itself launching (negating, destroying) the living towards new becomings. 
Negation is the becoming reactive of the active, it is that which negates or resists A 
Life, whereas active negation, effectively affirmation, is the becoming active of the 
reactive. The affirmative and the negative are the two qualities of the will to power, 
it both affirms and negates: 
To affirm and to negate express the will to power just as to act and to react 
express the force. (And just as reactive forces are nevertheless forces, the will 
to negate, nihilism is of the will to power: “ … a will to nothingness, a 
hostility towards life, a refusal to admit the fundamental conditions of life, 
nevertheless is and always remains a will” (1)) (Deleuze, 2007, 60-61).82 
will as genetic element and the action as symptom, the light and the heavy 
Will is the genetic element of all our actions, feelings and thought (Deleuze, 2007, 
89), it is as such that each can be made into the ‘symptom’ of a will. The method of 
analysis proposed to counter a method of contextualized readings involves relating 
an action to the will to power, and as such to its two qualities, to make it the 
symptom of a will that is either affirmative or negative. The method involves asking 
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 A Life can equally be said to have these two “qualities”: the actualization of the virtual which can 
be considered as negative, a becoming reactive which forms the essence of the living; and the 
virtualization of the actual which can be considered as affirmative, a becoming active, launching the 
living into becoming, (re-)plunging the living into A Life. 
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the question: what wills or wants the will which the action is a symptom of? ‘What 
[wills or] wants a will is not an object, an objective or an end. Ends and objects, even 
motives are still symptoms. […] One only ever wills qualities: the heavy, the light 
…’ (Deleuze, 2007, 89). The answer to the question will always either be the heavy 
or the light, and never ‘an object, an objective or an end’. 
An action is symptomatic, or expressive, of either a will which negates A Life or a 
will which affirms A Life. An “action” expressive of a will which negates A Life, 
i.e. a reaction, establishes territories, conserves or protects territories, or adapts and 
limits itself to the territories inside which it takes place, submitting to that which the 
territories impose. The figure who performs a reaction wills the heavy, the heavy 
burden of territories. ‘Heavy do earth and life seem to him; and the spirit of gravity 
wants it so! But whoever wants to become light and a bird must love himself – thus I 
teach’ (Nietzsche, 2006, 154). The figure who performs an action expressive of a 
will which affirms A Life wants to escape territories, it wills the light, it wants to 
flow through territories without being affected by them, it wants to liberate itself and 
as such A Life from the burden that territories impose.  
Of what will is an action a symptom of? In other words, what does a figure who 
performs a movement or an action will or want? The heavy or the light. Of what will 
is the action documented in When Faith Moves Mountains symptomatic of? What do 
the figures of When Faith Moves Mountains will or want (or more appropriately 
what does Alÿs will or want through the action he asked the figures to carry)? 
action and reaction in terms of motive and objective 
It seems to me that to ask what does a figure who performs an action will or want in 
terms of ‘an object, an objective or an end’ is in a sense insightful when attempting 
to identify the nature of the will its action is a symptom of (affirmative or negative), 
i.e. when attempting to identify the quality of its movement or action (active or 
reactive). To react is to establish, to limit, to protect, to conserve, in other words to 
resist becoming, to resist A Life. The action on the other hand liberates A Life, 
through it A Life expands itself. The reaction in comparison to the action appears to 
have a more clearly defined and identifiable motive and objective. This is essentially 
because the reactive force is ‘utilitarian, of adaptation and of partial limitation’ 
(Deleuze, 2007, 69), the reaction in a sense stems from an easily identifiable motive 
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and has a defined utility. Correlatively, the reaction always involves a movement of 
relative de- and re- territorialization and that which is reterritorialized onto is 
straightforwardly identifiable. For example, a figure establishes, protects or 
conserves a nest or a house in order to shield itself from the wind and the rain. The 
figure wants to protect itself, it reacts, and does so by reterritorializing itself on the 
clearly identifiable nest or house. On the other hand it appears more difficult to 
identify the motive and objective of the action. It seems difficult to identify what is 
the motive of a figure and what it wants in terms of an objective when it performs an 
action or active movement, otherwise termed absolute movement of the living. What 
do tens of millions of chaffinches want when they assemble together at a specific 
time and place? And what motivates them to do so? What do the figures of When 
Faith Moves Mountains want if they are not performing a social allegory, and if this 
objective cannot be, it seems, simply reduced to moving the mountain? The objective 
or purpose of an absolute movement of the living is not clearly defined, nor is that 
which the figure reterritorializes itself onto. What does a figure will or want when 
leaving the nest or the house in order not to confront but to unite with the rain and 
the wind? What is the figure’s motive, what motivates it? It is as if the only answer is 
the light, lightness, as opposed to an utilitarian objective. And what is the figure 
reterritorialized onto exactly? The rain, the wind? It is as such that actions or 
absolute movements of the living appear to different degrees as troubling and 
mysterious, they are to some extent inexplicable, their respective motive and 
objective are not as clearly defined as that of reactions. The absolute movement of 
the living is also to a certain degree inexplicable in terms of location and direction. 
Where is the figure who unites with the rain and the wind, and where is it going? 
Where were the tens of millions of chaffinches, and where were they going exactly? 
Although ‘near Thourne’, did they not simultaneously appear to be somewhere else, 
and did they not appear to go in a mysterious direction which escapes us and perhaps 
even them? The absolute movement of the living necessarily takes place in nature 
but to some extent it simultaneously appears to take place somewhere else, on 
another plane. The absolute movement of the living occurs according to a logic that 
does not belong to the sickness of man and his world but to the health of A Life, 
negating or transmuting the human, re-liberating A Life from where it is imprisoned. 
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nihilism versus transmutation 
The “action never wills” (a formulation to shorten: “the action never is the symptom 
of a will which wills”) to negate or to destroy, only the “reaction wills” to negate or 
to destroy: nihilism. The action negates or destroys (active negation or active 
destruction) but in a sense wills not to do so, at least not primarily. The (active) 
negation or destruction of the action is a consequence of its will to lightness, of its 
affirmative will. The action negates “not nihilistically but affirmatively”, not to kill 
the living and A Life, but to transmute the living, to liberate A Life from the living. 
Nihilism is the destruction or killing of life and as such of A Life, whereas 
transmutation is a destruction which allows for becomings and which consequently 
liberates A Life, a destruction that is both a pre-requisite of, and consequential to, the 
liberation of A Life where it is imprisoned. It is in that sense that Bacon’s Figures 
are not the massacre or destruction of figures (mutilated bodies, figurative painting), 
an operation which would be nihilistic, but the liberation of A Life imprisoned in 
figures (bodies without organs, Figural painting). 
When Faith Moves Mountains: to flow with the mountain 
Of what will is the action or movement of the figures of When Faith Moves 
Mountains symptomatic of? It does not seem that the objective of the action is to 
move the mountain, at least not primarily. It seems obvious that it is rather irrelevant 
whether the mountain was actually moved or not, that it simply is a consequence 
which is worth little attention in comparison to that which it is a consequence (or 
symptom) of. The action or movement wills to flow through the mountain, to pass 
through the territory that it is whilst being unaffected by that which it ordinarily 
imposes. But even more so, the action wills to flow with the mountain, it wills to 
make the mountain flow as it itself flows through it. The action is the symptom of a 
will that is affirmative, the action or movement wills the light, lightness. Could it not 
be said that through their movement the figures burden themselves with the heavy 
that the mountain as territory is or imposes (and quite literally with the weight of the 
sand, with the weight of the mountain they shovel forward)? No because to burden 
oneself with a territory, to react to a territory, is to bear the territory, to be submitted 
to it, to follow that which it imposes. To be submitted to the mountain is to pass on 
or around it, it is to be forced to climb it or to have to go around it. The figures of 
When Faith Moves Mountains are not submitted to the mountain since their 
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movement involves the (presumed) movement of the mountain itself. Both the 
figures and the mountain flow together through a movement. Could it not be said 
then that their movement simply is a nihilistic reaction, that it negates or destroys a 
territory nihilistically, as if Bacon were to paint massacred figures, that it annihilates 
the living, killing A Life in reciprocal presupposition with it? For obvious reasons it 
seems rather ludicrous to propose that the figures annihilate the mountain, 
nihilistically killing the Life that it is. But in relation to this method of analysis of 
actions, the question is worth asking since nihilism and transmutation, and as such 
negation and affirmation (which involves active negation), can easily be confused 
(wouldn’t this confusion concern the misappropriation of Nietzsche by the Nazis?). 
Rather, the (presumed) movement of the mountain, the destruction of what the 
mountain was prior to the figures’ movement, is the active negation which the 
transmutation of the figures and the mountain involves, a consequence or symptom 
of their will to lightness. The action wills not to react to or negate the mountain, it 
wills lightness, and that the mountain is moved or not is a more or less relevant 
consequence of this affirmative will. It is by being an expression or symptom of a 
will to lightness that the action and as such the work finds it meaning, and not in the 
contextualized readings by which it is transformed into an allegory.  
The figures neither territorialize themselves on the mountain, nor nihilistically 
destroy the mountain. They themselves become as if the wind and the rain, 
unrestrained, unaffected by the mountain, blowing over it and launching it into 
becoming. The figures leave a territory, their houses perhaps; they neither 
reterritorialize themselves on the mountain, nor climb or go around it (reaction), and 
neither do they annihilate the mountain (nihilism, which is also reactive); they unite 
with the wind, flowing through the mountain as the mountain flows through their 
movement (action, active, affirmation). The figures simultaneously liberate 
themselves “from themselves”, from their essence, from their becoming reactive 
through the transmutation, through lightness, and from the territory (the mountain) 
they pass through. Equally, the figures of solar-guided migrations liberate 
themselves not only from the territory they depart from and the territories they pass 
through, but they also simultaneously liberate themselves “from themselves”, they 
become other through their absolute deterritorialization: What have they become in 
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order to perceive not the terrestrial sun reigning over a territory but the celestial sun 
of the Cosmos? 
faith and the future versus a commitment to A Life in the present 
Alÿs uses the term faith in titling and discussing When Faith Moves Mountains: ‘As 
Medina said while we were in Lima, “Faith is a means by which one resigns oneself 
to the present in order to invest in the abstract promise of the future”’ (Alÿs, 2002). 
But it seems that it is exactly not faith which “moves the mountain”. What moves the 
mountain is a commitment to A Life which engenders a movement different in 
nature to our ordinary movements: an absolute movement of the living which is itself 
the symptom of a will to lightness. Through it, one is not ‘resigned to the present’, 
one embraces the present, certainly not to invest in the ‘abstract promise of the 
future’, but to literally attain to a unity with A Life in the present. 
 
Alÿs’ approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living 
Alÿs’ approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living can be described 
as follows. First, the selection of a territory and a mode of action (or transmutation, 
becoming active) in relation to this territory. Second, the performance of the action: 
a movement which in relation to the selected territory is symptomatic of a will to 
lightness, constituting an absolute movement of the living. Third, the narration (or 
documentation, representation) of the performance: the narration of an absolute 
movement of the living. 
It is through an action, through a becoming active, that a figure lives A Life. The 
narration of this action is the narration of a figure who lives A Life. Each of Alÿs’ 
actions needs to be analyzed through this method of analysis which involves no 
contextual reading, no allegory, no metaphor, no parody, etc. Each action needs to be 
related to the will to power in order to make it the symptom of a will which beyond 
any motive or objective constitutes its genetic element. The heavy or the light? In 
each case, the analysis is of the forces at play: the reactive forces that a specific 
territory is and imposes, and the forces of a movement that is either active or 
reactive. There is three possible outcome to this analysis: first, the establishment, 
protection or conservation of, or the submission to, a territory (reactions, ordinary 
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relative movements); second, the nihilistic negation or destruction of the territory by 
which the living and as such A Life is killed (nihilism, a will to nothingness, a 
hostility towards life, also a reaction); third, the transmutation, the becoming active 
which finds its ground or genesis in a will to lightness, involving an active 
destruction by which A Life is liberated from where it is imprisoned: both from the 
figure who performs the movement of transmutation and the territory in relation to 
which the transmutation is operated (actions, absolute movements of the living). To 
live A Life is to find the ground of one’s movements in an affirmative will to 
lightness. 
the paradox of the will to nothingness, Tornado: nihilistic reactions by Alÿs 
Tornado, 2000-2010, is the video documentation of Alÿs repeatedly running towards 
relatively small tornadoes which regularly form on the highlands south of Mexico 
City (Alÿs and Medina, 2010, 169). A figure (Alÿs) runs towards a tornado. The 
figure sometimes “enters” a tornado with a video camera in hand. On one occasion 
the figure is knocked down by the powerful winds and the camera falls down on the 
highlands’ sand, continuing to film the violent chaos of dust particles which fly 
around. This appears to be an example of nihilistic negation or destruction of a 
territory, the territory or organism that Alÿs himself is. In this sense Tornado 
narrates the repeated embodiment of a will to nothingness which opposes itself to a 
transmutation by which the figure becomes active and liberates A Life. The figure 
instead nihilistically reacts to the territory that it itself is and the movement stops. 
What does the figure who performs such action will? It is as if the figure wills the 
light because it wants to liberate itself from the territory (the figure itself as territory 
or organism) which imprisons the Life that it is, but aims to do so paradoxically 
through a nihilistic reaction towards itself. It is as if it wills chaos and not chaosmos, 
A Life. This is the paradox of a nihilistic movement symptomatic of a will to 
nothingness, the figure who performs it does not want to be submitted to the 
becoming reactive that the territory is and imposes, but it does not know how to act, 
how to live Life, it only reacts to the living and in doing so kills the living and as 
such A Life. 
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to live A Life requires effort and constancy in nature, versus illusions of absolute 
movement and correlating illusions of action 
To live A Life, to be active, is hard, like to attain to a vision of A Life in the living is 
hard. To live A Life is effectively against our essence, our continuously renewed 
becoming reactive. If the figures of solar-guided migrations are active during their 
migration and as such operate a deterritorialization that is absolute, as soon as they 
rest, they reterritorialize themselves on a territory, to protect and to conserve 
themselves. They have at that moment become reactive again, they survive as 
opposed to live A Life. They see no more the celestial sun of the Cosmos, they see 
the terrestrial sun reigning over the territory they occupy. Becoming reactive, our 
essence, always inevitably “catches up” with us. What did the figures of When Faith 
Moves Mountains do when they found themselves on the other side of the mountain 
they had moved? They probably needed to perform utilitarian functions such as 
going back home to feed themselves and to protect themselves from the sun, the 
heath and even the wind with which they previously had established a unity. They 
probably had to climb back the mountain or walk around it, submitting to that which 
the mountain imposed on them (the heavy), after having flown with it through their 
movement (the light). An absolute movement of the living requires effort and 
constancy. For a health to flow through the sickness that man and his world are, for a 
river of active forces to flow on an earth of reactive forces, for an absolute 
movement of the living to flow through the living, for a transmutation, effort and 
constancy is required. 
There is an illusion of commitment to A Life or an illusion of absolute movement if 
there is a semblance of absolute movement without a figure’s movement which 
embodies an effort and constancy in nature. There is no effort in nature in a 
projection onto any of the three types of universe transcendent to nature (paradigm 
imaginary-transcendent). There is no effort and constancy in nature for example in 
Alice falling down the rabbit hole since she attains to a world which lacks a 
relationship of reciprocal presupposition with nature (the same can be said of “to 
attain to Paradise”, or to project onto Charles Avery’s The Island). Neither is there 
an effort and a constancy when the figure plunges towards chaos, there is no effort in 
death or nihilism (paradigm chaotic-noise). The effort and constancy in nature might 
be that which leads to death, when the effort fatally overcomes the figure, when the 
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effort to attain to the vision of the celestial sun of the Cosmos or to move a mountain 
is hypothetically fatal, but death is the moment when the absolute movement ceases 
and the commitment to A Life fails. And finally, there is no effort when the figure 
bears with, submits to, the becoming reactive that nature is (paradigm human-
actual). The submission or reaction might be thought of and felt as an effort, but it is 
what could be termed a reactive effort as opposed to an active effort, it is to suffer 
the becoming reactive which defines us and the world by essence. 
Correlating to the illusions of absolute movement are the illusions of action. 
Corresponding to the paradigm imaginary-transcendent is the figure who is under 
the illusion that to act is to “project itself”, to imagine or fantasize a universe to 
project itself onto. To the paradigm chaotic-noise correlates the figure who is under 
the illusion that to act is to annihilate, to plunge towards death. To the paradigm 
human-actual corresponds the figure who is under the illusion that to act is to react, 
that to act is to perform in accordance to and as such bear with the territories that 
man and his world are. This figure is under the illusion of becoming active when it is 
in fact submitting to the becoming reactive of man and his world: to climb the 
mountain, to pass around it, to suffer the mountain, claiming victory and action 
whilst in fact performing a reaction. This figure is in Nietzsche’s Zarathoustra the 
donkey (or the camel), with its ‘false Yes’, the ‘Y-A, Y-A’, expression of bearing the 
weight of existing values, as opposed to the affirmative and true Yes of the Overman 
which expresses the lightness of the action (Deleuze, 2005c, 43), the lightness of 
living of A Life. 
modest absolute movements of the living, absolute movements of the living are not 
defined by a quantity of movement but by a quality of movement 
The effort and constancy of the movement do not need to occur on a grandiose scale. 
Absolute movements of the living are not defined by a quantity of movement but by 
a quality of movement: the active. Of what will is the action a symptom of, the 
affirmative will of the light or the negative will of the heavy? This has nothing to do 
with the quantity of movement which itself can be “measured” in terms of the 
relative component of movement. An absolute movement of the living is not defined 
by a grandiose relative component of movement. In most cases, Alÿs’ actions are 
neither as grandiose as DG’s troubling and more or less mysterious cases, nor as 
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grandiose as When Faith Moves Mountains. A transmutation of reactive forces does 
not need to be on a grandiose scale. Alÿs’ actions could be categorized according to 
a “scale of grandiosity”. The action, the figure’s act or activity through which it lives 
A Life, can be like a “short”, “slow” and “modest” solar-guided migration which 
nevertheless follows absolute variables, an act or activity modest in terms of its 
relative component of movement but where the deterritorialization nevertheless is 
absolute. There can be modest movements which are symptomatic of a will to 
lightness, i.e. there can be modest absolute movements of the living. 
Children’s Games, 2008-present, is an ongoing collection of video documentations 
of children games; for example a fully dressed man stands in a lake or sea and 
throws a pebble attempting to make it bounce on the surface of the water (Alÿs and 
Medina, 2010, 164). Doppelgänger, 1999-present: ‘When arriving in … (new city), 
wander, looking for someone who could be you. If the meeting happens, walk beside 
your doppelgänger until your pace adjust to his/hers’ (Alÿs and Medina, 2010, 105). 
What does a man or woman who plays a children game will, of what will is his or 
her action symptomatic of? Like the action of the figures of When Faith Moves 
Mountains expresses not a will to move the mountain, the actions documented in 
Children’s Games express not a will to play children’s games, the act of playing 
remains the symptom of a “deeper” will which is its genetic element. An adult who 
plays a children game wills lightness, he wants to flow through the socio-biological 
territory “adult” which he has to bear with and which he is submitted to. He wills the 
light through a becoming other, and in this instance he “symptomatically” becomes 
child. It seems obvious that the action of Alÿs in Doppelgänger is not simply the 
fulfillment of the objective to follow someone who could be him since, in a sense, 
this action appears as incredibly specific and yet rather futile. What the figure (in 
occurrence Alÿs) wants or wills is to flow through the territory he occupies as an 
individual in a social landscape. Alÿs wants to flow through the physico-social 
boundaries that are involved in one’s interactions within a social space. He quite 
literally wants to become other, to become someone who looks like him, as if 
wanting to disappear through adopting the rhythm of a stranger which for him can be 
thought to embody “the social”. Alÿs wants to disappear in or as, and as such 
become, “the social”. This action is symptomatic of a will to lightness, not the 
establishment, protection or reinforcement of territorial boundaries but their 
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disappearance, not to submit to physico-social boundaries but to actively destroy 
them and flow through them liberating the Life they imprison.  
to disappear: to become other and to become imperceptible 
Every movement or action symptomatic of a will to lightness, in its corroboration to 
a becoming other (becoming wind, becoming child, becoming “the social”, etc.), 
involves a will to disappear (the figure disappears since it becomes other), and 
ultimately a will to disappear “completely”: to become imperceptible. To become 
imperceptible does not occur through nihilism, through a will to nothingness, 
through organic death, it takes place through becoming A Life, through anorganic 
Life. ‘The imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula.’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 342) To become imperceptible means ‘être comme tout 
le monde’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 342), which signifies both “to be like 
everyone else” and “to be like the whole world”. To become imperceptible can mean 
both to become “the social”, to be like everyone else, to disappear in the social as the 
social, and to become the whole world, to disappear in the world as the world, for 
example to become and as such disappear in and as the wind, flowing with a 
mountain in one’s movement. The will to lightness ultimately leads the immanent 
end of becoming, the imperceptible, one is lightest when one has disappeared in and 
as the whole world, when one has become A Life. 
the method of analysis never involves the destination of the action or the movement  
Can the actions or movements documented in Doppelgänger and Children’s Games 
be said to be absolute movements of the living, and as such movements of 
reterritorialization on the absolute, movements of reterritorialization on another 
absolute plane in reciprocal presupposition with nature (or absolute 
deterritorialization)? A transmutation, from reactive forces to their becoming active, 
by definition involves a reterritorialization on the absolute since the active is 
precisely the absolute or A Life. To become active is to attain to the absolute or A 
Life. Analyzed as active, the actions documented in Doppelgänger and Children’s 
Games as such involve, by definition, reterritorializations on the absolute. Could it 
not be argued however that these actions or movements are reterritorializations on 
“the social” or “childhood” which are not absolute? In other words, could it not be 
argued that the reterritorializations are not on another absolute plane but on “the 
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social” or “childhood” which remain relative? One could equally argue against DG 
that the movement of the figures of solar-guided migrations is not one of absolute 
deterritorialization but simply of relative reterritorializations on the territories they 
pass through and on the territory which will constitute their final destination. The 
method of analysis needs exactly not to focus on the destination of movement (“the 
social”, “childhood”, the final destination of the migrating figures) but on the quality 
of movement: active or reactive. The destination remains an end, it remains the 
symptom of a will that is either a will of the light or of the heavy. The actions 
documented in Doppelgänger and Children’s Games are movements of 
reterritorialization on the absolute because they are active. Through them one 
becomes other, but the absolute is not attained in the other (in the destination), it is 
attained in becoming itself: the “adult” attains to the absolute not by attaining to 
“childhood” per se (the destination), but in the movement between “adulthood” and 
“childhood”, i.e. in becoming itself. The method of analysis of actions or movements 
never involves the destination of the action or the movement, but always and only its 
quality. 
quantity: difference of degrees in the experience of the absolute movement of the 
living as a tale 
Absolute movements of the living appear as troubling and more or less mysterious to 
different degrees. Tens of millions of chaffinches assembling together or five 
hundred people moving a mountain are cases more mysterious than an adult playing 
a children’s game or someone following a stranger that looks like him or her. 
Correlatively, the narrations of absolute movements of the living come to be 
experienced as tale to different degrees. They are to different degrees experienced as 
the troubling, mysterious and rare cases of a health in the sickness that man and his 
world are. As previously discussed, absolute movements of the living are defined by 
a quality of movement, the active, and not by a quantity of movement, by the 
grandiosity of their reciprocally presupposing relative component of movement. But 
the difference in degrees according to which their narrations are experienced as 
mysterious and consequently as tale, depend upon their quantity of movement. In 
other words, the more grandiose the relative component of an active movement (of 
an absolute movement of the living), the more its narration will appear as a tale, as 
troubling, mysterious and rare. A thousand chaffinches might assemble through a 
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movement that is active, but an assembly of tens of millions of them, a high quantity 
of movement of the same quality, appears mysterious and as a tale to a higher 
degree.  
To act, to live A Life, is to resist. Actions are acts of resistance, they resist the 
becoming reactive which forms our essence, they resist the living in order to liberate 
A Life, to allow A Life to flow through the enslaving territories inside which we live 
(including our organisms). For absolute movements of the living to be modest, and 
as such for their narrations to be experienced as tale to a low degree is not a negative 
aspect. On the contrary, by being modest they positively acknowledge that acts of 
resistance don’t need to be grandiose and spectacular, that figures of resistance don’t 
need to be heroic, and that absolute movements of the living don’t need to be epic. 
 
the paradigm to live A Life and the possible universe 
When Faith Moves Mountains, Children’s Games and Doppelgänger embody the 
paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life. As for works which embody the 
first three paradigms, works which embody this paradigm are said to correspond to 
and to involve in their aesthetic experiences a movement from nature to a possible 
universe. In relation to this paradigm, the possible universe is narrated: for example 
“the universe” where five hundred people moved a mountain, “the universe” where 
tens of millions of chaffinches assembled near Thourne, “the universe” where an 
adult plays children games, etc. This narrated universe effectively is our nature, but 
our nature where the troubling, mysterious and rare case of an absolute movement of 
the living has taken place, it is “the universe” of the tale (of what comes to be 
experienced to a certain degree as tale). The possible universe attained through the 
aesthetic experience (the narrated universe) is our nature, which through one or 
many figures’ performance of an act or activity, is transversed by an absolute 
movement of the living. Associated to the paradigm to live A Life is the type of 
possible universe termed nature transversed by an absolute movement of the living, a 
new type which adds itself to the types termed haptic vision, nature hallucinated and 
new nature. In an artwork which embodies the paradigm to live A Life, narrated is 
simultaneously an absolute movement of the living and a possible universe (our 
nature transversed by it). 
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the paradigm to live A Life and aesthetic experience 
In terms of the aesthetic experience of a work which embodies the paradigm to live A 
Life, the viewer does not go through the absolute movement of the living that the 
figure, subject of the narration, goes through. The figure through its act or activity 
goes through an absolute deterritorialization. The viewer on the other hand is 
effectively as if told a story (or narration), she goes through a relative de- and re- 
territorialization from nature to the narration of nature transversed by an absolute 
movement of the living. This aesthetic experience is similar to the relative de- and 
re- territorialization given by a work which embodies the renewing quality of 
movement, a work which gives to experience a new nature. The narration of nature 
transversed by an absolute movement is effectively the experience of a new 
possibility for nature, of nature metamorphosed, of nature transversed by a health, by 
a breath of air. The narration is experienced as the possibility to act and as such to 
resist: our nature as world where it is possible to live A Life. 
The departure from DG’s conceptualization of art which this paradigm involves is 
pronounced. As previously discussed, this departure is explicit in the difference 
between the absolute movements which for example Figural painting expresses and 
the absolute movements of the living conceptualized in this text. The expression of A 
Life in the living never involves narration, it is not our nature as world where it is 
possible to live A Life, it is an expression of A Life in reciprocal presupposition with 
nature, a vision which has nothing to narrate, no story to tell, it is and gives A Life. 
Nor does the expression of A Life involve the experience of a new possibility for 
nature, i.e. the narration of nature transversed by a breath of air, it is and gives a 
breath of air, it works directly on the nerves, and not through what is experienced as 
a tale. Whereas Bacon’s Figures result from acts of resistance, Alÿs narrates the 
stories of figures who perform acts of resistance. 
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8.c – Doig: ordinary relative movements narrated as absolute movements of the 
living 
 
introduction to Doig’s work 
Doig approaches the narration of absolute movements of the living differently to 
Alÿs and Huyghe. He neither fictionalizes absolute movement (Huyghe), nor does he 
narrate absolute movements of which the relative components express an absolute, 
i.e. absolute movements of the living (Alÿs). Doig’s approach is to narrate, to 
figuratively paint83, a relative component of movement as an act or activity in nature 
through which A Life is lived. Doig’s paintings are the narrations or figurations of 
figures which perform ordinary acts or activities in nature, they might play ping pong 
or cricket, canoe, climb a tree, swim, walk, paint, etc., or even be immobile.84 These 
movements are different to Alÿs’ actions in that their relative components do not 
express an absolute, they are not absolute movements of the living. But Doig’s 
approach is to “tell us”, to narrate to us, to figuratively depict, that through such 
movements A Life can be lived, that they can be the movements through which A 
Life is lived. Doig’s work, for example Untitled (Ping Pong), narrates to us that 
although the relative component of movement “playing ping pong” does not refer to 
a movement of absolute deterritorialization like for example “tens of millions of 
chaffinches assembling together” does, playing ping pong can be an activity through 
which the figure goes through an absolute deterritorialization. Untitled (Ping Pong) 
tells us that A Life can be lived through playing ping pong. Doig’s work tells us that 
playing ping pong or cricket, canoeing, climbing a tree, swimming, etc., can be 
activities through which absolute movement is performed, through which another 
absolute plane in reciprocal presupposition with nature can be attained, through 
which absolute variables can be followed, through which a unity with the Outside 
can be established. Doig for example portrays to us that the ping pong player can 
                                                 
83
 Doig paints figuratively, and as such his work is intrinsically illustrative and narrative. Deleuze 
links ‘the figurative’ with narration and illustration (Deleuze, 2002, 12). Doig paints the living, 
figures (figurative painting), he does not like Bacon paint A Life in the living, Figures (Figural 
painting). 
84
 For example: Untitled (Ping Pong), 2006-2008, Paragon, 2006, 100 Years Ago, 2000, Girl in White 
With Trees, 2001-2002, J.M. at Paragon, 2003-2004, Red Boat (Imaginary Boys), 2004, Pelican 
(Stag), 2004, Figure in Mountain Landscape, 1997-1998. 
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find himself not under the terrestrial sun which oversees his play but as having 
established new relationships with the sun, the ping pong ball, the table, the bat, the 
wall next to him and the surrounding environment by which the localization of his 
movement within such a scene has become cosmic, celestial, absolute. The figure 
plays ping pong in the transcendental field: not in nature per se, although necessarily 
in nature, but in the transcendental field, the pure plane of immanence or the 
Outside. Doig paints the scene of a figure playing ping pong as if this movement 
simultaneously takes place in nature and in the transcendental field (how Doig 
achieves this through the use of painting is discussed below in relation to both 
Untitled (Ping Pong) and Paragon). This does not mean however that Doig’s work is 
Figural, that his paintings express A Life in the living. Doig’s work is closer to the 
ontology of the photograph developed in this text than to Figural painting. Since he 
paints figuratively, Doig paints the living and not A Life in the living (Figural 
painting). But he paints the living as point of view on and from A Life and that has 
consequences for that which he narrates.  
engagement with the second paradigm through painting as a means by which to 
embody the paradigm to live A Life  
Doig’s work is an engagement through painting with the second paradigm of 
commitment to A Life the living as point of view on and from A Life. His work, like 
the extra-ordinary photograph, although obviously through different aesthetic means, 
gives an experience of the living as dispersion of the Outside. Doig figuratively 
paints the living in such a way that whilst the Outside is nowhere to be seen in the 
painting, the living or nature (for example a ping pong player) appears suspended in 
the Outside, it appears as dispersion of the Outside, and as such it appears 
simultaneously as point of view on the Outside (as if in nature facing the Outside as 
it disperses itself towards our eyes) and point of view from the Outside (as if in the 
Outside whilst it disperses itself through our eyes). The figurative painting narrates 
playing ping pong as activity through which the figure performs an absolute 
movement of the living, establishes a unity with A Life, as an activity through which 
the figure lives A Life.  
Doig does not express A Life in a sensation, he does not express the constitutive 
difference of levels that the sensation is (vision), and yet his work necessarily gives 
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to experience something different to the photograph which itself shares its genesis 
with that which is in its point of view. Doig’s work is neither genesis as the 
composition of chaos expressing A Life in a sensation (Figural painting which 
involves co-creation with A Life and a sensation), nor the capture or cut across the 
genesis of nature (extra-ordinary photograph which involves neither co-creation nor 
sensation, like science). Doig’s work is genesis as dispersion of the Outside, it 
involves co-creation but no sensation. As previously discussed, the second paradigm 
the living as point of view on and from A Life which Doig engages with through 
painting corresponds to a concern with what has been termed the reciprocal 
presupposition, tension or relation of territoriality between the living and the 
Outside. This relation of territoriality is exactly what Doig paints: the figure plays 
ping pong in the Outside, not per se in nature, although necessarily in nature; Doig 
paints the ping pong player as tension between nature and the Outside. But for Doig 
this is not an end in itself, it serves to narrate any act or activity as a movement 
through which a unity with the Outside is established, as a movement through which 
A Life is lived. Doig’s engagement with the second paradigm is a means by which to 
embody the fourth paradigm to live A Life. 
 
not an accident in nature but nature as accident, a new aesthetic in Doig after 1999 
Results from the engagement of Doig’s work with the paradigm the living as point of 
view on and from A Life that there is in several of his paintings85 an aesthetic similar 
to the one which describes the extra-ordinary photograph. Generally referenced are 
works by Doig that are post-1999 and which depict figures and not only landscapes. 
Prior to 1999, it seems that a constant in his work was to paint a chaos of figurative 
elements (like snow or branches) or a unity of tone and hue, beyond or through 
which a landscape can be perceived (a house, a lake, a snowboarder on a ski slope, 
etc.). Doig refers to this as: ‘paintings with a proliferation of matter on the surface of 
the canvas. I had wanted to get away from that device of always ‘looking through’, 
whether it be trees, branches or snow – in to the painting’ (Doig, 2007, 135). Beyond 
this ‘device’ or “aesthetic”, there seems to be a tendency in works post-1999 where 
                                                 
85
 For example Untitled (Ping Pong), 2006-2008, Paragon, 2006, Stag, 2002-2005, Red Boat 
(Imaginary Boys), 2004, Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre, 2000-2002, Grande Riviere, 2001-2002, etc. 
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nature itself comes to appear as accident: not the accidental composition of trees, 
branches or snow in nature, not an accident in nature, but nature as accident, the 
accident of nature. This aesthetic can be defined as an aesthetic of nature as 
accident, heterogeneous parts, interstices and Outside. 
Untitled (Ping Pong), heterogeneous parts and colour 
Untitled (Ping Pong). The painting is like a collage or capture of clearly defined 
heterogeneous forms or parts: some parts are organic (the player, the forest), others 
are geometric (the wall, the table), some parts are monochromatic and monotonic 
shores (some parts of the wall, the table) whilst others are of broken tones and 
painted with looser brush strokes (other parts of the wall, the grass, the forest). 
Untitled (Ping Pong) appears as collaged or captured “part by part” (parts of sky and 
of trees and of wall and of grass and … etc.). There is a sense of perspective but it is 
as if it is established by the juxtaposition of heterogeneous flat planes along the 
depth of field, denying a smooth continuity of space along this depth (the flat planes 
of the forest and sky, of the wall, of the table and of the grass). These heterogeneous 
parts, and it is as such that they are qualified as heterogeneous, do not primarily 
relate to each other through an associative unity. An associative unity constructs and 
“unites” space as a smooth continuity of space along the depth of field and across the 
viewpoint, as it is ordinarily perceived through human perception. The unity of the 
heterogeneous parts in Untitled (Ping Pong) is on the contrary primarily dispersive: 
they primarily find their unity in relation to an Outside of which they are the 
dispersion, denying to a certain degree the possibility of a smooth continuity of 
space. The associative unity of the view in the painting is doubled by the dispersive 
unity of its parts, the smooth continuity of space is fissured by interstices between its 
parts. 
By engaging with the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life like 
Struth, but through the medium of painting, Doig has evidently more freedom than 
Struth in articulating the dispersive unity of a view. Colours are neither restricted to 
ordinary perceptions (Struth), nor do the pure internal relations of colour (hot-cold, 
expansion-contraction) serve to establish differential relations to construct a Figure 
(Bacon). Colour is dispersed into each depicted part or object like the colours of a 
rainbow are dispersed from white light (the wall in Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre or 
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the trees in Red Boat (Imaginary Boys) for example). The attribution (or dispersion) 
of colour to each part is more or less random or accidental. In Untitled (Ping Pong) 
there are two directions in which the view is split into heterogeneous parts: across 
the view point and along the depth of field. There are the heterogeneous flat planes 
of which the juxtaposition forms the depth of field; and in turn each of these planes 
is split across the view point: the furthest plane along the depth of field is split as 
different parts of sky and trees, and the plane juxtaposed next to it is split into parts 
of wall. Each of these parts are attributed a colour more or less at random, denying 
the smooth continuity of space of the sky for example. Each flat plane along the 
depth of field is as if a two dimensional mesh subdivided into parts, each part 
capturing a more or less random dispersion of the Outside. Between these flat planes 
or meshes, and in-between their respective parts, are the interstices which lead to and 
relate each part to the Outside nowhere to be seen in the painting. The painting does 
not give a vision of the Outside, it gives a view of the living as dispersion of the 
Outside. Through the haptic vision (Figural painting), one sees not the universe in 
colours but the universe through colour, A Life expressed through the modulation of 
the pure internal relations of colour. In Doig’s work, one does not see the universe 
through colour, one sees the universe in colours (the living) but the colours, as more 
or less random distribution, deny a smooth continuity of space and as such appear to 
result from a dispersion of the Outside. 
Paragon, to flatten sensation on different non contiguous levels 
In Paragon, the orange field is different to the monochromatic and monotonic 
orange field often seen in Bacon, which expresses the infinite movements and speeds 
of chaos as if “prior”, or “after”, being given any consistency. This “level 0” of the 
constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is, is the “initial” level with which 
to begin to establish differential relations, to modulate colour. In Doig the bright and 
intense orange field is the figuration of what appears to be a beach. Paragon denies a 
smooth continuity of space doubling the associative unity of the point of view with a 
dispersive unity through the use of large flat planes: the boldly contoured parts of the 
vegetation on the left and top, of the sky on the top right corner and of the sea on the 
right. The beach, like the other parts, appears to a certain degree heterogeneous to all 
the others; all parts find their unity in a dispersive unity which relates them to an 
Outside absent in the painting. But there also is an aspect according to which this 
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figuratively depicted beach relates to the monochromatic orange field in Bacon. The 
bright orange colour of the beach has an intensity which highly contrasts with the 
less vivid colours of the vegetation, sea, sky and figures; and the beach itself seems 
defined by the contours of that which surrounds it rather than possessing its “own” 
contour, as if the orange field simultaneously is a beach and a background to the less 
brightly colored parts that appear to be laid down on top of it. The orange colour 
expresses an intensity beyond the toned down and naturalistic colours of the 
vegetation, sea, sky and figures. It serves figuratively in that it gives a colour to the 
beach, but it also appears as an intense background light. It is as if from this vivid 
and bright light that the other parts are dispersed, as if the living is a “toning down” 
of this intense light. There is not however a modulation of colour which establishes a 
continuous variation between this orange light and the other parts, the painting is not 
a set of differential relations expressing the Life of the scene, the Life of the figures, 
of the vegetation, of the sea, etc. The figures do not appear to simultaneously emerge 
from and dissolve into the orange light as Bacon’s Figures often do. The difference 
between the vivid light of the beach/background and the other toned down and 
naturalistically colored parts nevertheless serves to express a difference that is not a 
difference in actual or optical space. This difference is expressed in a difference of 
intensity of colour, and as such through a “kind of” modulation of colour, but not the 
modulation proper to Figural painting through which a continuous variation of 
differential relations is established and correlatively a haptic space “opened”. The 
beach/background is not only a figurative depiction and a background to the figures’ 
play in three-dimensional optical space, in relation to the other parts of the painting it 
simultaneously captures and expresses a different level of sensation.  
Bacon expresses A Life in a sensation, the bodies without organs that he paints 
account for the vertical line of genesis “in its entirety”, i.e. from the infinite speeds 
of chaos all the way up or down to its actualization (hence the produced or 
consequential resemblance of organs). In other words Bacon expresses “all the 
levels” of the difference of levels that the sensation is, and it is as such that his work 
expresses an indiscernibility between the living and A Life. On the other hand, as 
previously discussed, the photograph flattens sensation on a single level, a level 
beyond the threshold of human perception, a level which corresponds to the plane of 
reference that the photographic apparatus is, a level perceived by a scientific or 
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slicing eye. The photograph necessarily flattens sensation on a single level because 
the photographic apparatus, as plane of reference, “sees” and cuts across the Outside 
with a single plane that is uniform across its surface. One could think of the plane of 
reference that the photographic apparatus is as a two-dimensional, flat and uniform 
plane cutting across the Outside on a single flat and uniform level. This effectively 
means that a photograph cannot give to experience more than one level of sensation. 
In composing an indiscernibility between the living and the Outside, between the 
sensed (the living) and the sensing (A Life), Bacon’s work can be said to express “all 
the levels” and “the contiguity between the levels” which constitute the sensation.  
Paragon is different to both Bacon’s work and to photography. In Paragon, the parts 
of the vegetation, sea, sky and figures are the flattening of sensation on a certain 
level (or on different levels close to one another) and the part of the 
beach/background is the flattening of sensation on a lower (or higher) level closer to 
the infinite movements and speeds of chaos. As previously discussed, the use of 
colour in Doig serves to deny a smooth continuity of space and express the 
dispersive unity of a view like the extra-ordinary photograph does. Only as opposed 
to the photograph, in Paragon, the dispersed parts are captured on different levels 
“of dispersion”, in other words it flattens sensation on different levels. To think of 
Paragon “photographically”, its corresponding plane of reference by which it cuts 
across the Outside is neither flat nor uniform like that of the photographic apparatus, 
its plane has different depths by which it captures the Outside or A Life on different 
levels “of dispersion” or “of genesis”, at different “heights” along the vertical line of 
genesis that it is. The part of the beach captures the genesis at a low level on its 
vertical line whereas the other parts capture it at higher levels, i.e. closer to that 
which is perceived through ordinary human perception (hence for example the 
figures are fully formed and easily recognizable). Paragon captures or cuts across 
different depths along the vertical line of genesis. 
To return to Deleuze’s discussion of Lewis Carroll, with regards to the reciprocal 
presupposition or relation of immanence between a nature and an Outside, Sylvie and 
Bruno operates a progress from Through the Looking Glass which itself is a progress 
from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. In Sylvie and Bruno the reciprocal 
presupposition between a nature and an Outside is achieved in that a relation of 
immanence between the two is established: Sylvie and Bruno is not the two stories of 
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two worlds, nature (Victorian era) and an Outside (Fairyland), it is the single story of 
an imbrication between the two, of their becoming indiscernible. To compare 
painting and literature on ontological terms, Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne in 
comparison to Paragon is (ontologically) closer to Sylvie and Bruno in that Bacon 
establishes an indiscernibility between the living and the Outside. Paragon in a sense 
is closer to Alice's Adventures in Wonderland which does not fully realize an 
indiscernibility between nature (the nature Alice is in before falling down the rabbit 
hole) and the Outside (what Deleuze calls the world of depths), in that the book, or 
Alice, “only” establishes surfaces in-between the two (as opposed to an 
indiscernibility). Alice, after falling down the rabbit hole, ‘progressively conquers 
surfaces. She climbs or climbs back to the surface. She creates surfaces. Movements 
of sinking and burying give way to light lateral movements of sliding’ (Deleuze, 
1993, 34). From the world of depths or the Outside, Alice climbs back to the surface 
or the living, through the creation of “intermediary” surfaces. The large and 
heterogeneous flat planes in Paragon are surfaces on the Outside, on the world of 
depths. From the intense and bright orange light itself captured as a surface (the 
beach), Doig creates other surfaces by which to climb back to the living from the 
depths of the Outside (the surfaces/flat planes of the vegetation, of the sea, of the 
sky). In another establishment of a relation between science and photography, 
Deleuze refers to Carroll as a mathematician or a photographer in relation to his 
approach to literature with Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: ‘Mathematics is good 
because it establishes surfaces, and pacify a world whose mixtures in depths would 
be terrible: Carroll the mathematician or Carroll the photographer’ (Deleuze, 1993, 
34). Doig, like Carroll, establishes or traces surfaces on the Outside. As opposed to 
the photograph, Paragon has, like Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, many different 
surfaces on different levels by which to climb back to nature from the world of 
depths. These planes or surfaces on the Outside are different levels of sensation, 
different depths along the vertical line of genesis, ‘but the world of depths still 
rumbles under the surface’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34-35) or surfaces. The Outside still 
remains or rumbles under the surfaces created by Paragon and Alice's Adventures in 
Wonderland, an indiscernibility between nature and the Outside is as such not 
established. 
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In opposition to both Bacon and the photograph, Doig flattens sensation on different 
non contiguous levels: Paragon is the flattening of sensation on the lower level that 
the surface of beach is and on the higher level(s) that the surfaces of the vegetation, 
sea, sky and figures are. Can Paragon be said to express the constitutive difference 
of levels that the sensation is, to express A Life in a sensation? No, Doig “misses” 
the sensation since A Life ‘still rumbles under the surface[s]’ he establishes. In 
Paragon, the Outside or world of depths still remains under its dispersed parts even 
if these parts cut across it on different levels. Paragon does not account for “the 
whole” of the vertical line genesis like Bacon’s bodies without organs do, Paragon 
only expresses cuts across it on different non contiguous levels, a style of painting 
which remains figurative. Paragon can in one sense be thought of as photographic, 
but as a strange kind of photography which flattens sensation not on a single, flat and 
uniform level but on multiple non contiguous levels. Or, Paragon can inversely be 
thought of as Figural, but a strange kind of Figural painting which does not express 
sensation but flattens it on different levels unable to (and not wanting to) express an 
indiscernibility between the living and the Outside. This “ambiguity” between the 
photographic and the Figural is the strength of Doig’s work, and it is the property by 
which Doig is said to paint hallucinations. 
 
Doig and hallucination, the hallucinatory cubist eye 
Doig’s work is experienced as being of nature, and simultaneously as the view (his 
work remains figurative) of a landscape suspended in the Outside. Doig paints a 
view by decomposing it in surfaces each of which expresses a different level along 
its vertical line of genesis. As such, the view, like the extra-ordinary photograph, 
although on more than one level, expresses the relation of territoriality or tension 
between the living and the Outside, hence nature appears as suspended in the 
Outside. Through such view, nature is experienced as point of view on and from the 
Outside: it is as if the viewer cannot know if she is “standing” in nature experiencing 
different levels of nature’s genesis or if she is “standing” in the Outside experiencing 
different levels of its dispersion. She ultimately experiences both “positions” or 
points of view simultaneously, experiencing the simultaneity of or reciprocal 
presupposition between the living and the Outside. Whereas the extra-ordinary 
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photograph gives an aesthetic experience of nature hallucinated, Doig can be said to 
figuratively paint hallucinations of nature. To paint nature as a hallucination is for 
Doig perhaps an end in itself in his landscape paintings which contain no figures. 
But when he paints figures performing specific acts or activities, Doig narrates to us 
that the figures, through ordinary movements such as playing ping pong or cricket, 
have attained to a unity with the Outside, that they are, whilst necessarily in nature, 
suspended in the Outside. Through a figuration of nature which involves 
hallucination as its mode of aesthetic experience, Doig tells us that these figures live 
A Life. His work gives us neither the haptic eye of Figural painting, nor the scientific 
or slicing eye of the extra-ordinary photograph. It gives us a kind of hallucinatory 
cubist eye which breaks up a view not into multiple facets or surfaces corresponding 
to many perspectives on objects in the view, but into multiple surfaces expressing 
different levels along the view’s vertical line of genesis. Not a cubism which remains 
optical, giving to see nature simultaneously from different perspectives like a myriad 
of optical views, but a cubism which gives to see nature as different levels of 
dispersion or genesis of the Outside like a myriad of hallucinated views in a single 
viewpoint. Through the hallucinatory cubist eye the Outside is nowhere to be seen, 
and yet nature is experienced as suspended in the Outside and as different levels of 
genesis of the Outside. It is through the hallucinatory cubist eye that the ping pong 
player or the cricket players appear to be playing in the transcendental field, not per 
se in nature, although necessarily in nature. 
radical invention of an articulation between an associative unity and a dispersive 
unity 
Although Doig’s figurations of nature do not involve the radical invention of the 
Figure from chaos (Bacon), his procedure requires as much invention or “style”. For 
example Stag, 2002-2005, Red Boat (Imaginary Boys), 2004, Gasthof Zur 
Muldentalsperre, 2000-2002, or Grande Riviere, 2001-2002, can also be analyzed as 
an associative unity doubled by a dispersive unity. In each case the “style” of each 
painting needs to be understood not as modulation of differential relations of colour 
and the emergence of asignifying marks through the diagram, but as the invention of 
an articulation between an associative unity and a dispersive unity of parts that are 
heterogeneous as the flattening of sensation on different non contiguous levels. Each 
painting is the re-invention or re-instantiation of the aesthetic of nature as accident, 
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heterogeneous parts, interstices and Outside, each painting is a new manner by which 
to paint a hallucination. 
Doig paints the possible universe, Doig and Alÿs 
As embodying the paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life, Doig’s work 
narrates a possible universe, the work is the figuration of our nature transversed by 
an absolute movement of the living. Untitled (Ping Pong) and Paragon are nature 
transversed by an absolute movement of the living in that the activity of playing ping 
pong or cricket is narrated as that through which absolute movement is performed, as 
that through which a unity with the Outside is established. Doig’s work depicts our 
nature as world where it is possible to live A Life, and as such resist, even through 
ordinary acts or activities such as canoeing, climbing a tree, swimming, walking, etc. 
The departure from DG’s conceptualization of art is in a sense the same as for Alÿs. 
Similarly to Alÿs’ work, it is as if the viewer is told a story, the story of the 
possibility to live A Life. But Doig’s stories, as opposed to Alÿs’ work, are not of 
relative components of movement which to some extent appear as troubling, 
mysterious and rare (for example “five hundred people moved a mountain”): there is 
nothing mysterious about the relative components of movement narrated by Doig 
(“playing ping pong”, “canoeing”, etc.). What is troubling and mysterious in Doig’s 
stories is that the figures have attained to a unity with the Outside through the 
performance of such ordinary movements. It is as such that Doig’s work is 
experienced as tales of resistance: tales of nature transversed by a health, transversed 
by a breath of air which the figures have attained to through their specific and 
ordinary acts or activities. To resist and to live A Life by playing ping pong appears 
as a tale. Doig’s work tightly relates to Alÿs’: a breath of air through moving a 
mountain, playing children games, playing cricket, canoeing, etc. The departure of 
Doig’s work from DG’s conceptualization of art is in a sense not as pronounced as 
that of Alÿs’ work because although their work follows the same paradigm of 
commitment to A Life, Doig’s work has as its mode of aesthetic experience 
hallucination, which itself involves the establishment of a unity with the Outside. 
The figures’ movements are in Doig’s work experienced through the hallucinatory 
cubist eye, and as such from and through the Outside. 
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Sometimes Doig’s figures look back at us as in Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre or 100 
Years Ago (Carrera), 2001. It is as if these figures invite us and wait for us in the 
possible universe that they stand in. This is ultimately what Alÿs’ and Doig’s work 
do, their figures invite us and wait for us in our very own nature, but as if in a new 
nature where it is possible to live A Life. They give us hope, the hope to resist, to 
act, the hope for a breath of air, the hope for A Life in our own nature. 
 
 
new definition of art: art is a commitment to A Life and as such it is the movement 
from nature to a possible universe. 
Art following DG’s conception can be said to have the following definition: art is the 
expression of A Life in the living. A work which embodies either one of the four 
paradigms of commitment to A Life both is and gives through its aesthetic 
experience a movement from nature to a possible universe. From the expanded 
conceptualization of art stems a new definition of art: art is a commitment to A Life 
and as such it is the movement from nature to a possible universe.  
This definition encompasses the four paradigms of commitment to A Life: A Life in 
the living, the living as point of view on and from A Life, new living emerging from A 
Life and to live A Life. Art commits to A Life by opening our world onto itself and as 
such onto the absolute that A Life is, giving consistency to possible universes that 
themselves are and as such express A Life, the onto-genetic condition of the living or 
the lived, our world absolutely decentred from humans. Art commits to A Life or the 
Outside by giving us views through which our world is experienced as point of view 
on the Outside and point of view from and through the Outside, views through which 
our world is experienced as the hallucination of an alien world, as the possible 
universe that it is. Art commits to A Life by giving us views of our world inside 
which new forms have emerged, our world simultaneously torn open onto the 
Outside and re-patched by its dispersion, possible universes as new possibilities for 
our world. Art commits to A Life by giving us narrations of our world transversed by 
a breath of air from the Outside, narrations of the rare cases when one or many 
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figures perform an absolute movement, the narration of possible universes where it is 
possible, in our world, to live A Life.  
The expanded conceptualization of art correlatively embodies a commitment to A 
Life or the Outside and as such to immanence, and a commitment to the possible, an 
important aesthetic category for DG’s conceptualization of art: the possible against 
man and his world, against the living or the lived, or we shall suffocate. Each 
paradigm of commitment to A Life corresponds to a movement which leads to a 
possible universe which is of a specific type (haptic vision, nature hallucinated, new 
nature or nature transversed by an absolute movement of the living) and which 
remediates the suffocation that man and his world are in its own way. 
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table: paradigms of commitment to A Life, three levels of expansion of DG’s 
conceptualization of art 
The following table charts the properties for each of the four paradigms of 
commitment to A Life. 
 
Table 2. Paradigms of commitment to A Life, three levels of expansion of DG’s 
conceptualization of art 
 
 
Definition of the expanded conceptualization of art:  
art is a commitment to A Life and as such it is the movement from nature to a possible universe 
paradigm of 
commitment to 
A Life 
type of possible 
universe – 
movement from 
nature to … 
mode of aesthetic 
experience 
corresponding 
quality of 
movement 
description of 
experience 
movement, or de- 
and re- 
territorialization 
A Life in the 
living 
haptic vision vision 
from a view of 
nature or the 
living to a vision 
of A Life in the 
living 
haptic 
movement is 
and opens itself 
onto the 
absolute 
vision of nature 
opened onto itself and 
as such onto the 
absolute that A Life is 
absolute 
deterritorialization 
(and 
reterritorialization 
on the absolute) 
the living as 
point of view on 
and from A Life 
nature 
hallucinated 
hallucination 
from a view of 
nature to nature 
experienced as a 
hallucination 
hallucinatory 
movement is 
simultaneously 
absolute and 
relative 
nature experienced as 
point of view on and 
from and through the 
Outside or A Life, 
nature as possible 
universe, nature as the 
hallucination of an 
alien world 
best described in 
terms of movement 
as the reciprocal 
presupposition 
between absolute 
movement and 
relative movement 
new living 
emerging from 
A Life 
new nature view 
from a view of 
nature to the view 
of a new nature 
renewing 
movement is 
the incessantly 
renewed 
creation and 
emergence of 
the universe 
view of our nature 
metamorphosed, 
nature simultaneously 
torn open onto the 
Outside (or A Life) 
and “re-patched” by 
its dispersions  
relative de- and re- 
territorialization 
to live A Life nature transversed 
by an absolute 
movement of the 
living 
narration 
from nature to the 
narration of nature 
transversed by an 
absolute 
movement of the 
living 
not applicable 
 
this paradigm is 
not concerned 
with the nature 
of movement 
but with the 
performance of 
movement 
narration of our nature 
as world where it is 
possible to live A Life, 
where it is possible to 
perform an absolute 
movement of the 
living, to act and as 
such resist 
figure (subject of 
narration): an 
absolute movement 
of the living, an 
absolute 
deterritorialization 
viewer: relative de- 
and re- 
territorialization 
(in Doig’s case: the 
movement 
corresponding to 
the mode of 
aesthetic experience 
hallucination) 
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Conclusion 
 
DG’s conceptualization of art is the expression of A Life in the living. It is, 
essentially, at its core, a radical commitment to A Life. The problem this text 
engages with is the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art, an approach which 
hoped to develop a new conceptualization of art which remains close to the essence 
of DG’s conceptualization: the commitment to A Life. This involves a new 
conceptualization of art which describes a commitment to simultaneously movement 
(A Life is movement), immanence (A Life is pure immanence) and the possible (A 
Life leads to the possible). The strategy to achieve this expansion is the proposition 
that the expression of A Life in the living is only one possible way by which a work 
can embody a commitment to A Life, that it is only one possible paradigm of 
commitment to A Life amongst others. This text conceptualizes three new paradigms 
of commitment to A Life, forming an expanded conceptualization of art 
encompassing four paradigms (including the one defined by DG). The expanded 
conceptualization gives rise to a new definition of art: art is a commitment to A Life 
and as such it is the movement from nature to a possible universe. 
A commitment to A Life is not a disengagement with nature or the living, this would 
be a paradox, a contradiction, since they mutually presuppose each other. On the 
contrary, a commitment to A Life, following the four paradigms, has the fourfold 
purpose: to give visions of nature opened onto itself and as such onto the infinite that 
it is; to reveal our ordinary views of nature as points of view on and from the infinite 
inside which we live and which lives inside us; to launch nature towards the infinite 
so that it (re-)emerges anew, metamorphosed as a new nature; and to narrate the 
stories of figures who live in nature as in the infinite, to narrate the performance of 
acts or activities through which the infinite is attained and lived. A commitment to A 
Life is always to give back to nature its infinity, and to restore its infinite 
potentialities. A commitment to A Life is in a sense against the living or the lived, 
against man and his world, but for man and his world through (re-)discovering their 
absoluteness, through the embrace of the Life that they are. 
There are four paradigms of commitment to A Life: A Life in the living, the living as 
point of view on and from A Life, new living emerging from A Life and to live A Life. 
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The first one corresponds to DG’s conceptualization of art, and the last three are 
conceptualized in this text. Each of the first three paradigms corresponds to the 
emphasis on one of the three qualities of movement, as if investigating the nature of 
movement, i.e. the nature of the relationship between its relative and absolute 
components, the nature of the relationship between the living and A Life. The fourth 
paradigm corresponds to another concern: the performance of movement, the 
performance of an act or activity as that through which A Life is lived. These four 
paradigms are inspired from and conceptualized through the analysis of works by 
five artists: Francis Bacon, Thomas Struth, Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter 
Doig. The four paradigms are linked together by a specific logic concerning the 
nature and the performance of movement, a logic by which the expansion of DG’s 
conceptualization of art (the creation of new paradigms) is not simply arbitrary. This 
logic is not a predetermined logic illustrated by the works discussed in this text, on 
the contrary, it is the intuition that works by these five artists engage with A Life 
through different forms of commitment that led to the emergence of this logic. Other 
works by other artists could potentially inspire the conceptualization of other 
paradigms of commitment to A Life following this same logic, or lead to the 
emergence of a new logic by which DG’s conceptualization of art could be expanded 
differently than it is in text. The difficulty resides in conceptualizing new paradigms 
that actually describe ways to commit to A Life without falling into illusions of 
commitment to A Life. 
In addition to the four paradigms of commitment to A Life, this text conceptualizes 
three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life termed human-actual, 
imaginary-transcendent and chaotic-noise. The total of seven paradigms define the 
boundaries of a conceptualization of art centered on the aim to embody, and push the 
boundaries of what it means to embody, a commitment to A Life without falling into 
illusions: A Life versus illusion of A Life, vision or hallucination versus imagination 
or fantasy, becoming versus projection or death, breath of air versus suffocation, 
transcendental outside versus transcendent or terrestrial outside, action or absolute 
movement of the living versus reaction, the light versus the heavy, etc. 
A commitment to A Life always involves in different ways the decentralization of 
humans into the infinite transcendental plane of immanence inside which they live 
and which lives inside them. A commitment to A Life against man and his world, for 
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man and his world: ‘a decentring of man to better plunge it back in its living 
environment and as such find again the lost unity’ (Dosse, 2007, 205). 
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